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I. Main recommendations 
The Group of Personal Representatives of the Heads 
of State or Government invites the European Council 
to endorse the recommendations contained in the 
Group's report. These can be summarized as follows: 
The European Council is asked to: 
(a) endorse the priority nature of the projects in 
Annex 1, Part I, and Annex 2, List A and invite: 
(i) the Council and the European Parliament, 
in setting up the guidelines identifying the 
projects of common interest, to include these 
priority projects; 
(ii) the Member States and the Community to give 
all appropriate support to these projects and 
to implement them as soon as possible; 
(b) urge the European Parliament and the Council to 
adopt as soon as possible the guidelines and the 
accompanying financial Regulation; 
(c) take note of the potential relevance of a network 
approach in selected sectors of environmental pro-
tection, and invite the Commission, the Council 
and Member States to examine the possibility of 
establishing guidelines for environmental network 
infrastructure and the obstacles to environmental 
infrastructure, stressing the use of existing finan-
cial instruments in support of possible future 
guidelines and priority projects; 
(d) acknowledge that obstacles of an administrative, 
legal and regulatory nature are a major brake on 
the implementation of priority projects, and invite 
Member States and the Commission to take all 
appropriate initiatives needed to eliminate such 
obstacles; 
(e) confirm the objective of strengthening cooperation 
with neighbouring countries to connect the trans-
European networks with networks outside the 
Union, in particular in Central and Eastern Europe 
and the Mediterranean area; 
(f) confirm the objective of facilitating public/private 
partnerships, and invite Member States, the Com-
mission, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and 
the European Investment Fund (EIF) to take 
appropriate measures to this effect; 
(g) confirm that measures will be taken — if it should 
prove necessary — in order that priority projects 
do not run into financial or other obstacles which 
would jeopardize their implementation; 
(h) acknowledge that the particular approach of the 
Christophersen Group, consisting in identifying 
and accelerating selected priority projects, gives 
added value to the implementation of trans-
European networks, and that this effort should 
be continued in the future, and consequently to 
endorse the follow-up procedure recommended by 
the Group, namely that: 
(i) The European Council should provide, on a 
continuing basis, the necessary impetus to the 
implementation of priority projects by means 
of an annual report to be submitted by the 
Commission to the European Council in 
accordance with the White Paper action plan 
adopted by the European Council in December 
1993. 
(ii) If the achievement of individual priority pro-
jects is threatened, the Commission should 
report to the Council, which shall immediately 
consider appropriate responses together with, 
as appropriate, the Commission and the EIB. 
(iii) Member States and the Union should be asked 
to consider the creation of suitable vehicles 
('project authorities'), open to public and 
private operators as appropriate, to ensure the 
promotion of priority projects; the Com-
mission, the EIB and the EIF should support 
actively the coordination between parties 
potentially interested in priority projects, inter 
alia by project seminars arranged by the 
Commission; the Commission will examine 
how the abovementioned vehicles can be facili-
tated through Community legislation. 
(¡v) The Commission and the EIB should, in con-
sultation with Member States, monitor pro-
gress in the financing of individual priority 
projects, and if financial obstacles of a general 
nature and common to several priority pro-
jects occur, they will consider appropriate 
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2. Introduction 
The emergence of new political entities has led historically 
to corresponding adaptations of the infrastructures of trade 
and communication, which in turn helped consolidate the 
new entities. One may think of the network of viae 
Romanae leading to Rome, of the way road and rail 
networks consolidated the European nation-States in the 
19th and 20th centuries, or of the role of the railways in 
the development and cohesion of the United States in 
the last century. The ever-increasing unity among the 
countries of western Europe since the Second World 
War has led in recent years to demands for efficient 
trans-European networks. 
These demands correspond to very real economic and 
social needs. The justification of trans-European networks 
was spelt out in the Commission's White Paper on growth, 
competitiveness and employment: 
(i) higher economic growth; 
(ii) better functioning of the internal market; 
(iii) improved competitiveness; 
(iv) more economic and social cohesion; 
(v) improved quality of life; 
(vi) reduced pollution; 
(vii) easier integration into the Union of new members; 
(viii) better links between the Union and its neighbours. 
The call for efficient trans-European networks (TENs) 
comes from the citizens, as individuals and as economic 
agents. They wish to live and work in a sustainable 
economic environment which allows them to trade, com-
municate and travel throughout the Union, and into its 
neighbouring countries, as easily, as quickly and as 
cheaply as possible. 
It is with the hope of contributing to this that the Group 
of Personal Representatives of the Heads of State or 
Government submits to the European Council this report. 
The Christophersen Group exercise constitutes an excep-
tional political effort, aimed at accelerating the develop-
ment of trans-European networks. The objective has been 
to give added value to the development of networks, while 
respecting the competences of the Union institutions and 
Member States provided for in the Treaty, and without 
duplicating work already in progress elsewhere. The 
specific approach has been to identify and accelerate 
priority projects of common interest for the implemen-
tation of trans-European networks where the Group con-
sidered its contribution to be of specific value. 
The Group believes that it has succeeded in providing for 
synergy effects and momentum in the development of 
TENs. For some priority projects, acceleration is already 
evident. In view of the long planning and implementation 
time inherent in large infrastructure projects, the Group 
expects that for the other projects the benefits of this 
momentum will become evident in the near future. 
The Christophersen Group can report that identification 
and initiation of further work has been undertaken in 
areas where this appears necessary. The development of 
trans-European networks is a continuous process, and the 
Group considers it essential that a follow-up procedure be 
established, for which it proposes specific measures. 
(a) The mandates and objectives 
Following the decision of the European Council in 
December 1993, a group of personal representatives of 
the Heads of State or Government was established to assist 
in implementing efficiently, consistently and speedily the 
trans-European networks in transport and energy. The 
European Council in Corfu also asked the Group to 
examine the question of relevant networks in environment, 
as well as the financing of TENs in general. The EIB 
participated in the Group's work. The chairman of the 
Group, Vice-President of the Commission Mr Henning 
Christophersen, submitted an interim report to the Corfu 
European Council. The present report is the Group's final 
report with recommendations to the European Council. 
The Group's report is accompanied by a set of technical 
annexes which do not commit the Group. These provide 
background information, including, as indicated, results 
of work complementary to the Group's own work, notably 
in the project seminars and in the Commission. 
The Group set itself the following detailed objectives: 
(i) to identify projects of priority importance and 
obstacles to their speedy implementation; 
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(ii) to eliminate obstacles on a project-by-project basis; 
(iii) to address horizontal obstacles to the implementation 
of TENs in general, notably in the regulatory frame-
work. 
(b) Priority projects 
On the basis of agreed selection criteria, the Group 
proceeded to identify projects of priority importance in 
the TENs, where added-value effects were likely. The 
selection criteria applied are not identical for the sectors 
considered: transport and energy. However, the following 
selection criteria are common to the two sectors: 
(i) common interest for the trans-European networks, 
such as cross-border sections; 
(ii) large scale, bearing in mind the type of project and 
the relative size of the Member States directly 
concerned; 
(iii) economic viability and scope for private involve-
ment; 
(iv) contribution to Union objectives such as economic 
and social cohesion; 
(v) respect of other Union policies, notably on environ-
mental protection; 
(vi) maturity. 
On the basis of the selection criteria, the Group adopted 
by consensus a set of transport and energy projects 
considered to be of priority importance for the trans-
European networks, and for which the Group believed 
that the designation of priority status would facilitate their 
implementation. 
(c) The lists and their status 
The labelling and listing of projects should only take place 
when this benefits the projects and networks. Projects 
which can go ahead without any particular effort and 
projects which are unrealistic (white elephants) have been 
avoided. 
The exact implication of the priority status for projects 
depends on what the project needs. In increasing order of 
effort, the labelling can entail: 
(i) a message of political priority and commitment from 
the Union as well as the Member States involved, 
leading to focused attention by the actors at Union 
level as well as in Member States and the private 
sector; 
(ii) organizational measures such as inter alia project 
seminars to facilitate the project development; 
(iii) a focused effort to eliminate the obstacles encoun-
tered, including the use of Union measures and 
initiative. In so far as this might consist of financial 
support, this would respect the guidelines and criteria 
outlined in Section 7. 
The Group considers that the lists should be reviewed 
regularly. In particular, the lists of very mature priority 
projects should be reviewed annually by the European 
Council in the context of the White Paper action plan 
follow-up procedure, thus allowing for the exit of projects 
that are either well under way or indefinitely postponed, 
and for the entry of new projects as they reach the 
necessary state of maturity. In this sense, the lists should 
not be considered as closed. 
(d) Lists and guidelines 
The selected priority projects in the areas of transport and 
energy are all projects included in the Commission's 
proposals for guidelines currently under discussion. The 
Group considers that the labelling of a limited number of 
projects as being of priority importance constitutes a 
political impetus for the benefit of key projects in the 
trans-European networks, thus supporting the much wider 
work on the guidelines for trans-European networks 
according to the Treaty provisions. 
It should be noted that with the selection criteria applied 
in the Christophersen Group, notably the requirement of 
maturity and scope for added value, the set of identified 
mature priority projects cannot be expected to reflect 
the overall objectives and balances embodied in the 
guidelines. 
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The lists represent the set of important projects which 
could be initiated in the immediate future if a focused 
effort is made. The drawing-up of such a 'rolling plan', 
with a horizon of two to three years, helps all interested 
parties at the Union level, in Member States and in the 
private sector to focus attention and efforts, and to 
coordinate the timing of project realization, thus providing 
for synergy effects. 
In order to facilitate this process, the Christophersen 
Group's own work has been complemented with work 
focusing on the individual priority projects in the 
so-called 'project seminars' or 'round tables', convened 
by the Commission and gathering the appropriate 
interested parties, including the private sector. The 
objective is to accelerate project planning and implemen-
tation by identifying and eliminating obstacles. 
(e) Obstacles to project implementation 
Each project has its own characteristics. However, on 
the basis of experience so far, it is clear that the 
difficulties facing the priority projects can be traced 
back to one or a combination of the following features 
of the projects: 
transfrontier nature; 
large scale; 
moderate financial viability and high risk. 
The obstacles facing priority projects can be classified 
into three types: 
(i) political obstacles, such as difficulties in reaching 
clear political agreement and commitment from all 
authorities involved on the timing, technical fea-
tures, construction and operation of networks and 
projects; 
(ii) regulatory framework obstacles, related to adminis-
trative, regulatory and legal procedures that provide 
the operating environment for project planning, 
construction and operation; 
(iii) financial obstacles, related to drawing together the 
financial plan for the entire project in all its 
phases, and the timing and conditions of financing 
commitments. 
Every project is faced with hurdles in these areas, 
without this necessarily amounting to obstacles of a 
blocking nature. The Group considers that there is scope 
for reducing the degree of difficulty that each project 
has to overcome and provides recommendations to this 
effect. 
The Group notes that, concerning the financing situation 
for the mature transport priority projects, several projects 
do not have financing problems. Other projects appear 
to be facing financing problems, but it is still too early 
to conclude whether these are of a blocking nature. The 
rest of the projects are not advanced enough in their 
preparation to conclude whether financial problems 
exist. However, the Group cannot exclude that this may 
become the case in the future, and it therefore 
recommends that this issue remains under review. 
Action to eliminate obstacles depends on the nature of 
the obstacles and on the competence of the actors 
involved. 
The Treaty provides the Union with competences in the 
area of trans-European networks which corresponds to 
the transfrontier characteristics of networks. In exam-
ining the obstacles to the realization of the networks, 
the Group has identified difficulties arising from the 
transfrontier element to be of major importance. In 
accordance with the subsidiarity principle, such problems 
should be addressed at the level where they can be 
effectively solved, which has led the Group to consider 
possible measures and initiatives at the Union level. 
Although the project-by-project approach has been the 
guiding principle, it is only logical and rational that 
consideration is given to whether measures that could 
benefit specific projects could also more generally 
benefit other projects. This has led the Group to consider 
possibilities for 'horizontal' measures that could be 
taken both at Member State level and at Union level. 
This is especially the case for regulatory obstacles 
(streamlining of national approval procedures, technical 
interoperability, etc.), but also in providing for increased 
flexibility in the form of public financial support 
extended to TEN projects for the purpose of facilitating 
private involvement. The Group considers that further 
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work is necessary, and it invites the Union as well as 
Member States to continue examining such possibilities. 
In accordance with the public/private partnership objec-
tive, the Group has made efforts to associate the private 
sector as much as possible with the Group's reflection 
process, and to assist in identifying measures to facilitate 
private financing of TEN projects. 
3. Transport networks 
The proposal on the guidelines for the development of 
a trans-European transport network, as tabled in April 
1994 by the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament for co-decision, initiates an 
ambitious plan to integrate the present mode-oriented 
national transport networks into a single trans-European 
transport network by the year 2010. For this purpose, 
the proposed guidelines identify projects in the order of 
ECU 400 000 million, of which about ECU 230 000 
million is foreseen to be invested up to the year 2000. 
While the Council and the European Parliament are 
actively examining the guidelines with a view to their 
adoption in the coming months, the Christophersen 
Group presented to the Corfu European Council a 
preliminary set of 34 infrastructure and five traffic 
management projects as being of a priority nature. These 
constitute about a quarter of the total investments 
required for the trans-European transport networks up to 
the year 2010. The European Council in Corfu endorsed 
the priority nature of 11 mature projects, addressing 
mainly the high-speed rail network in Europe and the 
missing road links in the peripheral countries. 
considerable variations in the Member States' regulatory 
framework and traditional approaches to infrastructure 
development. Consequently, the Group considers that 
the approach of identification of priority projects and 
efforts to accelerate them will prove particularly helpful 
in the transport sector. 
The detailed analysis of the priority projects provides 
some general lessons to be learned on the obstacles 
facing projects. Although the projects show different 
degrees of maturity, most are hindered by one or a 
combination of the following factors (in addition to the 
usual uncertainties about construction costs and traffic 
potential): 
(i) too narrow a scope for the projects, leading to less 
than optimal profitability; 
(ii) different priority settings by the Member States 
concerned; 
(iii) problems regarding administrative and technical 
procedures; 
(iv) difficulties of designing the appropriate legal 
concept and finding the appropriate legal vehicle at 
the European level; 
(v) long traditions of public financing of transport 
infrastructure, combined with reluctance in tackling 
public/private partnership schemes, and insufficient 
availability or dynamic use of public funds. 
The non-financial obstacles have generally been found 
to be of fundamental importance by causing delays in 
planning and execution of projects. For some projects, 
solutions on these issues are a prerequisite for an 
optimal financing scheme. 
The work of the Group has been an important interim 
measure on the way to achieving the goals of the 
proposed guidelines. More than 40 project seminars and 
round tables have been held to accelerate the projects 
and help in setting up the financing plans of projects. 
Transport is the sector where most difficulties arise in 
achieving the objectives. This is due to the scale of 
investments, the often modest financial profitability of 
projects, although for most of them the economic 
profitability can be significantly higher, and the very 
About half of the envisaged total investments of 
approximately ECU 91 000 million in the priority 
projects should take place by 1999. As regards the 
financing situation, the Group notes that, for a few of 
the priority projects, the financing has been settled. For 
the rest, in particular in the rail sector, the financing 
schemes have not been settled, and the Group considers 
that efforts should be deployed to engineer more 
imaginative and efficient financing schemes, notably in 
terms of combining public, including Union, and private 
resources. 
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As regards the priority projects which will be subject to 
endorsement by the Essen European Council, the 
financing profiles can be divided into five categories: 
budget line — will be substantial and, in all probability, 
may exceed the amount which will be made available. 
Mature public/private 
partnerships: 
Mature projects which are 
financed on the basis of 
user charges with 
government guarantees: 
Conventionally financed 
railway projects: 
PBKAL-NL, Betuwe, 
PBKAL-UK, 
Malpensa, 
IRL-UK-Benelux road 
corridor 
Øresund 
PBKAL-B, high-speed 
train East, German 
high-speed train (Berlin-
Nuremberg and links with 
the high-speed train East), 
high-speed train South 
(B arcelona-French 
border), Brenner (access 
routes) 
Greek motorways 
(PATHE, Via Egnatia), 
motorway Lisbon-
Valladolid, conventional 
rail Belfast-Cork 
Brenner (base tunnel), 
high-speed train/combined 
transport 
France-Italy, high-speed 
train South 
(Madrid-Barcelona, 
Spanish/French 
border-Montpellier, 
Madrid-Vitoria-Dax), 
PBKAL-D (Cologne-
Rhine/Main), Nordic 
triangle, west coast main 
line 
All these projects are eligible for part-funding under the 
TEN budget line as appropriate. There are already early 
indications that possible claims from a limited number 
of projects for Union support — notably from the TEN 
Projects with substantial 
EU grants for cohesion 
motives: 
Projects with open 
financial plans: 
The state of maturity of the projects can be summarized 
as follows: 
(i) Malpensa, Øresund and Cork-Belfast CR appear 
ready for full implementation. 
(ii) The Greek and Lisbon-Valladolid motorways 
require some further design work, but the financial 
problems appear soluble once this is complete. 
(iii) For other projects, the seminars confirmed the 
interest of public/private partnerships: Betuwe line, 
PBKAL-UK, PBKAL-NL, Brenner base tunnel, 
HST/CT France-Italy, Nordic triangle, west coast 
main line and IRL-UK-Benelux road corridor. 
This was not the case for certain HST projects: 
PBKAL-B, PBKAL-D, HST East, German HST, 
Brenner-IT. However, as regards finalizing the 
financial set-up, further decisions will be made in 
the near future. 
(iv) Major progress has been obtained recently on the 
Brenner link, with the imminent signing of a 
memorandum of understanding on the construction 
of the base tunnel (although its financing is still 
unclear). 
(v) A new approach is being adopted for the further 
development of the PBKAL system as a whole: it 
was agreed in principle to set up a working group 
bringing together all the countries concerned, 
including Luxembourg, and aiming at accelerating 
the realization of the project. 
The Group discussed and assessed proposals for priority 
projects, including projects proposed by the acceding 
countries and projects concerning the connections to 
third countries. The Group considers that, in all, 14 
transport projects are of priority and very high maturity, 
and it proposes amending the list endorsed by the 
European Council in Corfu accordingly. 
In addition to the priority projects concerning physical 
infrastructure, the Group stresses the important role 
of traffic management systems, as networks without 
management will fail to serve their purpose. In addition, 
the mutual beneficial influence of the information 
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society and other economic sectors such as transport can 
help to consolidate the strategic position of European 
industry and transport telematics in particular. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the realization of a 
European air traffic management system to ensure 
parallelism between liberalization measures and improve-
ments in safety and efficiency. The Group recommends 
that the European Council initiate work on the basis of 
a proposal from the Commission taking into account the 
global aspects of air traffic management and the ongoing 
work in the framework of the European Civil Aviation 
Conference. 
The Group recognizes the specific importance of 
those physical infrastructure projects which incorporate 
telematics architecture via pilot projects and invites the 
Commission to proceed with an action plan. 
The European Council is invited, subject to the 
Treaty provisions concerning the guidelines, to: 
(a) invite the Council and the European Parliament 
to decide as soon as possible on the proposal 
on the guidelines for the development of the 
trans-European transport network
1 using the 
provisions of the Treaty, laid down in Articles 
129d and 189b, in the most efficient way; 
(b) endorse the priority nature of the projects in 
Annex 1, Part I, and invite: 
(i) the Council and the European Parliament, in 
setting up the guidelines identifying the 
projects of common interest to include these 
priority projects; 
(ii) the Member States and the Community to 
give all appropriate support to these projects 
and to implement them as soon as possible; 
(c) take notice of the projects in Annex 1, Part II, 
which the Group considers to be important but 
not yet mature; 
(d) acknowledge the importance of traffic-
management systems in general and the pilot 
actions in Annex 1, Part III, and in particular the 
fundamental trans-European nature and safety 
importance of air-traffic control systems, and 
COM(94) 106. OJ C 220. 8.8.1994. 
invite the Council to examine this question as a 
priority matter on the basis of a proposal from 
the Commission while taking into account work 
already under way in the European Civil Aviation 
Conference and the International Civil Aviation 
Organization. 
4. Energy networks 
The Group considers the development of the physical 
trans-European energy networks to be an important 
contribution to the creation of the internal energy market 
— which is currently under discussion in the Council 
and the European Parliament and the main feature of 
which will be enhanced competition resulting from an 
increase in the number of players — and to the 
reinforcement of the economic and social cohesion. 
Further, the Group noted that the obstacles to the 
development of energy networks were generally less 
important than in the transport sector. To the extent that 
obstacles occur, they relate more often to the regulatory 
framework and less frequently to financing. 
The Group nevertheless considers that its approach to 
the implementation of the transport projects is also 
useful in accelerating the development of energy 
networks, and that the Group's recommendations for a 
future follow-up procedure (Section 9 below) should 
apply equally to energy networks, taking into account 
the specificity of the energy network projects. 
The Group considers that the financing of the priority 
projects does not require the use of new mechanisms, 
and that the existing instruments (Structural Funds and 
EIB) are adequate for the purpose. 
The European Council is invited, subject to the 
Treaty provisions concerning the guidelines, and 
taking into account the specificity of energy network 
projects, including economic and financial viability, 
to: 
(a) take note of progress achieved on the priority 
projects identified at the Corfu meeting; 
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(b) endorse the priority status of the projects in List 
A in Annex 2, and invite: 
(i) the Council and the European Parliament, in 
setting up the guidelines identifying the 
projects of common interest, to include these 
priority projects; 
(ii) the Member States to give all appropriate 
support to these projects and to ask the 
involved enterprises to implement them as 
soon as possible; 
(c) take note of the projects in List Β in Annex 2 
which the Group considers to be of priority 
status, although they require no special Com­
munity action at this stage; 
(d) invite the Council and the European Parliament 
to finalize as soon as possible the examination of 
the proposals on guidelines for energy networks; ' 
(e) invite the Member States, the Commission and 
the EIB to make use, where appropriate, of 
the Structural Funds and Community loans, 
respectively, to contribute to the financing of 
those energy priority projects for which finance 
has not yet been agreed, while avoiding any 
distortion of competition; 
(f) reiterate the importance of the rapid creation of 
an Internal Energy Market in the light of its 
synergy effect with the physical energy networks. 
5. Environment networks 
Pollution does not stop at borders. The physical environ­
ment (nature, air, water and land) needs a global approach 
which often cannot be confined to a regional, national or 
even Union context. 
At its meeting in Corfu, the European Council explicitly 
asked the Christophersen Group to examine the question 
of relevant networks in the field of environment. 
Environment is not covered by Title XII of the Treaty on 
trans-European networks, and the Union approach to 
COM(93) 685. 
environmental protection does not operate with guidelines 
as in the transport and energy fields. The lack of guidelines 
for the long-term development of environment infrastruc­
ture in the Union complicates the task of identifying 
priority projects. 
The Group acknowledged the potential relevance of 
a network approach in certain environmental sectors 
(water/waste). Setting up guidelines similar to those of 
TENs would enable a more coordinated planning with a 
better priority setting between projects, thereby reducing 
the risk of failures and delays, as well as the overall costs, 
by achieving sufficient economies of scale. Accelerating 
the implementation of a sound water and waste infrastruc­
ture will help to improve the productive infrastructure and 
thus strengthen the economic position of the Union. 
The European Council is invited to: 
(a) take note of the potential relevance of a network 
approach in selected sectors of environmental pro­
tection, notably water and waste management, 
including waste disposal from contaminated sites, 
and of the work initiated by the Commission 
and the Member States to improve coordination 
between Member States and with third countries, 
and possibly to establish guidelines for the develop­
ment of a network infrastructure in these sectors; 
(b) take note of the possible usefulness of identifying 
priority projects and to invite the Commission and 
the Environmental Council to examine the matter; 
(c) request the Commission and the Council, in coop­
eration with the Member States, the EIB, the 
EIF and the European Environmental Agency, 
to examine possible financial and administrative 
obstacles to the development of environmental 
infrastructures, and, within the framework of 
existing Community financial instruments, ways of 
facilitating the financing of environmental infra­
structures, notably by a greater involvement of 
private investors; 
(d) stress that the Community and the Member States 
in the use of existing financial instruments and 
incentives should take account of possible future 
guidelines and priority projects in the environmen­
tal area. 
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6. Connecting the networks to third countries 
The Group fully recognizes the importance of cooperating 
with neighbouring countries to connect the trans-European 
networks with networks outside the Union, in particular 
to Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean 
basin, including Malta, Cyprus and Turkey. In this respect, 
infrastructure for road, rail, inland waterways, ports and 
airports should be considered appropriately. 
The Group believes that certain elements of the 
Christophersen Group approach also apply to connecting 
networks with neighbouring countries, although the 
context is different with respect to decision procedures 
as well as scope for action. In addition to the guidelines 
which cover only Union territory, consideration has to 
be taken of the priorities of neighbouring countries. The 
Group recommends that a strengthening of procedures 
for coordination and consultation with neighbouring 
countries in these matters should be continued. It 
welcomes the cooperation on project development 
between the Community instruments (notably the EIB 
and the PHARE (Poland and Hungary: aid for economic 
restructuring) programme) and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the 
Nordic Investment Bank, etc. 
The Group took note of the results of the Crete conference 
of March 1994 on transport, and takes note of the ongoing 
studies for the interconnection, on the one hand, of the 
electricity networks of the Central European countries, of 
the Balkan countries and of the Mediterranean basin, and, 
on the other hand, of the natural gas networks of the 
Central and East European countries. 
In the transport area, the Group has identified the follow-
ing projects: 
(i) with a view to an expected start-up before the end of 
1996: 
Berlin-Warsaw-Minsk-Moscow (rail and road). 
(ii) in a second phase (up to the year 2000): 
Dresden-Prague (road and rail); 
Nuremberg-Prague (road); 
Fixed link across the Danube (road and rail) between 
Bulgaria and Romania; 
Helsinki-St. Petersburg-Moscow (road and rail); 
Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest-Lvov-Kiev (road and 
rail); 
Baltic Sea telematic platform. 
The Group also recognized the importance of connecting 
Union networks to Switzerland, which undertook in the 
Transit Agreement' to construct a number of railway 
infrastructures connected to the Union network. 
In the energy area, the Group has identified the following 
projects: 
Algeria-Morocco-EU (natural-gas pipeline); 
Russia-Belams-Poland-EU (natural-gas pipeline); 
Baltic ring: electricity network interconnections between 
Germany, Poland, the Baltic States and Finland. 
In the light of the decisions taken by the European 
Councils in Copenhagen and Corfu, extending the TENs 
in particular to the associated Central and East European 
countries represents a key element in reinforcing the 
structural and economic links to the European Union. 
In the Mediterranean basin, information regarding traffic 
flows and the state of the physical infrastructure in 
ports should be gathered with a view to assessing the 
possibilities for developing specific port projects. The 
Group welcomes the intention of the Commission to 
continue and intensify work on drawing up a comprehen-
sive plan with the objective of coordinating the develop-
ment of transport infrastructure in the Mediterranean 
basin, including the allocation of human and financial 
resources, taking into account the particular geographical 
features of the region, with special regard to the need to 
exploit fully maritime transport integrated with other 
modes of transport. The Commission will report on the 
progress of work to the European Council at the end of 
1995. 
The Group takes note of the intention of the Commission, 
together with EIB, the EIF and the EBRD, to explore new 
guarantee mechanisms including guarantees for non-
1 Agreement between the EC and the Swiss Confederation on 
the carriage of goods by road and rail, OJ L 373 of 
21 December 1992. 
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commercial risks, such as risks of governmental perform-
ance related to investments in networks. The Group also 
notes that the Commission will examine, with Eurofirma 
and the appropriate financial institutions, the possible 
development of a specific mechanism to support railway 
financing in the Central and East European countries. 
The European Council is invited to: 
(a) confirm the importance of cooperating with neigh-
bouring countries to connect the trans-European 
networks with networks outside the Union, in 
particular in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean area; 
(b) welcome the considerable progress made in this 
field recently, and in particular take note of the 
transport and energy projects involving neigh-
bouring countries identified by the Group in 
Annexes 1 and 2; 
(c) invite the Commission and the Member States to 
intensify cooperation with neighbouring countries 
to identify priority corridors and projects, and to 
examine ways of facilitating their implementation. 
7. Financing and public/private partnerships 
The European Council in Corfu gave the Group a mandate 
to study the financing aspects of TENs, alongside the 
mandate given in Brussels for the Ecofin Council, together 
with the Commission and the EIB. 
The Group notes the cost estimates given in the Com-
mission's White Paper for investment in infrastructure in 
transport, energy, telecommunications and environment. 
Although cost estimates for large infrastructure projects 
are inherently uncertain, the Group notes the following 
estimates of the Commission, based on information pro-
vided by the Member States the 11 most mature transport 
projects as adopted by the Corfu Council represent an 
estimated total cost of ECU 76 000 million; the extended 
list of 14 projects (see Annex 1, Part I) currently proposed 
by the Group to the Essen European Council represents 
an aggregate amount of ECU 91 000 million; as for the 
other projects selected by the Group, the total amount, 
taking into account the changes made in preparation for 
the Essen European Council, is estimated to be ECU 
45 000 million for a further 19 projects (see Annex 1, 
Parts II and III); the 10 energy projects in Annex 2, List A 
represent an estimated total cost of ECU 5 000 million. 
The Group further recalls the objective, confirmed both in 
the Brussels and in the Corfu conclusions, of facilitating 
private involvement in the development of TENs and 
suggesting ways of using public resources to enhance 
private involvement. 
The Group welcomes that the Christophersen Group 
exercise has led the EIB to undertake to introduce a 
special window for the financing of infrastructure of 
Community interest, and in particular the list of priority 
projects, the purpose of which is to increase the momen-
tum of EIB lending which was achieved under the 
Edinburgh facility. The financing involved will probably 
amount to a third of the Bank's lending in the European 
Union. The window will cover transport, telecommuni-
cations and energy investment in the public sector, the 
private sector, and partnerships between the two, as well 
as environmental lending for projects of a trans-European 
nature. The window will be available for lending not only 
within the Union but also in Central and Eastern Europe 
as well as Scandinavia, the Mediterranean area and the 
transalpine crossings. The main features of this window 
are — in appropriate circumstances, where there is a 
sound financial case: 
(i) provision of longer maturities and longer capital 
grace periods so as better to match the debt repayment 
required to the cash-flow characteristics of the pro-
jects; 
(ii) provision of refinancing facilities to the banks at the 
outset of a project so that they can be assured that 
their loans can be refinanced in accordance with their 
normal maturities; 
(iii) provision of financing of interest during construction, 
fixing of loan rates in advance of drawdown and 
establishment of framework credit line agreements in 
which the Bank undertakes at an early stage to 
provide a substantial part of the finance required, 
provided that the project promotor meets certain 
commitments; 
(iv) involvement of the EIB in the earliest possible stages 
of the financial and contractual structuring of a 
project in cooperation with the Member States and 
the Commission so that the Bank's involvement and 
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that of the EIF can facilitate the identification of 
suitable financial arrangements; 
(v) an extension of the Bank's normal eligibility rules to 
provide for the systematic inclusion of transport, 
energy and telecommunications network infrastruc-
ture irrespective of whether it is located inside or 
outside the assisted areas. 
Concerning the Community financing of TENs, the Group 
notes that: 
(i) the designation as a priority project does not auto-
matically imply eligibility for Community finance, 
and that the lack of priority status does not preclude 
projects from financing; the priority status should be 
considered jointly with the rules governing existing 
Community financing sources; 
(ii) the Commission and the EIB have undertaken to 
continue the monitoring of individual priority pro-
jects and to give further thought to more general 
actions and measures which could improve and 
facilitate their financing. 
The newly created EIF could, in due course, play a 
significant role in supporting and promoting public/private 
partnerships for TEN projects. In the initial stages of a 
project's life, the Fund could assist in the setting-up 
and design of appropriate financial and organizational 
structures, while at a subsequent stage it will help to reduce 
project risks through its direct financial involvement 
(extension of loan guarantees; participation in the equity 
capital). The Fund's capital structure, in which the Com-
munity, the EIB and financial institutions are all rep-
resented, constitutes a partnership in itself, already bring-
ing together several of the parties concerned. 
The European Council is invited to: 
(a) confirm the objective of facilitating public/private 
partnerships and optimizing private financial 
involvement in the priority projects and invite 
Member States, the Commission, the EIB and the 
EIF to take appropriate measures to this effect; 
(b) welcome the progress made in coordinating and 
adjusting existing Community instruments to 
facilitate the financing of TENs, and to attract 
private involvement; 
(c) confirm that the Council should be informed if the 
achievement of certain projects is threatened for 
financial reasons linked to insufficient profitability 
— for example, because of the length of invest-
ments or environmental constraints — and that 
the Council, together with the Commission and 
the EIB, will immediately consider appropriate 
responses, within the limits set by the financial 
perspectives; 
(d) confirm that measures will be taken — if proven 
necessary — in order that priority projects do not 
run into financial obstacles which would jeopardize 
their implementation; 
(e) take note of the fact that the Group presents no 
new financing instruments, but — in the event 
that an appropriate response could mean possible 
future Community action in favour of priority 
projects — endorse that it should respect the 
following guidelines and constraints as regards the 
use of Community recources: 
(i) the level of Community budgetary support 
should remain within the own-resources ceil-
ing set by the Edinburgh European Council; 
(ii) a project-by-project approach (as opposed to 
general measures with target amounts); 
(iii) any new forms of Community support should 
only become available to the extent that the 
existing instruments cannot meet specific 
needs, and it should be closely tied in with the 
instruments already existing at the Com-
munity level including the EIB and the EIF; ' 
(iv) any grant support extended by the Community 
in a non-conventional manner (for example, in 
the form of equity or reimbursable advances) 
should be managed by and extended through 
the traditional channels for such support (i.e. 
generally the Member States concerned); ' 
(v) Community action should be concentrated on 
vital links which are essential for the networks, 
but normally less attractive from a purely 
national perspective; 
1 The UK personal representative did not agree to the principle 
of any new or 'non-conventional' forms of Community 
support. 
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(vi) the volume of Community support for a pri-
ority project should be set with due regard to 
the trans-European network importance of 
the project as well as commitment and support 
from the Member States directly concerned 
by the project; 
(vii) in the event that a new legal base should prove 
necessary for such Community action, the 
Commission will present appropriate pro-
posals, and individual decisions — within such 
new legal bases — on projects should involve 
the Commission, the EIB, and possibly the EIF 
and the Council; ' 
(f) welcome that the Commission and the EIB will 
jointly monitor the progress of financing of individ-
ual priority projects and, if need be, consider 
appropriate ways and means to address possible 
horizontal financial obstacles affecting several pro-
jects; the European Council notes that if the 
Commission concludes that existing Community 
mechanisms need to be adapted or new ones 
created, the Commission will make appropriate 
proposals to the Council; 
(g) invite the Council of the Union and the European 
Parliament urgently to finalize examination of the 
Commission's proposal for a financial regulation 
for TENs, while taking into account the need 
for flexibility, value for money and the above 
guidelines for possible future Community action. 
8. The regulatory framework 
The experience gained from implementing the priority 
projects and from dialogue with the relevant authorities in 
the Member States and with the private sector indicates 
that obstacles of a regulatory, legal and procedural nature 
generally account for the long implementation time of 
projects. 
This is particularly the case for transfrontier projects, 
which often suffer from assessment from a purely national 
1 The UK personal representative reserved his Government's 
position on any such proposals, since he did not agree to the 
principle of any new or 'non-conventional' forms of Com-
munity support. 
point of view (projects are seen as extensions of national 
networks), thus underestimating the benefits of global 
approaches and complicating the synchronization of the 
involved Member States' project decisions and implemen-
tation procedures. The transfrontier nature thus aggravates 
the regulatory delays already present in each individual 
Member State. 
The Group considers that the problems caused by the 
regulatory issues constitute a major delaying factor for 
implementation of the trans-European networks and that 
action to reduce these obstacles should focus both on 
reducing delays due to national procedures and Union 
legislation (where appropriate), and on a project-specific 
effort. 
The Group considers that a specific effort to help the 
priority projects individually could be the establishment 
of suitable vehicles ('project authorities') to promote 
project start-up, implementation and operation. By the 
transfrontier nature of projects, the vehicles would consist 
of representatives of (operators in) the Member States 
directly involved. In view of the overall objective of 
facilitating private involvement, such vehicles should, in 
principle, be open to private and public operators. 
The concept of vehicles is flexible, and their main purpose 
is to accelerate project implementation. Depending on the 
specific situation, the vehicles could take on varying 
forms and competence. In their weakest form they could 
consist in a closer administrative cooperation between 
involved parties, whereas in most cases a separate legal 
entity would be preferable. A vehicle could, for instance, 
be project-specific or cover several projects, grouped 
geographically or sectorally. In some instances, a vehicle 
will primarily be useful in the early phases of project 
conception and implementation; in others the vehicles 
would also be in charge of project construction and even 
operation. Some vehicles would only serve the purpose of 
overcoming regulatory obstacles; others, normally in 
cooperation with the EIB and the EIF, could take on the 
financing responsibility by raising private capital directly 
for the projects under their authority. 
The Commission will examine whether and how establish-
ment and operation of vehicles can be facilitated by the 
adaptation of existing legislation or new legislation, and 
Member States as well as the Union institutions are invited 
to facilitate the creation and operation of such vehicles. 
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The Group notes that the creation of such vehicles should 
be optional and thus not a precondition for eligibility for 
Community assistance according to existing rules. 
The European Council is invited to: 
(a) ask the Member States to examine possibilities for 
reducing regulatory obstacles in general, and for 
priority projects in particular; invite the Com-
mission to study the need for Union action aimed 
at reducing regulatory obstacles, and invite the 
Council and the European Parliament to accelerate 
the examination of relevant proposals currently 
under discussion; 
(b) invite the Member States to consider the creation 
of suitable vehicles to be responsible for the pro-
motion of priority projects, notably by identifying 
obstacles to project implementation and by estab-
lishing the necessary contacts between all parties 
concerned; the Commission, the EIB and the EIF 
are invited to support actively the coordination 
between parties potentially interested in priority 
projects. 
9. Follow-up procedure 
The Treaty provisions already provide for Community 
procedures for the work on trans-European networks, and 
the Group considers that these will be the major avenue 
for the future work on networks, notably as concerns the 
sectoral Councils and the European Parliament. 
However, in view of: 
(i) the political priority and economic importance of 
TENs in general and of the identified priority projects 
in particular; 
(ii) the commitments undertaken by the European 
Council in Brussels and in Corfu; 
(iii) the demonstrated and potential added-value effect for 
TENs of the distinctive approach embodied in the 
Christophersen Group exercise, notably the identifi-
cation and promotion of selected priority projects; 
(iv) the fact that more work is needed, both on the 
individual priority projects and on horizontal issues 
such as regulatory obstacles, financing and ways of 
facilitating public/private partnerships; 
(v) the fact that the Group believes that it has been able 
to set in motion important developments for the 
benefit of TENs, but that its own role has come to an 
end with the termination of its current mandate; 
the Group considers that there is a need for a follow-up 
procedure to the Christophersen Group exercise. This 
should be complementary to and fully respect existing 
procedures, and aim specifically at continuing the special 
effort to identify and accelerate the priority projects. The 
complementary measures should respect the following 
principles: 
(i) The follow-up procedure should provide for the 
regular monitoring of priority projects at the highest 
political level, as well as a focused effort to advance 
the projects at the practical level. 
(ii) The concept of lists of priority projects should be 
retained as a means of identifying, on a regular basis, 
TEN projects of trans-European importance which 
deserve special attention. 
(iii) A project-specific 'bottom-up' approach should be 
pursued. 
(iv) Efficient, flexible and non-bureaucratic organiza-
tional structures for priority project start-up and 
implementation should be encouraged. 
(v) Private involvement in the development of trans-
European networks should be enhanced wherever 
possible. 
In the light of these principles, the European Council 
is invited to endorse the following recommendations 
for specific follow-up measures to the Christophersen 
Group exercise: 
(a) In the context of the White Paper action plan 
follow-up, adopted by the European Council in 
Brussels in December 1993: 
(i) the Commission will each year in December 
submit, after consultation with the Member 
States, a report to the European Council on 
progress on TENs, and the priority projects in 
particular; it will forward this report also to 
the European Parliament; 
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(ii) in the light of this report, the European 
Council will ensure the provision, on a con-
tinuing basis, of the necessary impetus to the 
implementation of priority projects. 
(b) Following the mandate given by the European 
Council in Corfu, the Commission will report to 
the Council if the implementation of any of the 
priority projects is jeopardized by financial or 
other obstacles, and the Council will immediately 
consider, with the Commission and the EIB, appro-
priate responses. The Commission and, where 
appropriate, the EIB will monitor jointly the pro-
gress of the financing of individual priority pro-
jects; wherever financial obstacles of a general 
nature and common to several projects occur, they 
will consider ways and means to facilitate the 
financing. If the Commission concludes that exist-
ing Community mechanisms need to be adapted 
or new ones created, the Commission will make 
appropriate proposals to the Council; 
(c) The Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions will be informed regu-
larly by the Commission about progress on TENs. 
(d) Member States are invited to consider the 
creation of suitable vehicles to ensure the pro-
motion, construction and operation of the priority 
projects. The Commission will examine whether 
and how establishment and operation of vehicles 
can be facilitated by the adaptation of existing 
legislation or new legislation. 
(e) The Commission should continue to arrange 
project seminars for priority projects where 
appropriate. 
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List of transport priority projects 
I — Priority projects 
Work begun or to begin by the end of 1996 
High-speed train/combined transport North-South I/A/D 
Nuremberg-Erfurt-Halle/Leipzig-Berlin 
Brenner axis Verona-Munich 
Β 
Β 
UK 
NL 
D 
E/F 
High-speed train (Paris-)Brussels-Cologne-Amsterdam-London 
Belgium: French/Belgian border-Brussels-Liège-Belgian/ 
German border; 
Brussels-Belgian/Dutch border 
United Kingdom: London-Channel Tunnel access 
Netherlands: Belgian/Dutch border-Rotterdam-Amsterdam 
Germany: (Aachen-)
1 Cologne-Rhine/Main 
High-speed train South 
Madrid-Barcelona-Perpignan-Montpellier 
Madrid-Vitoria-Dax 
High-speed train East 
Paris-Metz-Strasbourg-Appenweier(-Karlsruhe) 
with junctions to Metz-Saarbrücken-Mannheim 
and Metz-Luxembourg 
Conventional rail/combined transport: Betuwe line 
Rotterdam-Dutch/German border(-Rhine/Ruhr) ' 
High-speed train/combined transport France-Italy 
Lyons-Turin 
Turin-Milan-Venice-Trieste 
Greek motorways: PATHE: 
Rion-Antirion, Patras-Athens-Thessaloniki-Promahon 
(Greek/Bulgarian border) and 
Via Egnatia: 
Igoumenitsa-Thessaloniki-Alexandroupolis-Ormenio 
(Greek/Bulgarian border-)Kipi (Greek/Turkish border) 
Motorway Lisbon-Valladolid P/E 
Conventional rail link Cork-Dublin-Belfast-Larne-Stranraer IRL/UK 
Malpensa airport (Milan) I 
F/D 
F/D 
F/L 
NL/D 
F/I 
GR 
1 Ongoing construction support already provided at Community level. 
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Fixed rail/road link between Denmark and Sweden DK/S 
(Øresund fixed link) including access routes for road, rail and air 
Nordic triangle
1 FIN/N/S 
Ireland/United Kingdom/Benelux road link UKV(IRL) 
West coast main line UK 
II — Further projects of importance 
Acceleration possible so that work can begin in about two years 
Combined transport EU-wide 
projects identified up to now in France, Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, Portugal and Spain 
Spata airport (Athens) GR 
Berlin airport D 
Maurienne motorway F 
Marateca-Elvas motorway Ρ 
High-speed train in Denmark DK 
Transapennine highway Bologna-Florence I 
High-speed train/combined transport Danube axis ^ 
Munich/Nuremberg-Vienna(-Budapest-Bratislava) 
Nice-Cuneo motorway I/F 
Projects which need to be further examined 
Fehmarn Belt fixed link DK/D 
Bari-Brindisi-Otranto motorway I 
Rhine-Rhone link F 
Seine-Scheldt link F 
Elbe-Oder link D 
Danube upgrading between Straubing and Vilshofen D 
High-speed train Randstad-Rhine/Ruhr NL 
Amsterdam-Arnhem(-Cologne) 
Subject to adhesion. 
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Road corridor Valencia-Saragossa-Somport E 
High-speed train (Brenner-)Milan-Rome-Naples I 
Magnetic lévitation train: Transrapid D 
High-speed train connection Luxembourg-Brussels B/L 
Road corridor Naples-Reggio di Calabria I 
III — Europe-wide projects 
With regard to the projects which deal with the implementation of new 
technologies and relate to traffic management and which will improve the use of 
infrastructure for all modes of transport (land, sea, air) benefiting several Member 
States, the following projects were identified as pilot actions: 
Air-traffic management system: an integrated aircraft monitoring system with 
Eurocontrol 
Road-traffic management services: pilot actions using traffic control centres and 
radio data system-traffic message channel (RDS-TMC) 
Vessel-traffic management and information services: a European ship reporting 
system 
Multimodal positioning system by satellites: pilot installation using Inmarsat 
Pilot projects for a railway management system: control command systems for 
selected high-speed rail links 
IV — Projects connecting to third countries 
Priority project: work begun or to begin within two years 
Berlin-Warsaw-Minsk-Moscow (rail and road) 
Further projects of importance 
Dresden-Prague (road and rail) 
Nuremberg-Prague (road) 
Fixed link across the Danube (road and rail) between Bulgaria and Romania 
Helsinki-St Petersburg-Moscow (rail/road) 
Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest-Lvov-Kiev (rail/road) 
Baltic Sea telematic platform 
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List A: Priority energy network projects 
(Projects on which work has already begun or may begin in the short term — up to 1997 
— and which are to be completed in the medium term, up to 1999.) 
Projects in the European Union 
(a4) Italy-Greece 
(b6) France-Italy 
(b7) France-Spain 
(blO) Spain-Portugal 
(c2) Denmark 
(e6) Greece 
(e5) Portugal 
(f6) Portugal-Spain 
Projects with neighbouring countries 
(h4) Algeria-Morocco-European Union 
(h7) Russia-Belarus-Poland-European 
Union 
electrical interconnection 
(submarine cable) 
electrical interconnection 
electrical interconnection 
electrical interconnections 
east-west electrical interconnection 
(submarine cable) 
natural gas network 
natural gas network 
gas interconnections 
gas delivery pipeline 
gas delivery pipeline 
List B: Other priority energy network projects which have not 
reached the same state of maturity 
(Projects on which construction work should be begun in the medium term, at least as 
regards the initial stages.) 
Projects in the European Union 
(d6) Italy-Austria 
(d3) Norway-Continent 
(dll) 
Projects with neighbouring countries 
(n2) Baltic ring 
electrical interconnection 
electrical interconnections between Nor-
way and Germany, between Norway and 
the Netherlands, and electrical connec-
tions within Norway to link up with these 
interconnections. 
electrical interconnections between Ger-
many, Poland, the Baltic States and Fin-
land. 
NB: The project codes are the same as in the proposed guidelines (COM(93) 685). 
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List of the personal representatives 
of the Heads of State or Government 
Chairman: H. Christophersen, Vice-President, European Commission 
A U. Stacher 
Director-General for European Integration and Economic Coordination 
Β J. Smets 
Kabinetschef van de Eerste Minister voor de Economische en Sociale Cel 
Chef de Cabinet du Premier Ministre pour la Cellule économique et sociale 
D G. Haller 
Staatssekretär im Bundesministerium für Finanzen 
DK J. Thomsen 
Departementchef i Økonomiministeriet 
GR L. Nikolaou 
Permanent Adviser to the Prime Minister 
E J. Α. Zaragoza 
Secretario de Estado de Política Territorial y Obras Públicas 
F P. de Boissieu 
Représentant Permanent de la France auprès de l'Union Européenne 
IRL J. Loughrey 
Secretary, Department of Transport, Energy and Communications 
I A. Minuto Rizzo 
Consigliere diplomatico del Ministro del bilancio e della programmazione 
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I — The background 
I. The Maastricht Treaty 
The Maastricht Treaty, in giving a specific section 
(Title XII) to trans-European networks (TENs), gave 
formal recognition to their importance for the Union and 
its Member States. The Treaty sees the establishment of 
TENs not only as a legitimate and laudable end in itself, 
but also as a valuable tool towards implementing other 
primary Union policies. 
Article 129b of the Treaty lays down that the TENs should 
contribute to economic and social cohesion and to the 
creation of the internal market. To this end the Union is to 
aim at promoting the interconnection and interoperability 
of national networks, as well as access to such networks. 
It has also to take account in particular of the need to link 
island, landlocked and peripheral regions with the central 
regions of the Union. 
In order to achieve these objectives the Treaty entrusts 
three main tasks to the Union: 
(i) to establish specific guidelines for transport, energy 
and telecommunications covering the objectives, pri-
orities and broad lines of measures envisaged in the 
sphere of trans-European networks; these guidelines 
shall identify projects of common interest; 
(ii) to take any measures that may prove necessary, in 
particular in the field of technical standardization, to 
ensure the interoperability of the networks; 
(iii) to support the financial efforts made by the Member 
States for projects of common interest financed by 
Member States and identified in the framework 
of the guidelines, particularly through feasibility 
studies, loan guarantees or interest-rate subsidies. 
As regards the Member States, the Treaty calls on them, 
in liaison with the Commission, to coordinate among 
themselves the policies pursued at national level which 
may have a significant impact on the achievement of the 
objectives referred to above. The Commission can, in 
close cooperation with the Member States, take any useful 
initiative to promote such coordination. 
Finally, the Treaty foresees the possibility of the Union 
cooperating with third countries to promote projects of 
mutual interest and to ensure the interoperability of 
networks. 
2. The Commission's White Paper on growth, 
competitiveness and employment 
In its White Paper on growth, competitiveness and 
employment, the Commission proposed that the 
implementation of TENs be accelerated as one of the main 
ways to stimulate growth, increase competitiveness and 
create employment over the period 1994-2000. Achieving 
this aim requires the rapid implementation of the TENs 
and since the Commission was not in a position to shorten 
the lengthy administrative procedures in the Member 
States which this acceleration would require, it proposed 
instead to concentrate on a small number of priority 
projects and to adopt an ad hoc approach to facilitate and 
speed up their implementation. 
Action by the Union in the field of TENs is necessary 
because the absence of open and competitive markets is 
hampering, to differing degrees, the optimal use of 
existing networks and their completion in the interest both 
of consumers and operators. Furthermore, the inherent 
sluggishness of the preparation, planning, authorization 
and evaluation procedures and regulatory obstacles 
hamper the implementation of large projects. In addition, 
experience shows that transnational projects frequently 
run into difficulties because of conflicting priorities 
between the countries involved. 
It is well worth underlining the principles underlying the 
Commission's approach to the TENs as expressed in the 
White Paper: 
Subsidiarity. Creating the TENs is primarily a task for the 
Member States. The Union's role is important but limited: 
to act as a catalyst, bringing out the common interest of 
projects, convening project seminars (see 'bottom-up 
approach' below) and facilitating the implementation of 
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the projects by helping to find solutions to financial and 
regulatory obstacles. 
Public/private partnership, especially in financing. The 
long-term investment required in some sectors, particu-
larly in transport infrastructures, necessitates new types of 
partnerships between private and public financing. In 
addition, the constraints on the Community's and the 
Member States' public budgets limit the scope for invest-
ment by the public sector. The Commission has calculated 
that some ECU 400 000 million needs to be invested in 
the TENs between 1994 and 2010 and, for the reasons just 
mentioned, a considerable part must come from the private 
sector. 
Bottom-up approach. In the bottom-up approach the 
seminars or workshops on individual projects play a 
central role. Depending on the specifics of each individual 
project, they involve, in principle, all interested partners: 
national and regional authorities, promoters, financial 
institutions, industrialists, users, etc. Their task is to 
identify the specific problems of each individual project 
— financing in general, private-sector investment in 
particular, non-financial obstacles, especially of a plan-
ning and administrative nature, etc. — and propose 
concrete solutions. The Commission's role is that of 
catalyst, convening and facilitating the work of the 
seminars. The EIB participates in these seminars as a 
matter of course. The findings of the project seminars 
have an important role to play in enabling the Group to 
address horizontal issues and to study further the financing 
issues. 
3. The European Council, Brussels, 
December 1993 
The European Council, at its meeting in Brussels in 
December 1993, on the basis of the Commission proposals 
in the White Paper, took a series of important decisions 
aimed at accelerating the implementation of the TENs. 
One of these decisions was to create the special Group 
of Personal Representatives of the Heads of State or 
Government chaired by Vice-President Christophersen 
— the 'Christophersen Group' — to assist the Com-
mission in its task as regards transport and energy (and 
later environment) network infrastructures. It also set up a 
parallel group chaired by Mr Bangemann to report to it on 
the measures to be taken as regards infrastructures in the 
field of telecommunications/information. 
The European Council urged the Council of the Union to 
make full and rapid use of the possibilities offered by 
Article 129b of the Treaty to accelerate the implemen-
tation of the TENs. The European Council further invited 
the Council of the Union and the Parliament jointly to 
speed up the legislative procedures in order to allow the 
adoption of the guidelines which were still outstanding. It 
also addressed recommendations to the Member States. 
The Heads of State or Government asked the Commission 
to report to it annually in December on the progress being 
made. 
4. The European Council, Corfu, June 1994 
The European Council held in Corfu in June 1994 took 
note of the Group's interim report and welcomed the work 
achieved so far by the Group. On the basis of the Group's 
report, the European Council agreed on a first priority 
list of 11 major transport projects and reaffirmed the 
importance it attached to the other important transport 
projects in the report. As far as the energy sector was 
concerned, the European Council took note of the projects 
listed by the Group and requested that the Group continue 
its work, examining in particular their economic viability. 
The Member States involved were asked to make every 
effort to ensure that all the transport projects whose 
preparation is sufficiently advanced will be started up 
immediately and that the others are started up as far 
as possible during 1996 at the latest by accelerating 
administrative, regulatory and legal procedures. The Euro-
pean Council invited the Commission to take all useful 
initiatives in this respect including the convening, where 
appropriate, of project seminars aimed at coordinating the 
activities of all parties involved. 
The European Council called on the Group, together with 
the representatives of the acceding States, to continue 
their work on the basis of the mandate proposed in the 
Group's report: 
(i) studying further the extension of the trans-European 
networks to neighbouring countries (in particular to 
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Central and East European countries and to the 
Mediterranean Basin); 
(ii) examining the question of relevant networks in the 
field of environment. 
These proposals are currently being examined by the 
Council, European Parliament, the Committee of the 
Regions and the Economic and Social Committee. Their 
adoption should take place in the course of 1995. 
As regards the financing of networks, the European 
Council confirmed that measures would be taken — if it 
proved necessary — in order that priority projects do not 
run into financial obstacles which would jeopardize their 
implementation. It noted the conclusions of the Ecofin 
Council and the studies carried out by the Commission 
and asked the Group and the Ecofin Council to continue 
to examine the question until the Essen European Council, 
taking account of the specific characteristics of each 
project, the leading role of private funding and the 
judicious use of existing Community resources. 
The European Council asked to be informed if it appeared 
that the achievement of certain projects was threatened for 
financial reasons linked to insufficient profitability — 
for example because of the length of investments or 
environmental constraints. The European Council com-
mitted itself to consider immediately with the Commission 
and the EIB the appropriate responses, within the limits 
set by the financial perspectives. In the minutes of the 
meeting, however, it was noted that this did not constitute 
a guarantee of financing from the Community. 
5. Recent developments, January to 
November 1994 
6. The Christophersen Group exercise 
(a) Aims and working methods 
The Group has seen its task as primarily one of speeding 
up and facilitating the work already under way in the 
Union and Member States, so that clear decisions on 
priorities could be taken and projects implemented. It 
has been careful not to duplicate the work being done 
elsewhere, especially in the Council of the Union, but to 
aim at adding value to the work on implementing TENs. 
Specifically the Group set itself the aims of: 
(i) identifying priority projects and facilitating the sub-
sequent work in specific project seminars; 
(ii) accelerating the priority projects, notably by organiz-
ing project seminars; 
(iii) addressing the project-specific and horizontal 
obstacles to implementation of TENs in terms of the 
regulatory framework; 
(iv) helping to clarify the financing issues and ways of 
encouraging private investment in the projects; 
(v) facilitating rapid political agreement on the transport 
and energy guidelines. 
Pursuant to Article 129c of the Treaty and to the con-
clusions of the Brussels European Council, the Com-
mission, in the course of the first months of 1994, tabled 
proposals for: 
guidelines in the fields of energy and transport;
! 
interoperability of high-speed trains;
2 
a financial regulation for TENs.
3 
1 COM(93 ) 685 and COM(94) 106. respectively. 
2 COM(94) 107. 
1 COM(94) 62. 
It was agreed that the decisions should be taken on the 
basis of the broadest consensus possible, so as to give the 
Group's proposals maximum impact. 
The Group's work has followed a bottom-up approach. 
On the one hand, this is due to the — in some cases — 
very incomplete information available about proposed 
priority projects, which in turn is related to their lack of 
maturity. On the other hand, the bottom-up approach was 
chosen to provide concrete information about specific 
obstacles in project implementation, on the basis of which 
lessons about horizontal difficulties and remedies could 
be learned. 
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As far as the identification of transport and energy priority 
projects is concerned, the Group adopted selection criteria 
(see below) and concentrated its discussions on the more 
mature projects. 
The list of the personal representatives of the Heads of 
State or Government is to be found in Annex 3 on p. 27. 
As from July 1994, the personal representatives of the 
Heads of State or Government of the four acceding 
countries also took part in the work of the Group. In view 
of the long experience of the European Investment Bank 
in financing major infrastructure works, Vice-President 
Christophersen invited the President of the Bank, Sir 
Brian Unwin, to participate in the Group. The Commission 
also invited the Bank to take part in the various project 
seminars and other preparatory meetings. 
Between January and November 1994, the Group met 
11 times and had discussions with a wide range of 
representatives of international and private financial 
organizations and leading industrial figures. Almost 70 
working papers were submitted. 
The Group has taken into account the report of the group 
of prominent people from the telecommunications sector, 
under the chairmanship of Commissioner Bangemann, in 
its examination of traffic-management systems. 
(b) Overall assessment 
The Christophersen Group exercise constitutes an excep-
tional and primarily political effort, and it should be 
evaluated accordingly. 
The exercise should thus be seen in the larger context of 
Community action in each of the sectors of transport, 
energy and environment, where much progress has taken 
place in 1994. 
The primary objective has been to identify and accelerate 
priority projects. The main results are contained in the 
Group's report to the Essen European Council and else-
where in these Technical Papers. 
The Corfu European Council asked the Group to examine 
the question of relevant networks in the field of environ-
ment. The late inclusion in the mandate of the Group, and 
the less-pronounced network characteristics as well as the 
absence of guidelines for environment networks, have 
made it impossible for the Group to reach the point of 
identifying individual priority projects within the short 
time available. The Group's work has, however, set in 
motion an effort to establish guidelines in relevant sectors 
of environmental protection. 
The Group has obtained concrete acceleration of the 
priority projects by focusing the attention of all the 
involved parties, including the private sector, and thus 
creating the conditions for synergy effects. In this respect, 
the personal representatives have played a key role. 
The Group's work on individual priority projects also led 
it to consider obstacles of a more general nature that affect 
several priority projects or infrastructure development in 
general. Thus, a number of areas for potential horizontal 
measures were identified and work on these initiated. 
The Group considers that, in addition to the immediately 
visible results of the Group's effort, a momentum has 
been created which should facilitate infrastructure devel-
opment in the future. Much political and media attention 
is being devoted to the issue, and the private sector has 
warmly welcomed the exercise. 
Throughout the Christophersen Group's work, the objec-
tive of facilitating public/private partnerships has been 
pursued. The Group and the Commission services have 
solicited and received comments from the private sector, 
and representatives from the private sector have submitted 
written contributions and met with the Group. Private 
operators have participated in a number of project sem-
inars, and the Commission has arranged seminars on 
public/private financing. In the work on the individual 
projects, emphasis has. constantly been focused on 
expanding the scope for private participation. Unques-
tionably, national authorities are today generally much 
more open to involvement by the private sector. The 
Group considers that these developments should be further 
advanced in the follow-up procedure. 
The objective of public/private partnerships will necess-
arily take some time to emerge as a reality, but a process 
of modernization of national authorities' approaches in 
this field has been initiated, and the currently weak 
market mechanisms for direct private involvement in 
these activities should grow stronger with time. 
At the practical level, the Group's work has been sup-
ported by so-called 'project seminars', convened by the 
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Commission, and gathering, as appropriate, all interested 
parties, including the private sector. These project sem-
inars or round tables have been complemented with other 
project-specific efforts. 
The importance of these measures should not be under-
estimated; the exchange of information on projects and 
indications of intent on the part of public and private 
parties is time-consuming and much less straightforward 
than normally assumed. The project-seminar approach 
lends itself well to certain projects and to certain stages of 
project planning. 
The project-seminar approach has, however, its limits. 
The Group considers that the facilitation of contacts on, 
and promotion of, specific projects should be strengthened 
in the future, and it therefore recommends specific 
additional measures, notably on the creation of adminis-
trative vehicles. 
In assessing the Christophersen Group exercise, it should 
finally be borne in mind that infrastructure projects of 
exceptional scale necessarily take time to conceive, plan 
and implement, and that the specific planning and 
implementation is outside Union competence. 
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I. Introduction 
The Treaty on European Union gives new responsibility 
to the Union in the matter of transport infrastructure. 
Transport infrastructure policy becomes part of the wider 
context of infrastructure network developments for the 
Union. Title XII requests the Union to establish trans-
European networks for energy, transport and telecom-
munications. For this purpose, the Union shall establish 
guidelines that will describe the objectives of the network, 
broad lines of measures, and priorities for action; further-
more the guidelines shall identify projects of common 
interest. 
The proposal on the guidelines for the development of a 
trans-European transport network (COM(94) 106), as 
tabled in April 1994 by the Commission to the Council 
and European Parliament for co-decision, initiates an 
ambitious plan: to integrate the present mode-oriented 
national transport networks into a single trans-European 
transport network by the year 2010. For this purpose, the 
Union has identified projects of an order of magnitude of 
about ECU 400 000 million, of which about ECU 230 000 
million should be invested in projects up to the year 2000. 
While the Council and Parliament undertake to arrive at a 
decision during the coming months, the work done by the 
Christophersen Group has been an important interim 
measure in achieving the described goals of the guidelines, 
in particular by accelerating the completion of projects 
which can be seen as crucial for the establishment of 
the trans-European transport network. The Group has 
provided the necessary political backing permitting, 
amongst others: 
the likely removal of regulatory obstacles; 
the examination and implementation of unconventional 
financing schemes; 
the involved Member States to reach faster the necessary 
joint decisions; 
the public-private partnership to be promoted. 
The background: 
The network approach 
developed with the introduction of the trans-European 
network title in the Treaty on European Union, which 
came into force in November 1993. One of the first 
steps taken by the Union was to introduce coordination 
procedures between the Member States and the Union. In 
1978 the Committee on Infrastructure was established; it 
followed several Council regulations giving support to a 
limited number of projects, the last of which is to expire 
in December 1994. However, the limited scope of these 
regulations did not allow the development of an integrated 
European infrastructure policy. 
The network approach taken by the Union Treaty aims at 
providing the necessary infrastructure for sustainable 
mobility as outlined in the White Paper on the future 
common transport policy: safe, efficient and environmen-
tally friendly forms of transport for the benefit of the 
Union citizens. The establishment of the trans-European 
transport network must be seen as an important instrument 
for the social and economic cohesion of the Union and, in 
particular, the local and regional communities will benefit 
from it. It will prove to be of specific importance for the 
peripheral regions: not only will the regional networks be 
greatly enhanced through better access to the main trans-
port corridors, but also access to main European centres 
will be significantly improved. 
Further to this, economic bodies will benefit from the 
synergies realized through an intelligent interlinking of 
the individual transport modes into a single network 
and through corresponding services provided. Therefore 
important actions when establishing the network are 
targeted towards its proper management. 
Transport infrastructure has always been high on the 
European agenda: transport policy was already considered 
a common policy in the Rome Treaty; it was further 
3. Projects of common interest 
Projects of common interest are considered to be the 
constitutive elements of trans-European network policy. 
They help to develop the network and are defined 
according to a list of criteria which include the 
following: 
(i) the completion of the connections, key links and 
interconnections needed to eliminate bottlenecks, fill 
in missing links and complete major routes; 
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(ii) the development of access to the network, taking 
particular account of the need to link island, periph-
eral and landlocked regions to the centre of the 
Union; 
(iii) the design, development and implementation of sys-
tems for the management and control of transport 
and network traffic with a view to their optimization. 
Furthermore, projects of common interest, as identified in 
the guidelines, should be potentially economically viable 
and comply with all Union policy. The multimodal 
character of the guidelines incorporates environmental 
policy as an integral part of overall transport policy. This 
is the contribution made by the trans-European transport 
network to the implementation of the common transport 
policy and its objective of sustainable development. 
(v) be mature, so that the projects can be implemented 
quickly; 
(vi) avoid public financing of infrastructure where it 
would lead to distortion of competition contrary to 
the common interest; 
(vii) comply with the Union's legislation in particular 
regarding the protection of the environment. 
As to maturity, the priority projects were classified into 
three groups. For the first group of projects, work is either 
under way or should begin within two years. With the 
second group, acceleration appears possible so that work 
can begin in two years' time. The third group consists of 
projects of great importance for the network, which appear 
likely to take more time before work can begin or which 
require further study. 
4. The Christophersen Group list: 
Priority projects forming key links missing 
in the network 
The Christophersen Group established a list of projects 
which it considers to be of a priority nature for the 
development of the Union's transport infrastructure. 
When establishing this list, the Group used, in the first 
place, the criteria for the identification of projects of 
common interest but added a further criterion on the basis 
of proposals set out by the Commission and in close 
cooperation with the EIB. Priority projects should comply 
with all the following criteria, that is, they must: 
(i) be projects of common interest fulfilling the criteria 
set out in the Community guidelines for the develop-
ment of a trans-European transport network and 
identified there; 
(ii) be of exceptional scale, bearing in mind the type of 
project and the relative size of the Member States 
directly concerned; 
(iii) pass the test of economic viability, including 
improvements in the Union's competitiveness and 
technological performance; 
(iv) allow scope for private investment; 
5. Priority projects identified by the Group 
The European Council in Corfu has already acknowleged 
a preliminary set of 34 priority projects and five traffic-
management projects. In subsequent actions, special atten-
tion was given to a smaller number (approximately 10 to 
15) of the above projects which are highly advanced as 
regards maturity and are likely to have a favourable 
impact on growth, competitiveness and employment. 
The final list proposed for the Essen Summit shows a set 
of priority projects selected to meet a twofold goal: firstly, 
they must possess a strategic character with a view to 
improving the attractiveness, competitiveness and 
cohesion of Union territory and its economy; secondly, 
they must contribute to the short/medium-term perspective 
of growth and employment impulses. At the same time, 
most of the projects could benefit from the involvement 
of private capital as regards project realization. 
In addition to the hardware infrastructure projects iden-
tified by the Group, the particular role of traffic manage-
ment systems has to be stressed, as networks without 
management will fail to serve their purpose. In addition, 
the mutually beneficial influence of the information 
society and other economic sectors such as transport can 
help to consolidate the worldwide strategic position of 
European industry; in the realm of transport telematics, 
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European industry has a leading position to lose. Of 
specific interest are those projects which incorporate 
telematics architecture into the transport sector via pilot 
projects and in some cases full-scale developments. There-
fore, priority consideration must be given to harmonized 
command control systems for the railways on a European 
scale, a single air traffic management system and road 
traffic management services. Vessel-traffic management 
and information services for European waters will help to 
improve safety at sea, particularly in connection with the 
transport by sea of dangerous goods, which is obviously 
of strategic priority. 
6. Effects on growth, employment 
and competitiveness 
railway network. Immediately, i.e. only during construc-
tion (period 1990-2010), jobs equivalent to about 
5.6 million man-years will be created, this is to say 
280 000 per year. Further to these, about 710 000 perma-
nent jobs will be either maintained or newly created so 
that out of 1 000 employees in Europe, 4.5 will work in 
the high-speed railway sector. 
Particular impact is expected to come from the realization 
of the traffic management projects, as Europe is at present 
playing the leading role: less congestion in the air and on 
the roads will save costs in the order of ECU 10 to 20 000 
million per year; additional value-added services will 
offer new business opportunities which could well reach 
an annual volume of ECU 50 to 100 000 million, providing 
enormous opportunities for small and medium-sized com-
panies specializing in information and telecommuni-
cations services. 
Total investment in 34 of the projects under consideration 
— in the order of ECU 100 000 million over 15 years — 
will have a rather small, direct impact on economic factors 
within the Union: 100 000 to 200 000 jobs are expected to 
be created for the implementation of these projects, and 
economic growth may be directly affected by 0.1%. 
Indirect effects on activities surrounding the construction 
sector could be significant. However, the maximum total 
result is unlikely to exceed 0.3% of GDP (gross domestic 
product) and about 400 000 additional jobs. 
However, the indirect impact on regional development 
where such large projects are implemented should on no 
account be underestimated: better access to central areas 
of activity within the Union will lead to improved regional 
competitiveness and business activities. In all, 58 000 km 
of motorway and more than 70 000 km of railway lines 
(23 000 km of which allow speeds of more than 200 
km/hr) will help to improve accessibility to many of the 
Union's regions substantially, paving the way for new 
opportunities for the citizens in the peripheral regions. 
The following examples may serve to illustrate the above 
points: as far as a single project is concerned, the Malpensa 
airport, for instance, will generate 6 000 permanent jobs 
at the airport itself while between 12 000 and 18 000 
additional jobs will be created throughout the region. The 
construction as such will provide about 20 000 man-years 
of employment. An example on a different scale is 
the completion of the entire trans-European high-speed 
As regards the impact of transport infrastructure on the 
environment, any project applying for either Community 
funding or EIB loans has to pass the environmental impact 
assessment as set out in the Community Directive 85/335; 
in other words, before a decision with respect to funding 
can be made the successful completion of the environmen-
tal impact assessment has to be proven. 
Environment, looked at in an appropriate manner, should 
not be considered as being an obstacle to sustainable 
mobility; the Commission favours assessing the possible 
impact infrastructure might already have at the early stages 
of a project, thereby also contributing to streamlining and 
optimizing relevant administrative procedures without 
lowering standards. With a view to the overall impact of 
the trans-European transport network on the environment, 
the Commission is at present preparing a comprehensive 
study. 
7. Working methods and main lessons 
to be drawn 
The priority projects have been subject to screening, the 
intensity of which has, however, varied according to the 
different parts. The projects in the second part have mainly 
been subject to information collection in order to allow a 
preliminary assessment of the situation. Seminars and/or 
37 Il — Transport networks 
working round tables have been conducted for the projects 
in the first part aimed at appraising their situation, 
potential limits, alternative future developments, financing 
issues, etc. This exercise has clearly demonstrated the 
valuable role that the Commission can play in the develop-
ment of the trans-European transport networks, as set out 
in the Treaty and in which the EIB has actively participated 
in allowing different voices to be heard. In this respect, 
the participation of national administrations and transport 
operators — notably railway companies, regions, banks, 
interested sectors of industry, etc. — around one table can 
be considered as having been crucial for the progress in 
several projects. The following first set of conclusions 
may be drawn: 
(i) The projects show different degrees of maturity in 
various respects; however, common to most of the 
priority projects is that they were hindered mainly 
due to one or a combination of the following points: 
a too-narrow scope of the projects in terms of 
enhancing profitability and also as regards geo-
graphical divisions where several Member States 
were involved; 
different priority settings by the Member States 
concerned; 
environmental problems still to be solved; 
an absence of appropriate legal formulas at European 
level; 
a lack of a single cross-border agent endorsed with a 
clear mission to push forward the project as a whole; 
a long tradition in public financing of transport 
infrastructure, combined with reluctance in tackling 
public/private partnership schemes; 
insufficient availability or dynamic use of public 
funds. 
(ii) The usefulness of the coordinated actions and the role 
of the Commission in terms of providing assistance as 
regards unblocking certain approaches; sometimes it 
was the first time in many years that actors have sat 
around a table recognizing that they have an interest 
in the same projects. In this case, the association of 
the industry and private banking sector seems a very 
important one. However, it needs to be noted that not 
all Member States show a clear willingness to 
cooperate with the private sector and the Union or 
with other potentially interested partners, such as 
regional communities. 
(iii) Examination of the financial difficulties proved to 
be very helpful: limitations of certain approaches 
towards the priority projects emerged, as well as new 
formulas envisaged in some cases, particularly in 
response to the new Union financial instruments (i.e. 
high speed in France and Spain in the first case and 
in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in the 
second). In addition, it became quite clear that the 
Member States could benefit from the experiences of 
others, especially as regards risk-sharing schemes 
which are the key in terms of public/private partner-
ships. 
(iv) The analysis of the different administrative and legal 
set-ups in respect of the different Member States 
provided some new ideas on how to remove hin-
drances in view of transborder project developments 
(i.e. Lyons-Turin rail connection). 
(v) The need for an integrated approach to these large-
scale projects, not only with regard to their consider-
ation as single entities, but also to their intermodal 
aspects (for instance the Brenner rail link together 
with the road corridor, or Malpensa airport and its 
rail access). 
The work done so far on the first 11 priority projects 
shows that these activities must be considered as a first 
but imperative step for the implementation of every 
such important priority project. It seems clear that the 
guidelines for network developments, in which common 
interest projects are defined, and the possibility of new 
financial set-ups for several of those projects require 
working round tables or specific seminars (as a missing 
link in the decision-process chain?) prior to a decision 
being taken on whether to go ahead with the project; in 
some cases such meetings were fundamental in producing 
a breakthrough towards implementation for projects which 
had been under discussion for over 20 years. 
The Commission is ready to continue this process with a 
selection of projects every year and, for this purpose, the 
Commission will come up with a rolling plan on these 
priority projects based on the experience gained during 
the work for the Christophersen Group. Close cooperation 
with the EIB and in particular the EIF is envisaged. 
However, private sector actors from the banking and 
industrial communities, in particular those experienced in 
project design, should participate in these future activities. 
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8. Traffic management services and 
their development in Europe 
Traffic management services have an important contri-
bution to make in the realization of the goals of the 
common transport policy, namely sustainable mobility. 
The absence of a common European approach has led 
many of the different actors (both public and private) in 
the transport field to develop, implement, and operate 
differing information and command systems. The recog-
nition of this state of affairs is the premise for the positive 
role the Community should play towards the development 
of traffic management services at a European level. 
The research and development carried out within the 
context of the Community framework programmes, par-
ticularly EURET and DRIVE, has led to the development 
of more advanced and standardized traffic management 
services concepts. This new potential encouraged the 
Commission, in its proposal for guidelines for the develop-
ment of a trans-European transport network, ' to incorpor-
ate traffic and transport management as an integral part of 
the approach. The proposal is based upon the principles of 
interconnection, interoperability and access. It will be 
essential to ensure that these principles are maintained in 
traffic management services. 
component of the information society. Their successful 
implementation will bring progress in the flow and 
management of information. They will also make an 
important contribution to increasing efficiency (such as 
reliability of journey times) and improving safety in the 
transport sector. 
Beyond the single interest of the transport sector, modern 
and performant traffic management services, making 
efficient use of the most recent information and communi-
cation technologies, will contribute in a significant manner 
to the achievement of the objectives emphasized in the 
White Paper on growth, competitiveness and employment: 
creating more employment and restoring economic pros-
perity in Europe in a safer environment. 
For example, in road transport alone, such investments 
would boost a service market which could reach an annual 
volume of 10 to 15 times the telematics infrastructure 
investment mentioned in the table below. 
The use of a positioning system by satellites could open 
another market (worth ECU 50 000 million) for equipment 
and services within the next 10 years. 
As a follow-up to the White Paper on growth, competi-
tiveness and employment,
2 the Commission adopted, in 
July 1994, a communication to Parliament and the Council 
on Europe's way to the information society.
3 This com-
munication promotes an action plan for a regulatory 
and legal framework, for networks, basic services and 
applications in the context of the information society. The 
priority applications considered include, among other 
things, traffic management services. 
The rapid implementation of traffic management services 
based upon these principles will act as a catalyst to the 
services and products industry. This will have clear 
benefits and important implications for the development 
of high-technology industry and employment in Europe. 
Traffic management services also form an important 
A communication from the Commission to European 
Parliament and the Council on telematics applications for 
transport in Europe, which covers the whole action area 
for transport management and value-added services, was 
adopted by the Commission on 4 November 1994. 
(a) Main areas of activity 
The five principal traffic management services explained 
in greater detail in the Annexes cover the areas of road, 
rail, sea-vessel traffic management information services 
(VTMIS), air traffic management (ATM) and a posi-
tioning system by satellites. 
1 COM(94) 106, OJ C 220 of 8 August 1994. 
2 ISBN 92-826-7423-1 (Parts A+B). ISBN 92-826-7071-6 
(PartC). 
' Communication of the European Commission, COM(94) 347. 
Investments envisaged for the successful implementation 
of traffic management services are estimated to be about 
ECU 11 500 million until 1999 and about ECU 34 000 
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million until 2010. For each mode, the figures are approxi-
mately: 
(million ECU) 
Road traffic management 
services' 
Air traffic management 
Sea-vessel traffic manage-
ment information services 
Rail traffic management 
services 
Positioning system by 
satellites 
until 1999 
2 600
2 
6 500 
800 
350 
200 
until 2010 
31 000 
not known 
1 100-1 500 
710 
850 
1 System infrastructure and on-board equipment. 
2 System infrastructure: up to 1999: ECU 2 000 million. 
up to 2010: ECU 13 000 million. 
(b) Priority areas (1994-96) 
The degree to which traffic management services have 
been developed varies greatly within the Community, 
both according to the mode of transport (air, road, rail or 
sea) and whether it has a local, national or international 
dimension. 
In certain sectors, traffic management services operating 
on a European or international basis (e.g. air traffic 
management) have already been functioning for a number 
of years. However, there are other sectors where these 
systems have not yet been developed to the same degree, 
where they have still not made full use of the technological 
opportunities and where they have been designed essen-
tially to meet local or national needs (e.g. sea-vessel and 
road traffic management). The European Union could 
provide the vital impetus for the establishment of such 
services by giving them a European dimension from the 
outset or encouraging the integration of existing systems, 
where these have been developed on an exclusively 
national basis and are therefore characterized by fragmen-
tation. 
In particular: 
In the rail sector, the European rail traffic management 
system (ERTMS) has developed to a point where certain 
components of the system can enter into the predevelop-
ment phase. This phase must be based on full-scale tests 
on the European high-speed train network. The full-scale 
tests, in which both railway constructors and operators 
must be involved, should begin as soon as possible. The 
costs of carrying out these tests represent an additional 
burden for railway operators who agree to carry out such 
tests on their own network. As the tests will benefit all 
Community operators, funding will have to be found that 
allows those who agree to these tests to be able to carry 
them out without economic problems. However, full 
implementation must be financed from the resources of 
the railway network. 
In the road sector, in the short term, the immediate priority 
is the implementation, on a European scale, of the basic 
infrastructure consisting of monitoring equipment, traffic 
control and management centres using a basic telematics 
system architecture that will safeguard their interoperabi-
lity and interconnectivity. Particular attention should be 
given to the collection, validation and dissemination of 
traffic information to individual road users. For this 
purpose the implementation of a pan-European automatic 
traffic information and management service based on the 
radio data system-traffic message channel (RDS-TMC) 
appears to be the most appropriate first step. 
In the medium term, emphasis should be given to the 
establishment of an appropriate telematics infrastructure, 
to foster a better traffic management by the application and 
use of innovative control strategies, tools for automatic 
incident detection, travel and traffic information services 
(whether broadcast via RDS-TMC or transmitted via 
cellular radio or beacons), multi-purpose electronic debi-
ting systems for automatic fee collection or access control 
purposes, and satellite positioning systems, e.g. for moni-
toring of hazardous goods transport. 
Investment in basic road traffic management infrastructure 
may have a very powerful leverage effect if it complies 
with and supports the functional requirements of value-
added services. These have the potential to promote 
significant investment and job creation in the private 
sector particularly for on-board equipment and the services 
market. This affects also the export chances of the Union. 
The introduction of automatic debiting systems on the 
TERN will contribute to improving its traffic management 
but at the same time stimulate the introduction of other 
services. 
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With regard to air traffic management, work is already 
under way. The Commission has adopted a two-stage 
approach: the first is to integrate air traffic control 
equipment so that the control is homogeneous for air 
space users. ' The second stage involves exploitation of 
the possibilities offered by the new technologies such as 
digital data links (monitoring) and positioning systems 
(navigation). This technological progress is the only 
possible response to the traffic volume forecast for the 
next decade. 
pan-European network, in cooperation with the European 
Civil Aviation Conference in the context of the Eatchip 
(European air traffic control harmonization and inte-
gration) programme. 
For all modes of transport the Commission will ensure 
that the external dimension of transport management 
services is duly taken into account when developing 
Union priority projects. 
With regard to sea-vessel traffic management information 
services (VTMIS), the degree of development varies. For 
example, there are numerous traffic management services 
already in existence in Northern Europe, some of which 
merely require modernization, whereas the Mediterranean 
and outlying regions have practically none. The 
implementation of existing or forthcoming (Eurorep) 
directives will require the setting-up of a complete Euro-
pean ship reporting system based on the electronic inter-
change of data (EDI) and using VTS infrastructures, 
which, in certain cases, will therefore have to be set up 
specially to meet this objective. 
With regard to the positioning system by satellites, the 
first phase of the project could begin in 1995 and, provided 
solutions to the various 'administrative obstacles' are 
found, operational systems could be available from 1996/7 
onwards. A special communication to the Council and 
Parliament
2 provides more information on the prospects. 
With regard to the extension of traffic management 
services to third countries, the declaration adopted by the 
second pan-European transport conference
3 underlines 
that common standards should be applied and that maxi-
mal compatibility should be sought when introducing 
or developing technical systems so as to ensure their 
interoperability. It will be also essential to develop Euro-
pean systems that can compete. 
The Commission is currently working towards the defi-
nition of guidelines for a network of air traffic manage-
ment for the Union. This network will be integrated into a 
Today the fragmented organization of air traffic services has 
resulted in technical incompatibilities that disrupt traffic. Stan-
dardization of the interfaces between control centres and means 
of monitoring will guarantee compatibility. 
COM(94) 248. 
Crete conference March 1994. 
(c) Definition of priority projects 
Priority is due, first of all, to those projects to be 
initiated in the period 1994-96 resulting from a political 
undertaking already made at European level, for instance 
through legislation or action programmes adopted under 
the common transport policy. In this connection the 
following proposals have been identified: 
• Rail 
The (German, French and Italian) operators, in cooper-
ation with IUR/CCFE, could evaluate the ERTMS system 
on the routes put forward in the following projects: 
The high-speed train East project (Paris-eastern 
France-Germany) 
This project will extend from Paris to Munich and Vienna 
via Strasbourg. For the German section, only the line from 
Saarbrücken to Mannheim is included in the project. 
Lyons—Turin combined transport/high-speed train link 
These two major projects of the European high-speed 
train network are ideally suited to such tests and these two 
projects are included in the list of priority projects adopted 
already by the Heads of State or Government at the Corfu 
Summit. 
• Road 
On the basis of the Council resolution of 26 September 
1994 on telematics in the transport sector, an initial 
implementation of major trans-European corridors (7 000-
10 000 km) of a road traffic management system covering 
interconnection of traffic information and traffic control 
centres, and the application of RDS-TMC should be 
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launched in a concerted European way. The Committee 
on Transport Infrastructure is invited to grant a study on 
such an immediate application on 27 October 1994. 
• Air 
The setting-up, with Eurocontrol, in the area with the 
densest air traffic, of an integrated aircraft monitoring 
network that will increase the capacity of the European air 
space (ECU 100 million): this network will be backed up 
by a communications network for the exchange of data 
between control centres (ECU 40 million). This project 
will have to be carried out on the basis of the standardiz-
ation rules set out in Directive 93/65/EEC. 
• Satellites 
The setting up of a pre-operational satellite navigation 
system taking account of the requirements of all transport 
users (air, sea, land): the EC contribution (ECU 
60 million) will enable the aerospace industry, coordinated 
by the European Space Agency, to demonstrate the 
technical feasibility of this concept (see Commission 
communication on satellite navigation services 
(COM(94) 248)). This should be followed by a full 
installation (ECU 790 million) financed from user fees. 
• Maritime 
The project identified for immediate action is that connec-
ted with the implementation of the European ship-
reporting system (Directive 93/75/EEC and proposal for a 
Eurorep Directive of 12 December 1993), backed up 
by the priority land-based VTS and radio-navigation 
infrastructures, costing around ECU 350 million, and a 
system for the analysis of traffic flows (EPTO). 
example, clearly easier to recover costs from the user of a 
physical infrastructure than from the user of a maritime 
area where everyone has the right of free movement 
under international law. However, whatever the technical, 
institutional or legal obstacles to the application of this 
principle, solutions are currently being sought and should 
make it possible in future to place stringent limits on the 
need for public funding. 
In the rail sector the integration of the European rail traffic 
management system into the high-speed infrastructure 
projects means that the financing should be an integral 
part of the normal project financing. 
In the sea-VTMIS, financing is expected to continue to be 
closely linked to the public financing of the construction 
and the operation of infrastructure. This does not, how-
ever, exclude the possibility of private involvement. The 
mechanism of recovery of cost of aid to navigation is also 
being analysed. 
The types of financing in the road sector will vary 
from case to case, but there are clear opportunities for 
public/private partnerships and the realization of the 'user 
pays' principle through fees. 
In the ATM field, where in the past the costs were covered 
entirely by the tariffs, an important question to resolve is 
whether public funds should be used to reduce the tariffs. 
The development of the positioning system by satellites 
will initially be financed by contributions from the Euro-
pean Community, Eurocontrol and from the European 
Space Agency. Later on, the operational system could be 
subject to private financing. However, one must consider 
that the American GPS and the Russian Glonass system 
can be used free of charge for the next 10 to 15 years since 
they have already been paid for from defence budgets. 
(d) Financing 
The financing of the traffic management services varies 
from service to service. 
Recognition of the 'user pays' principle should be a 
common objective in the financing of traffic management 
services. However, as situations vary greatly in practice, 
it will be applied in different ways and with different 
degrees of sensitivity according to the sectors; it is, for 
(e) Administrative and regulatory framework 
In some areas such as rail and air traffic management, the 
long-term regulatory framework is already quite clear as a 
consequence of the proposed Directive on high-speed rail 
and the Directive on ATM standards. In other transport 
modes (e.g. maritime) the regulatory framework com-
monly developed in the Union by the public authorities for 
safety objectives could be the catalyst towards telematics 
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applications for commercial purposes. In the case of road 
traffic management services and both ATM and the 
positioning system by satellites, it is clear that steps will 
have to be taken by the European Union to ensure that the 
appropriate framework can be put in place. In all cases 
however, the European Union has an important role to 
play, since many problems are common to all Member 
States, although to different degrees, and indeed have 
cross-border dimensions and effects. Support has also to 
be given to the European standardization bodies and 
Eurocontrol for the development of a coherent industrial 
approach. 
The development of traffic management systems is set in 
a global context and, consequently, Union policy must be 
to ensure, in the appropriate agencies, that the European 
systems are recognized, integrated or compatible with 
systems used at world level. The regional dimension of 
traffic management services, moreover, implies greater 
cooperation with the countries bordering the Union. 
(f) Conclusions 
The above information confirms: 
(i) the importance of traffic management services based 
on telematics for the establishment of the trans-
European transport network and for the entire trans-
port sector; 
(ii) the priority to be given to the development of the 
areas highlighted for the next few years and in 
particular to the specific projects listed above ; 
(iii) the necessity of stimulating public/private partner-
ships for the traffic management services; 
(iv) the importance of a regulatory framework, in particu-
lar for technical standards, at a European level in 
order to stimulate European-scale markets. 
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I. Introduction 
Energy networks — and the energy which they supply — 
are of strategic importance for economic development, 
industrial competitiveness and the European Union's 
security of supply. Although the primary economic reason 
for developing them is to satisfy the demand for energy, 
they also contribute to enabling consumers to benefit from 
the single market and to linking island, landlocked and 
peripheral regions, i.e. to the Union's objectives of 
integration and cohesion. The strategic importance of 
energy networks was recognized with the inclusion of 
energy networks in the common approach to trans-
European networks (Title XII of the Treaty) and con-
firmed by the White Paper. 
these proposals, including the list of projects of common 
interest, during Germany's Presidency. The European 
Parliament's opinion — which is needed for formal 
adoption of the proposals — is expected by the start of 
1995. 
At its meeting in Corfu in June 1994, the European 
Council took note of the projects listed in Annex II to 
the Interim Report from the Christophersen Group and 
requested the Group to continue its work, examining the 
economic viability of the projects in particular. The 
European Council also called on the Group, together 
with the representatives of the acceding States, to 
continue studying, on the basis of its mandate, the 
extension of the trans-European networks to neighbour-
ing countries. 
The networks are a fundamental component of the 
Union's energy infrastructure. The electricity networks 
contribute to more efficient electricity generation and to 
fuller utilization of the existing generating capacity. 
Consequently, development of the networks reduces the 
need to build new power stations, for which it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to find sites because of 
environmental protection constraints. The gas networks 
in turn are essential to supply the market, often from 
distant sources. The development of the gas networks 
will also enhance the flexibility and security of the 
Union's energy supplies. 
The current situation on the Union's energy networks 
confirms the extremely high utilization, on the brink of 
saturation, of the existing interconnections between 
electricity grids. If the marked upward trend in transfers 
of electricity in the Union (which have doubled since 
the mid-1980s) is to continue, new electricity lines will 
have to be brought into service between the Member 
States. Nor will it be possible to meet the new demand 
for gas unless the existing gas pipelines are fully 
exploited and new transmission pipelines are brought 
into service. 
The Commission's proposals on the guidelines for 
trans-European electricity and natural gas networks ' are 
being examined by the Council and the European 
Parliament. The Council could reach agreement on all 
The Christophersen Group's work in the second half of 
1994 has made it possible to complete the assessment and 
selection of the priority projects in the light of the 
objectives of the White Paper. 
2. Selection criteria for the energy projects 
To assess the importance of the projects submitted to it, 
the Group agreed to consider three categories of criteria: 
(i) Eligibility criteria for action on trans-European net-
works, i.e.: 
• correspond to the definitions, objectives and pri-
orities already agreed for trans-European networks 
by the Council
2 when it examined the Com-
mission's proposed guidelines; ' 
• display potential economic viability. 
(ii) Economic impact criteria 
• be of significant size in relation to the energy 
market of the country or countries concerned; 
COM(93)685 final. 19.1.1994. 
Points agreed at the Council meeting on energy on 25 May 
1994. 
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• be mature enough for work to start within the next 
two or three years; 
• be open to private funding. 
(iii) Criteria reflecting Community policies 
• cause no distortion of competition; 
• contribute to completion of the internal market in 
accordance with the Treaty and the principles laid 
down in Section 3 below. 
The Group agreed to submit to the European Council 
only the energy network projects which were the most 
important from the point of view of the objectives of the 
White Paper but which have been having difficulties that 
have delayed the start or hampered the progress of the 
work. 
Usually, the difficulties facing energy network projects 
are procedural or regulatory: the length of the feasibility 
studies leading to detailed definition of the projects, 
slowness and delays in the building permission procedures 
or the lack of a regulatory framework in the case of 
schemes to introduce new energy sources. 
transfers between electricity or gas companies alone. 
They must fit into the context of a more open, 
competitive market, to the benefit of industrial and 
private consumers. 
However, the Group considers that this synergy must 
not be turned into an argument for establishing strict 
parallelism with the internal energy market dossier since 
this could slow down the progress possible on the 
networks dossier in the event of protraction of the 
Council's discussions on the Commission's proposals on 
the internal energy market. 
In this connection, the Commission recalled that 
the objective of calling into question the existing 
import/export monopolies, of implementing the direc-
tives on the transit of electricity and natural gas and, 
finally, of the proposals under discussion is to establish 
a legal framework compatible with integration of the 
markets. 
In the case of projects in the peripheral regions of the 
Union, where the financial returns on projects of this type 
are generally lower than in the central regions, financing 
can be an added problem. 
4. The different financing problems 
raised by energy networks 
3. Synergy between the development of 
the energy networks and completion 
of the internal market 
The Group examined the synergy between development 
of energy networks and completion of the internal energy 
market. In this connection, the advisability of establishing 
a strict link between the two was raised. 
The financing problem is not the same as with transport 
networks. In the case of energy projects, use of 
non-budgetary resources to finance investment in the 
energy sector is already the general rule. As for projects 
which will not produce financial returns until the longer 
term, particularly projects in the peripheral regions, the 
Union's current financial instruments — ERDF aid and 
EIB loans — must be drawn on as far as possible. 
This will generally provide a means of solving the 
financing problems. 
There are clear synergies between development of the 
networks and completion of the internal market. For one 
thing, the availability of adequate interconnections is a 
sine qua non for interoperability, transfers and a more 
flexible supply. For another, the new links which it 
proves necessary to build must not be for the benefit of 
Consequently, giving priority to the energy projects does 
not imply calling for extra public funds. The objective 
where financing is concerned is, clearly, to raise funds 
from energy undertakings, banks and other sources for 
projects confirmed at the highest level as being of common 
interest and priority. 
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5. Examination of the energy projects by 
the Group 
6. Recommendation by the Group on 
the energy projects 
The Group has completed its appraisal of the energy 
projects submitted to it and drawn the following con­
clusions: 
(a) Each of the nine priority projects drawn to the 
attention of the European Council in Corfu fits in 
well with all the criteria applied by the Group; in 
particular, each of these projects displays potential 
economic viability. 
(b) A 10th project also satisfies all the criteria applied by 
the Group, namely the trans-Pyrenees electricity link 
between France and Spain. 
(c) The Group has shortlisted three large-scale projects 
proposed by the acceding countries, i.e.: 
(i) the electricity link between Austria and Italy; 
(ii) the electricity interconnections between Norway 
and the Continent; 
(iii) the Baltic ring electricity project. 
These projects fit in with all the selection criteria but are 
less advanced. 
The Group recommends that the European Council adopt 
the list of priority energy projects in Annex 2 of the 
Group's report (see p. 26). 
This list is divided into two parts: 
(i) An A list of 10 priority energy network projects. 
These projects are ready. Work can start in the near future 
(by 1997) and the schemes can be brought into operation 
in the medium term (by 1999). The political support to be 
given to them should help to overcome the persisting 
administrative, regulatory or financial obstacles to these 
projects (see Annex Β for details) and make it possible to 
start the work rapidly and reap the direct and indirect 
benefits expected from construction and entry into service, 
both for the energy sector and for the European economy 
as a whole. 
(ii) A Β list of three other priority energy network 
projects. 
These projects are of direct interest to the acceding 
countries. They are not as advanced as the projects on the 
A List. The political support to be given to them will be 
the starting point for in-depth study and/or finalization of 
these projects with a view to speeding them up. The early 
phases of work on these projects could start in the medium 
term (by 1999). 
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I. Mandate 
In the follow-up debate on the White Paper, the European 
Council in Corfu (24 and 25 June 1994) asked the 
Christophersen Group to examine the question of relevant 
networks in the field of environment (point 1.3 of the 
Presidency conclusions 'Trans-European networks and 
environmental projects'). 
ment. The Group also looked into the question of current 
bottlenecks in environmental investment, if any. 
However, this approach should only be seen in the context 
of a transition towards an approach characterized by 
prevention of (further) environmental damage through the 
creation of a 'sound environmental infrastructure'. This 
involves the application of the principles on which the 
sustainable economic development model and the Union 
policy on the environment, including the fifth action 
programme, are based. 
2. White Paper/environment 
Environment and economy have become more and more 
interlocked into a seamless web of causes and effects. The 
White Paper on growth, competitiveness and employment 
underlined this interdependency and suggested a sustaina-
ble model in which the economic-ecological relationship 
should be considered as a stimulant for growth and 
employment and a basis for innovation and technological 
development. 
More specifically, the White Paper deals with environ-
mental concerns in three major areas: 
(a) in the short term, the promotion of investment in 
environmental infrastructure on a Union level; 
(b) recommendations for medium-term actions which can 
strengthen competitiveness and maintain and boost 
employment ( new technology, clean technology and 
biotechnology); 
(c) contribution towards the implementation of a new 
'sustainable development' model based on principles 
of integration into the other Union policies, precaution 
and prevention in order to avoid the overexploitation 
of environmental and natural resources and to de-
couple future economic prosperity from environmen-
tal degradation. 
The Christophersen Group has addressed the first concern: 
environmental infrastructure networks within which the 
selection of priority projects of common interest can take 
place; these projects should focus on helping to renew the 
economic base of degraded areas and to improve the 
productive infrastructure and on protecting the environ-
The network 'environment': 
A common responsibility 
The physical environment (nature, air, water and land) is 
in itself a (natural) network extending across national 
borders. This natural network has been overexploited and 
damaged by industrial production over the past century, 
urbanization, tourism and agriculture (erosion). Although 
some success has been achieved, there is still a lot of 
work to be done both by governments and other bodies 
(enterprises and public) in restoring and rehabilitating the 
degraded environment and preserving remaining high-
quality natural areas. There is a shared responsibility in 
building up a sound and cost-effective environmental 
infrastructure of facilities and installations in order not to 
hamper economic development, industrial competi-
tiveness and quality of life over time. 
4. Towards a coordinated/network approach 
Implementing this sound environmental infrastructure 
of facilities and installations needs in some sectors a 
coordinated and/or network approach at Union level 
similar to that of the TENs. Depending on the mechanism 
and incentives involved, this coordination could assist and 
accelerate the arrangements involving different Member 
States, thereby reducing the overall costs by achieving 
sufficient economies of scale, whilst respecting the prin-
ciples of subsidiarity. In this context two groups can 
be distinguished: networks of physically interconnected 
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and/or interdependent infrastructure (i.e. water and waste) 
and other networks deriving from a specific environmental 
state of affairs (e.g. nature, contaminated sites). In particu-
lar for the first group, water management (WM) and waste 
stream management (WSM), the planning of the necessary 
facilities and installations should take place on a common 
level so as to facilitate appropriate management in an 
open internal market which will result in more effectively 
reducing pollution and promoting quality. Relevant 
environmental EC directives (waste), international con-
ventions (protection of water resources and marine 
environment ) and policy initiatives of international and 
regional cooperation often imply a coordinated or network 
approach for environmental assessments, investments and 
monitoring. 
the effectiveness of investment by another in cleaning and 
safeguarding the 'global commons' (North Sea, Baltic 
Sea, Mediterranean, Irish Sea and the Atlantic Ocean). 
Direct economic revenues from these investments could 
include: maintaining the base of coastal tourism; savings 
in the drinking-water production process; improved feed-
stock of aquatic species for human consumption and thus 
maintaining the base for fisheries; savings in the disposal 
of dredged spoil in major waterways and coastal waters. 
Although difficult to quantify, the indirect revenues in 
terms of preservation of species and well-balanced ecosys-
tems are important. 
(b) Waste 
5. Network for water management and 
waste stream management 
(a) Protection of water resources and 
the marine environment 
The network of watercourses in Europe is a vital resource 
for most economic activities. For example, in the Mediter-
ranean countries, where tensions are increasing between 
different users, water management will play a fundamental 
role in economic development and competitiveness. More 
and more Member States linked to catchment areas of 
rivers or to common coastal zones are cooperating to 
act collectively against freshwater and marine pollution, 
caused by insufficient treatment of urban or industrial 
waste water. Various conventions and ministerial confer-
ences (Barcelona, Helcom, North Sea, etc.) call upon 
authorities to tackle jointly the myriad of water problems 
encompassing surface water, drinking-water and 
groundwater in river catchment areas. Some of these joint 
activities have led to comprehensive action programmes 
costing thousands of millions of ecus (Rhine, Baltic Sea, 
Elbe, METAP (technical assistance for the Mediterranean) 
and the Danube (under preparation)). Although the physi-
cal interdependence in catchment areas is basically one-
way (downstream depends on upstream activities), effec-
tive prevention or reduction of pollution in the marine 
environment requires measures everywhere in the catch-
ment areas. Failure to act by one Member State can reduce 
The volume of waste strains treatment and disposal 
capacity in most EU countries. It leads in some cases to 
unsustainable forms of waste disposal and to heavy 
clean-up cost in the future. These strains are aggravated 
due, in some instances, to uncontrolled cross-border 
movements of waste. Appropriate investments in waste 
installations (recycling and treatment aiming, where pos-
sible, at energy saving) throughout the EU are needed. 
Under the waste framework Directive, Member States are 
required to establish an integrated and adequate network 
of disposal installations. Other directives — some still 
under preparation — provide for further harmonization of 
conditions for an environmentally sound disposal of 
(dangerous) waste. Disparity between the provision of 
waste disposal in the various Member States may create 
inadequate conditions of competition and thus directly 
affect the functioning of the internal market. 
This integrated/adequate network of disposal facilities is 
based on the principles of proximity, most appropriate 
technologies safeguarding a high level of environmental 
protection and public health, and self-sufficiency per 
Member State, taking into account the geographical con-
ditions and the need for specialized installations for certain 
types of waste. In particular, disposal of certain dangerous 
waste due to its volume and diversity calls for planning 
on a European scale of a network of certain special 
facilities and installations. The advantages of such an 
approach are: (1) improvement of economic viability by 
adjusting supply and demand, thereby reducing costs 
for European industries and municipalities; (2) a better 
guarantee of continuity in sufficient capacity; (3) cooper-
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ation which will have a positive impact on the develop-
ment of new technologies. 
Institutional/economic features of 
environmental infrastructure 
The administration level responsible for promotion or 
implementation of water and waste projects is complex 
and strikingly different from that in the transport and 
energy sectors. A lot of individual projects are prepared 
by the regional or local authorities and (semi-) private 
companies. In a way, this reflects the importance of local 
factors and the limited scope for standardized solutions. 
On the other hand, it has important drawbacks as the 
planning and implementation capacities of many of the 
operators are quite limited. This weakness often results 
in unnecessary delays and operational problems which 
increase the risks and reduce the potential profitability. In 
many instances, the environmental and economic pres-
sures already work in the direction of closer cooperation 
and concentration in the water sector. A network approach 
would support this existing tendency. 
Despite the fact that a lot of new waste-water treatment 
facilities are still needed in the next decade the water 
sector, and to some degree the waste sector, are rather 
mature markets. Water consumption and household waste 
are hardly increasing due to increased environmental 
awareness. Together with uncertain future developments 
in environmental standards, this development creates 
problems for the operators as regards repayment capacity. 
Consequently, the financial rates of return of projects are 
often much lower than the economic rates of return which 
take external costs and benefits as well as the resource 
base of the economy into account. 
The financial viability of measures in the area of environ-
mental infrastructure depends mainly on the level of 
charges set either directly by the authorities or at least 
under strict supervision by the regulatory authorities. In 
some Member States, prices reflect approximately the full 
cost of investment and operation; in others, political 
considerations prevented an adaptation of the charges in 
line with cost. In this case many of the utilities have 
become an increasing burden to the budget, resultine in 
severe backlogs in reinvestments and creation of new 
capacities. 
If a proper resource pricing in conformity with the 
'polluter/user pays' principle were to be practised within 
a reliable and predictable regulatory framework the finan-
cial viability of many projects could be reached (although 
profitability will often remain modest) and the latter 
becomes at least to a larger degree bankable. Direct and 
permanent subsidies should be restricted to cases where 
they are objectively necessary, mainly for social reasons 
(small islands/remote rural areas). 
7. Financing 
Traditionally in Europe a major part of the environmental 
infrastructure has been operated as a public utility financed 
from the public budget. However, due to deteriorating 
public budgets no longer able to cope with requirements 
in this area, there is a marked trend to reach a wider 
involvement of the private sector. A straightforward 
privatization of services does not always provide a sol-
ution given the interest of private investors to concentrate 
in the commercially most-attractive locations, normally 
the big cities. There is, none the less, a considerable scope 
for mixed solutions in the form of a cooperation or joint 
venture between communes and the private sector as is 
widely practised in Germany and France, for example. 
The acceptance of mixed or private sector operations 
implies that the financial instruments will have to be 
adapted away from the current refinancing of public 
deficits in the form of general loans towards project-
related financing. The latter could involve the blending of 
commercial funds with public loans or grants so as to 
reduce financing cost. Depending on its construction it 
can consist of an interest rebate only or of a reduction of 
the repayment obligations for the principal as well. 
The amount of money needed for financing environmental 
infrastructure is less draconic than for the other TENs. 
As the individual projects are comparatively small, the 
banking system can cope with the necessary volume of 
financing without major difficulties. However, the real 
financial issue is cost and to a minor extent the maturity 
of the loans needed. Small projects with a long planning 
and implementation period and consequently a long 
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pay-back period produce relatively high administrative 
costs for the financial institutions. The situation becomes 
further exacerbated if the projects are delayed due to 
imperfect management and if there is a regulatory risk. 
All these possible factors contribute to relatively high 
costs of financing for projects which, due to their nature 
(for example flood protection) or for socioeconomic 
reasons (for example remote areas), have a very limited 
financial profitability. 
The European financial infrastructure is well developed to 
provide the necessary financial services. The role of the 
commercial sector can be complemented by the EIB and 
the specialized national banks for long-term infrastructure 
finance. However, local financial institutions with an 
intimate knowledge of the local situation have normally a 
very limited experience in project financing, which often 
entails technical and legal assistance in project preparation 
and implementation in addition to handling of the loans as 
such. 
8. Advantages of a Community 
coordination I network 
The interlinkage of environmental, institutional and finan­
cing aspects in parts of water and waste infrastructure 
calls for wider Union coordination. The objectives and 
advantages of the network approach are the following: 
(i) A more coordinated planning of the water-related 
infrastructure in transnational catchment areas or of 
waste management in a zone defined by topography 
and by supply and demand rather than political 
criteria would allow a better priority setting between 
the projects according to environmental policy cri­
teria. An intelligent phasing of the investment can 
substantially improve the environmental and econ­
omic return of the investment. 
(ii) A coordinated and better planned investment reduces 
the risks of failures and delays. Thus, the overall 
economic cost will be reduced and the financial cost 
will be lower. A network approach could reduce the 
cost of the investments and increase the environmen­
tal benefits and thus the overall economic viability of 
the investment. 
(iii) A coordinated approach would allow a meaningful 
packaging of small projects into programmes. This 
reduces the administration cost and hence the spread 
required from the financial institutions; in addition, 
it facilitates the (co-)financing from Community 
and national resources (see Annex IV. A on Union 
assistance for environmental infrastructure). 
(iv) A network approach avoids duplication of work and 
allows a more efficient use of the scarce and costly 
sectoral planning resources. 
(v) Setting up these networks will also create the neces­
sary cooperation, a solid home base and an incentive 
for new technologies and interesting 'eco-business' 
in the Community, which is encountering stiff com­
petition from the USA and Japan. 
(vi) Synergy effects can be created with other 'networks', 
for example, with transport as regards waterways and 
port facilities. 
(vii) Cooperation with third countries, in particular with 
those with which the Community shares common 
seas and rivers, can also be a cost-effective way to 
solve pollution problems in the Community. 
Hence, the prime objective of a coordinated/network 
approach is to achieve more cost-effectiveness in the 
implementation of the necessary environmental infrastruc­
ture. Finally, setting up these networks and accelerating 
the implementation of a sound water and waste infrastruc­
ture corresponds best with the objective(s) of the White 
Paper: Helping to improve the productive infrastructure 
and thus to strengthen the economic position of the 
Community. 
9. Conclusions 
A — A coordinated network approach in the field of 
environment is considered relevant by the Christo­
phersen Group, in particular in the following fields: 
(a) Protection of water resources and the marine 
environment; 
(b) waste. 
Β — As a follow-up procedure, necessary guidelines 
describing principles, objectives and specific cri-
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teria should be established for these sectors within 
the framework of the Environmental Council in 
order to enable more effectively: 
(a) optimal consultation and coordination between 
decision-making levels while respecting the 
principle of subsidiarity; 
(b) optimal selection of priority projects/groups of 
projects of common interest taking into account 
the specifics of environmental infrastructure 
projects (e.g. scale); 
(c) optimal use of the available Union financial 
resources. 
Further examination is necessary of the bottlenecks 
in environmental investment and of the way(s) the 
use of the existing Union financial instruments, in 
particular the EIB and LIFE (financial instrument 
for the environment), could be improved and where 
appropriate adjusted in the light of (a) these bottle-
necks, (b) the necessary financial incentives for the 
implementation of the guidelines, and (c) the extent 
to which the 'polluter-pays' principle can be 
applied. In particular, the examination on the 
financing of environmental infrastructure should 
look into the improvement of: 
(a) the coordination between the financial insti-
tutions and the various levels of authorities 
concerned, as well as the promoters; 
(b) the terms and conditions of the financial instru-
ments such as duration of loans, interest rate 
and guarantees. 
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Annex IV.A 
Community assistance for environmental 
infrastructure 
Grants 
(1994 ¡n million ECU) 
Structural 
Funds (SF) 
Cohesion Fund 
LIFE 
PHARE 
TACIS 
Objective 1 
Objective 2 
Objective 5b 
Community 
initiatives 
1993 
1991-93 
1990-93 
1991-93 
1989-93 
Total 
SF/CSF 
48 665 
7619
2 
3 4612 
5 4942 
1 564 
195 
3 294 
1 360 
Environ-
ment and 
water ' 
4 294 
1 143 
415 
908
 4 
613 
195 
267 
256
7 
% 
total 
8.8 
14 
12 
16.5 
39.2 
100 
8 
18 
1994-99 
Total 
SF/CSF 
96 346 
6 977 
6 134 
13 450
5 
14 455 
197 
(1994-95) 
990 
(1994) 
510 
(1994) 
Environ-
ment and 
water ' 
8 332 
n.a.-
1 
n.a. 
n.a. 
7 227 
197 
n.a. 
n.a. 
% 
total 
8.6 
50
(' 
100 
Cohesion Fund by sector 
(million ECU) 
Approved 
Water supply 
Water quality 
Waste 
Sewage 
Erosion 
Nature 
Other 
1993 
274.68 
78.51 
13.66 
109.84 
98.14 
22.69 
16.3 
19948 
78.036 
1.748 
5.12 
34.481 
— 
7.184 
22.07 
LIFE by priority (1991-93) 
(million ECU) 
Promotion sustainable development 
Nature/habitats 
Improvement services 
Measures outside Community 
Other 
79.081 
92.684 
8.229 
13.708 
1.298 
195.000 
CSF: Community support framework. 
1 Water projects have often more than one objective (water supply, electricity, agriculture, etc.). 
2 Estimates 1994 prices. 
3 n.a.: not yet available; negotiations are ongoing. 
4 Envireg, Interreg, Rechar. 
5 No separate environment Community initiative is envisaged. 
6 50% is taken as an indicative 'appropriate balance' with transport. 
7 Mainly nuclear safety. 
8 Provisional. 
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Annex IV.A 
Loans 
EIB (million ECU)
1 
1. Loans within Community 
(a) individual 
(b) global
2 
Edinburgh
3 
2. CEEC
4 
3. Mediterranean 
1989-93 
Total 
70 484.1 
55 517.7 
14 966.4 
2 363.3 
1 702.0 
1 903.1 
of which: 
environ-
ment 
7 829.7 
6 025.7 
1 804.0 
404.6 
— 
335 
% 
11 
17 
18 
1993 
Total 
16 779.4 
14 126.0 
2 653.4 
2 363.3 
882.0 
680.5 
of which: 
environ-
ment 
2 214.3 
1 674.8 
539.5 
404.6 
— 
152.0 
% 
13.1 
17 
22.3 
Loans EIB 
Environmental sectors 
Drinking-water supply 
Waste water treatment 
Supply/sewerage 
Waste (solid and liquid) 
Multi-purpose 
1989-93 
570.7 
2 323.4 
3 141.8 
990.4 
803.3 
7 829.7 
1993 
171.6 
479.2 
797.3 
400.9 
365.3 
2 214.3 
Edinburgh facility (until July 1994) approved ECU 6 593 million 
Environment 
Transport 
Energy 
Telecom 
Facility 
1 353 
3 237 
1406 
597 
Total EIB loans 
4 595 
10 340 
3 491 
1 850 
Sectoral 
Water management 
Waste 
Industrial 
Mixed (global loans)
5 
585 
83 
206 
479 
ACPs excluded. 
Allocations on global loans signed. 
1993 global/individual loans signed under the Edinburgh facility; total approved (July 1994): ECU 6 593 million, 
of which, environment ECU 1 353 million. 
Period 1990-93 signed contracts. 
Water, waste, small infrastructure. 
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in particular to Central and Eastern Europe 
and to the Mediterranean basin 
I. Introduction 
The Maastricht Treaty stipulates that, in the field of 
trans-European networks 'the Community may decide to 
cooperate with third countries to promote projects of 
mutual interest and to ensure the interoperability of 
networks'. The Europe Agreements of the Community 
with Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Romania and Bulgaria foresee that a priority area for 
cooperation shall be 'the construction and modernization, 
on major routes of common interest and trans-European 
links,' of transport infrastructure, while the Transport 
Agreement with Slovenia sets out specific infrastructures 
to be developed. 
While the Community is the main trading partner for the 
associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe and 
other neighbouring countries, trade with these countries 
has also increased in importance for the Community. The 
share of associated countries' exports in EU imports grew 
from 2.7% (1989) to 4.2% (1993) and the share of 
associated countries' imports in EU exports grew from 
2.8% (1989) to 5.3% (1993). 
Extending trans-European networks to these countries 
not only serves a short- and medium-term objective of 
stimulating economic growth and employment, but also 
helps to integrate their economies with that of the Com-
munity, to which these countries will seek to accede in the 
future. 
Taking this background into account, on the basis of the 
mandate of the Christophersen Group, the development 
of the priority corridors for trans-European transport 
networks in Central and Eastern Europe, identified as a 
starting point for the future work by all transport ministers 
at the second Pan-European Transport Conference in 
Crete in March 1994, was discussed with the countries 
concerned, the international financial institutions (IFI, 
i.e. World Bank, EBRD, EIB), leading European and 
international private banks and enterprises active in this 
field, in a number of meetings of the G24 transport 
group and, where private investors showed an interest, in 
workshops confined to specific corridors. Such specific 
workshops were held for the corridors Berlin-Warsaw-
Minsk-Moscow; Dresden-Kiev; Dresden-Prague-Bu-
dapest; Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest-Lvov-Kiev; Turku-
Helsinki-St Petersburg-Moscow. 
A number of conclusions, requiring action by the Union 
as well as by the countries concerned, can be drawn from 
these discussions, both in relation to the specific projects 
proposed for priority implementation, and in general 
as regards the development of trans-European transport 
networks in Central and Eastern Europe with the partici-
pation of the private sector. 
2. Specific projects 
(a) Criteria 
The criteria determined by the Group for the selection of 
projects within the European Union were taken as a 
starting point for the determination of criteria for projects 
outside the Union. 
Against this background, emphasis was placed on projects 
that ensure the interlinking of EU regions and regions 
of third countries, taking into account the intensity of 
cooperation and partnership and the long-term objective 
of promotion of a wider economically integrated space in 
a geographically balanced manner. 
Two additional sets of criteria were devised and applied 
to various candidate projects. These criteria stem from 
those applied within the Union as regards trans-European 
networks and from the criteria identified by the second 
Pan-European Transport Conference. They can be sum-
marized as follows: 
Transport policy criteria 
Selected projects should serve the interconnection of 
networks of third countries with the Union network; they 
should facilitate in a sustainable manner international 
transport flows (10% of international traffic on average) 
within the defined corridors and contribute to establishing 
mutually compatible, interoperational and modally bal-
anced TENs. 
Viability criteria 
The maturity and administrative and financial viability of 
the projects should be well established, taking into account 
the size of the project, the priorities set and the efforts 
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made by third-country governments, and the possibility of 
public and private external financing. 
(b) Selected projects 
Taking into account the Group's discussions so far and on 
the basis of these criteria, bearing in mind that projects for 
which the implementation has begun or is about to begin 
have not been retained, the following projects should be 
further promoted: 
(i) with a view to their expected start-up between now 
and 1996: 
• Berlin-Warsaw-Minsk-Moscow (rail and road); 
(ii) in a second phase (up to 2000): 
• Dresden-Prague (road and rail); 
• Nuremberg-Prague (road); 
• fixed link across the Danube (road and rail) 
between Bulgaria and Romania; 
• Helsinki-St Petersburg-Moscow (rail/road); 
• Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest-Lvov-Kiev 
(rail/road); 
• Baltic Sea telematic platform. 
The Berlin-Warsaw-Minsk-Moscow project will 
improve the connection of major Polish, Belarus, Ukrain-
ian and Russian industrial centres to the Union. Initially, 
the Berlin-Moscow project will put the emphasis on the 
railways, in accordance with the priorities of the authori-
ties concerned. The EIB and PHARE already co-finance a 
major railway project in Poland. 
The Dresden-Prague project and the fixed link across the 
Danube are on a corridor which provides an essential link 
between Greece and the rest of the Union. The two 
projects cover critical bottlenecks on the priority corridor 
No IV, which was identified as a starting point for 
future work on coherent infrastructure development at 
pan-European level. This corridor is interconnected with 
project No 7 (Patras-Bulgarian border), retained by the 
European Council in Corfu, on the border between Bulga-
ria and Greece. 
The construction of a fixed link across the Danube 
between Romania and Bulgaria could improve appreciably 
traffic flows between the Balkan region and the Union. 
Furthermore, this type of project is particularly adapted to 
mixed financing since the direct revenues generated, in 
the form of tolls, by this new infrastructure might be 
significant. 
The Helsinki-St Petersburg-Moscow corridor is of stra-
tegic importance, as is the Berlin-Moscow project, for 
access to the Russian market via Finnish ports, both in 
terms of imports and exports. With Finland joining the 
Community in 1995, the Community interest in this 
project is increased. 
The Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest-Lvov-Kiev corridor is 
— as far as the Slovenian territory is concerned — already 
under development with support of the Community under 
the Transport Agreement with Slovenia. Construction of a 
missing link between Slovenia and Hungary will improve 
access of south-east European countries to the Adriatic 
ports and the Community, thus facilitating the develop-
ment of trade in this region. 
A Finnish proposal on a Finnish/German/Russian pilot 
project 'Telematics in foreign trade delivery management 
in the Baltic Sea area' that would comprise the develop-
ment of a telematic platform in the area, will improve the 
competitiveness of companies operating in the area and 
allow for a more effective use of multimodal transport 
chains between riparian Baltic States and between these 
States and the European Community, in particular after 
the accession of Finland to the European Union. 
The Group also recognized the importance of connecting 
Union networks to Switzerland, which undertook in the 
Transit Agreement' to construct a number of railway 
infrastructures connected to the Union network. 
Mediterranean basin 
The Commission services have been examining a Spanish 
proposal for an 'intermodal trans-European network' that 
entails the development of logistic platforms centred 
around six major ports that are connected to the Com-
munity network. 
In this context, it should be noted that a Member State 
Group on Ports and Maritime Transport was set up to 
1 Agreement between the EC and the Swiss Confederation on the 
carriage of goods by road and rail, OJ L 373. 21.12.1992. 
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assist the Commission in developing the port element of 
the trans-European network. Regional groups were set up, 
inter alia for the Mediterranean basin with Spain acting 
as a coordinator and Italy as a rapporteur. Information 
regarding traffic flows and the state of the physical 
infrastructure in ports will be gathered with a view to 
assessing specific port projects at a later stage. 
The Commission intends to continue and intensify work 
on drawing up a comprehensive plan with the objective 
of coordinating the allocation of human and financial 
resources to the development of transport infrastructure in 
the Mediterranean basin, taking into account the particular 
geographical features of the region and, in particular, the 
need to exploit fully maritime transport integrated with 
other modes of transport. The Commission will report on 
the progress of work to the European Council at the end 
of 1995. 
Traffic management systems 
Traffic management systems also offer a vast potential for 
private investment due to their profitability in Central and 
Eastern Europe. In particular, air traffic management 
systems in this region might even today be of interest to 
private investors due to the possibility of collecting 
substantial overflight and landing fees. With regard to 
the extension of traffic management systems to third 
countries, the declaration adopted by the second Pan-
European Transport Conference emphasizes that common 
standards should be applied and that maximal compati-
bility should be sought when introducing or developing 
technical systems so as to ensure their interoperability. It 
is essential to develop European systems that are also 
competitive on a worldwide scale from an industrial 
policy perspective. 
The Commission is currently working on the definition of 
guidelines for an air-traffic management network for the 
Union. This network will be integrated into a pan-
European network, in cooperation with the European 
Civil Aviation Conference in the context of the Eatchip 
(European air-traffic control harmonization and inte-
gration) programme. 
As regards other modes of transport, the Commission 
will ensure that the external dimension of transport 
management systems is duly taken into account when 
developing Union priority projects. 
3. General conclusions from the workshops 
(a) A Community priority for trans-European 
network financing 
Public sector contributions to the financing of transport 
infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe come from 
the government budgets of the countries concerned, the 
World Bank group institutions (World Bank, MIGA, IFC), 
the EBRD, the EIB, the budgets of the Union and certain 
other bilateral donors. As a contribution to a reasonable 
division of labour, the Commission concluded that the 
Union, as a motor for European integration, should, in the 
context both of its pre-accession strategy for the European 
Agreement countries and its interest in the integration of 
the countries linked to the Union by a cooperation 
agreement, target its support to the development of 
trans-European transport networks as an essential contri-
bution to the economic and social integration of Europe. 
A clear priority should be given by the Union to supporting 
projects located on the corridors identified by the second 
Pan-European Transport Conference in Crete in March 
1994 as a starting point for future work on coherent 
infrastructure development at pan-European level. How-
ever, further considerations should be given to remarks 
made at the Crete conference with regard to parallel 
corridors and their economic viabilities. 
Participants from the private sector stressed that a coherent 
development of TENs cannot rely on the improvement of 
fixed infrastructure alone. It will be necessary to coordi-
nate support for actions on infrastructure and support for 
other measures, such as the speeding-up of border-
crossing controls and customs procedures and the develop-
ment of an appropriate overall policy and legal framework 
in the country concerned, in order to ensure the necessary 
coherence to form a basis for private investments. 
Examples of this are the Commission's strategy towards 
railways and the encouragement of short-sea shipping, 
where infrastructure improvement suggestions (covering 
ports and navigation systems) go hand in hand with 
planned policy promotion measures. The regulatory 
framework for road and rail transports, and especially the 
degree of allocation of the respective costs of these 
transport modes to users, needs to be addressed since it 
influences to a very high degree the profitability of 
investments in the respective infrastructures. 
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Participants from the IFIs suggested that the Union 
might further intensify the approach already practised — 
especially by the World Bank and the EBRD — of 
imposing reasonable conditions regarding progress in 
policy and organizational reform on support for infrastruc-
ture investments. This would ensure that projects financed 
with EU support can be used and operated effectively and 
therefore produce the maximum benefit for the transport 
system and the economy as a whole. 
(b) A framework for early and continuous 
private involvement 
Private parties stressed that they were willing to take up 
risks associated with TEN projects in Central and East 
European countries (CEECs) only within a certain econ-
omic and legal framework. In most CEECs there has until 
now been a particular problem due inter alia to the 
absence of a legal framework providing for the possibility 
of concessions and the collection of fees from users of 
infrastructures.' In the railway sector, the possibility for 
private parties to operate railway services or at least 
to participate in operating companies was an essential 
condition for the increased involvement of private inves-
tors. Provision should also be made for private parties to 
develop and operate services on and along infrastructure, 
such as hotels, petrol stations or shopping facilities (for 
example, in train stations), as well as ports or airports, 
thus capturing some of the benefits of the improved 
infrastructures and opening up additional possibilities for 
private financial contributions to infrastructure develop-
ment in terms of capital and know-how. 
Discussions in the workshops also revealed that private 
investors prefer to be involved as early as possible in the 
planning process for specific projects. For example, terms 
of reference and the selection of consultants for feasibility 
studies should be agreed with potential investors and 
creditors in order to make sure that the findings are 
acceptable to them. In some cases it might be useful, 
within certain limits, to leave alignment and technical 
design to the private investors in order to achieve an 
approach rigorously guided by economic considerations 
and geared towards satisfying a specific service demand. 
For specific projects, development and promotion com-
panies could be set up jointly by interested private parties 
and the public sector. Participation in such a company 
would prove the seriousness of the commitment of part-
ners and ensure continuity in the project-related work. 
EU technical assistance should strengthen its responsive-
ness to these concerns both in its own procedures and by 
focusing on helping the countries concerned to make 
progress towards meeting these essential concerns. 
(c) Keeping the corridors in view 
Workshop participants from the private and public sectors 
stressed the need for a comprehensive vision on the 
development of corridors, for two reasons. Firstly, the 
profitability of individual projects can be very heavily 
dependent on how a corridor as a whole develops. 
Secondly, it is important to avoid 'cherry picking', 
whereby either private investors concentrate only on the 
most profitable parts,
2 such as ports
3 or airports,
4 leaving 
the public sector to pay for the less attractive sections, or 
— in the reverse situation — where the public authorities 
offer only the less profitable parts to private investors, 
leading to the effective failure of attempts at public/private 
partnership. 
These points were in particular emphasized in the dis-
cussions on the Berlin-Moscow corridor. In response to a 
German request, the Ministers for Transport of the 
countries on this corridor and the Commission have 
concluded a multilateral memorandum of understanding 
on coordinated work on planning and development of this 
corridor (including legislative, organizational and training 
aspects) as an umbrella for specific projects involving 
both the private and the public sector. This memorandum 
1 For example, for road projects, Hungary is a forerunner both in 
terms of the legal situation and in terms of the number of 
projects under way with private participation; Poland intends to 
pass a law on concessions for motorways and the possibility of 
collecting tolls before the end of 1994. In Belarus and Russia, 
developments in this directions are also under way. 
For example, the first motorway project in Hungary financed 
with private capital is the route Vienna-Budapest, where the 
share of international traffic is higher than average; however, 
other projects are already under way where this is not necessarily 
the case. 
Traffic flows concentrate in ports, being natural monopolies. 
Investments can thus often be secured by long-term supply 
contracts, for example, for oil or other valuable natural resources. 
A terminal at Warsaw airport was financed without a government 
guarantee or contribution for the price of ceding all income from 
user fees to investors. 
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also covers specific governmental measures to increase 
return on investments, such as border-crossing facilitation. 
The private sector welcomed this initiative and proposed 
that this model might be used on other projects as a means 
of increasing investor confidence in the coordinated 
development of a corridor. 
Participating countries stressed that the possibilities for 
support of TEN priority projects should be the same along 
the whole corridor in order to keep a certain coherence in 
development, especially as regards cross-border projects. 
Thus, within the existing financial perspectives, the Union 
should be able to support TEN projects such as the Berlin-
Moscow corridor on the Russian and Belarus territory in 
the form of co-financing and special cross-border 
measures, such as grants for improving border crossings, 
as it can already do on Polish territory. In this context it 
was also important to note that the accession of Finland 
will lead to a joint border between Russia and the 
Union. It might also be useful to consider extending the 
geographic scope of activity of the EIB in TEN financing 
further east in the direction of Russia, as has been 
requested by the Russian Government. 
(d) Using existing financial instruments 
to attract private investments 
Due to the specific characteristics of transport infrastruc-
ture projects, such as the long payback period and the fact 
that not all benefits of an investment necessarily accrue to 
the investor, participants in the workshops concluded that 
a private/public partnership would often be the best 
constellation for approaching priority projects. Private 
participation in public projects should be sought also from 
within the countries concerned, in order to increase the 
leverage effects of public funds, including those given as 
aid by the Union, thus reinforcing the potential contri-
bution in compensation for the very limited government 
budgets available for infrastructure investments in Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
A number of options for the use of EU instruments were 
discussed which warrant further exploration. 
Private participants suggested that existing financial 
instruments could in the first place be specifically 
employed so as to attract additional private capital for the 
financing of projects. Aid could be made available in the 
forms appropriate for the specific project needs, for 
example as a loan guarantee or interest-rate subsidy as 
foreseen in Article 129c (1) last indent of the Maastricht 
Treaty, minimizing at the same time Community overhead 
costs. Co-financing might be targeted at TEN projects in 
which private parties participate. Full financing, together 
with other public contributions, such as a loan from the 
EIB or another IFI and the State budget, should only 
proceed where it can be demonstrated that no private 
parties have an interest in participating. Mixed financing 
should be preferred wherever possible. 
A number of countries, IFIs and private participants said 
that consideration might be given to extending the group 
of institutions qualifying as a partner for EU co-financing. 
This should be possible not only with the international 
financial institutions in the narrow sense (World Bank, 
EIB, EBRD) but also with the IFC, MIGA, Eurofima, and 
Member States as well as third country long-term credit 
institutions, investment guarantee agencies and export 
credit insurers. Furthermore, an EU contribution to the 
capital costs of the project or in some other form should 
be possible not only if one of these institutions is involved 
as lender, but also if it is involved as insurer, guarantor or 
equity stake holder. In all these cases, the participation of 
the qualified partner guarantees a certain review of the 
economic and financial viability of the project financed. 
EU aid might also be granted in the form of minority 
equity risk capital participation in purely private invest-
ments with the major share of risk being carried by the 
private sector. 
The ceiling for EU co-financing, presently at 15% of the 
budget available for PHARE, should be lifted and replaced 
by a more flexible regime which can take appropriate 
account of the different economic situations in the 
countries concerned and the specific project needs. Fur-
thermore, the geographic scope of EU co-financing should 
be expanded in line with TEN developments, as already 
referred to above. 
EIB loans should be combined, where possible, with 
private participation in a project. To reach this goal, the 
possibility of private involvement in a project might be 
systematically evaluated; and potentially interested private 
parties should be actively approached in order to promote 
their participation in the given project. 
Rules for the EU instruments and the technical assistance 
to the countries concerned should be developed to achieve 
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these objectives. National administrations should receive 
general training in the expertise necessary to achieve 
private/public partnerships which are beneficial to all 
stakeholders, and assistance in accompanying concrete 
projects in terms of support to marketing, financial 
engineering, contracting and implementation. 
(e) Improved guarantees for TEN projects 
Existing EU financial instruments in a start-up phase help 
to overcome incremental obstacles of project development 
or indeed, through a loan, take up the full project risks. 
However, under present rules the latter must be secured 
by a full budgetary guarantee of the Union and a State 
guarantee, which in particular reduces the possibility for 
the beneficiary State to provide guarantees to private 
investors. On the other hand, long-term guarantees would 
help to attract additional private capital to TEN projects 
without necessarily burdening the Union with the full 
project risks. 
A number of options for improving guarantee possibilities 
have been discussed in the workshops; they warrant 
further exploration. 
The extension of the EIF activities to financing TENs in 
Central and Eastern Europe would be helpful, but only 
partly cover the needs expressed by the private sector. In 
fact, in many cases the commercial risks of a credit or 
investment could be carried to a certain extent by the 
private sector. However, guarantees need to cover those 
aspects of investments which cannot be controlled by the 
investor, such as political risks and the risk of government 
non-performance relating to the conditions agreed for 
the investment, for example, the terms agreed in the 
concession agreement. While the principle of subsidiarity 
requires further in-depth evaluation as to how far such 
risks could be covered by Member States' instruments, 
some deficiencies in existing instruments are already 
apparent. The private sector expressed the view that 
therefore certain EU initiatives would be welcome. 
Given that investments in the transport sector require 
long-term capital — with concession periods lasting from 
15 to 50 years — the Commission was asked to explore 
whether it could aim at promoting credit insurance 
schemes with this kind of duration, thus clearly going 
beyond existing export credit insurance maximum 
maturity coverage of 10 years. Since under present OECD 
rules longer coverage is not possible, a review of these 
rules, in order to allow for longer coverage when TEN, 
or, more generally, transport infrastructure, projects are 
concerned, was suggested by private banks and industry. 
It should, however, be noted that agreement on such an 
extension, on a general basis, would be far from easy to 
achieve within the OECD. 
It was also suggested that the Union could also increase 
investor confidence in investments in TEN projects in 
those countries with which it has an Association or 
Cooperation Agreement by setting up a guarantee mechan-
ism covering political risks as well as risks of govern-
mental or regulatory performance as contractually agreed 
within the framework of a private/public partnership. 
Private sector participants during the Berlin-Moscow 
workshop stressed that such guarantees would greatly 
enhance their ability to invest in or lend to TEN projects 
in these countries. The Union was particularly well placed 
to provide such guarantees, given its political as well as 
economic relations with the countries concerned, 
especially with those which have entered the pre-accession 
stage. Such guarantees would be an appropriate means to 
demonstrate the confidence of the EU in the political 
stability of the new democracies and the reliability of the 
respective governments, forming an essential element of 
a broader strategy to attract private investments, especially 
during the pre-accession stage. Following the World Bank 
approach, as security for the guarantee to the private 
investor, a counter-guarantee from the country profiting 
from the loan or investment guaranteed could be required. 
The budgetary implications of such a guarantee mechan-
ism could be kept to a minimum.' It would also have the 
advantage of not counting against the limit of sovereign 
lending of the countries concerned. 
(f) A special effort for railway financing 
With a network denser than in the EU, the railways are 
still the backbone for the transport of goods and people in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Securing sustainable mobility 
on the long distances of certain corridors, such as Berlin-
This proposal is based on a presentation of the World Bank 
during the Moscow-Berlin corridor workshop, outlining the 
possibility of using guarantees to attract private capital; the 
proposal was approved by the board of the World Bank on 8 
September 1994. 
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Moscow, will require full exploitation of the potential 
competitive advantage of the railways. 
Participants from industry and railways therefore stressed 
that the Union should increase efforts to support railway 
projects. Investments should be supported in different 
areas, since confining support only to fixed infrastructure 
investments would ignore that a higher service level can 
often be reached in a less costly way by other technical or 
managerial improvements, such as upgrading of the rolling 
stock or of train management systems. Furthermore, new 
forms of financing, such as leasing of railway equipment, 
both from presently State-owned railways to new private 
operators and from existing railway wagon-leasing com-
panies should be supported. With new and innovative 
approaches, the railways would be able to attract private 
capital, provided also that the regulatory framework 
defining competition with road transport, and especially 
the question of internalization of external costs, were 
adequately addressed. 
One example of a possible combination of measures 
regarding rolling stock and infrastructure is the route 
Dresden-Prague, which presently runs with numerous 
curves through the Elbe valley. The use of tilting trains 
(type 'Pendolino', 'Talgo') can improve speeds on this 
section, thus avoiding a totally new alignment of infra-
structure at high costs. The Czech Government envisages 
a mixed financing for the total cost of infrastructure 
investments of at least ECU 100 million, with contri-
butions of up to one third from the government budget, 
one third from international public sources, such as the 
EIB, EBRD and PHARE, and one third from private 
investors, which could receive a guarantee for up to 25% 
of their investment. The Deutsche Bundesbahn AG has 
shown an interest in participating in this project in the 
framework of an arrangement allowing it to recover 
investment costs through the charging of user fees. 
For the Berlin-Moscow corridor concepts for private 
participation in investments and operations are also being 
developed. According to the EBRD, a combination of 
investments in terminals at the Brest border crossing, to 
facilitate movements across the change of gauge between 
Russia and the rest of Europe, and investments in pools 
for freight and passenger wagons which can be used both 
on broad and narrow gauge could attract private and 
public funds, since a reduction of delays at this bottleneck 
would significantly increase the profitability of operations 
on this corridor. A necessary element for this project to go 
ahead is the willingness of the railways of the countries 
concerned to participate in the investments and to cooper-
ate better in the operation of services. 
Ministries of Transport might also encourage railway 
companies to consider better use of their creditworthiness 
to attract private capital in order to expand the geographi-
cal and substantial scope of the activities of Eurofima, a 
joint financing organization of European railways. If 
this is not possible, the Commission might explore the 
setting-up of an organization similar to Eurofima and 
including all CEEC railway companies, specifically for 
railway financing in Central and Eastern Europe. In 
both cases, the extension of the range of activities to 
infrastructure financing might be considered. 
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As regards the financing of TENs, the conclusions of the 
European Council held in Brussels (December 1993) 
emphasized that the principal mission of the Community 
consisted in 'mobilizing private investors in favour of 
projects of European interest, through a reduction of 
financial risks.' The Corfu conclusions invited the Christo-
phersen Group and the Ecofin Council to examine the 
issue further, 'taking account of the specific characteristics 
of each project, the leading role of private funding and the 
judicious use of existing Community resources.' 
The Group agreed that the financing question should, in 
principle, be analysed on the basis of concrete financing 
issues for individual projects, following the bottom-up 
approach. Given the state of progress in the preparation of 
the financial plans for the 11 priority transport projects 
endorsed by the Corfu European Council, a complete 
mapping of financing issues for the selected priority 
projects cannot be presented at the time of the expiration 
of the mandate of the Group. 
The Group's conclusions concerning the financing issue, 
as presented in the Group's report, were drawn on the 
basis of, inter alia, several working papers presented 
notably by the Commission and the EIB. 
This chapter summarizes the information available to the 
Group in the following five sections: 
( 1 ) An update of the figures on the aggregate cost of the 
priority projects, based on the latest information 
available, as well as a summary of the financing 
profiles of the priority projects. 
(2) Financial characteristics of infrastructure projects. 
(3) Private sector involvement. 
(4) Existing Community financial instruments. 
(5) Suggestions and recommendations on how existing 
financial means at Community level, and in certain 
instances also at national level, could be used in a 
more cost-efficient manner, more specifically in the 
framework of public/private partnerships. 
The Group is in agreement about the content of Sections 
1 to 4, whereas Section 5 on options for adjustment 
of existing instruments, elaborated by the Commission 
services, did not obtain unanimous support in the Group. 
The following sections explore ways of organizing suc-
cessful public/private partnerships in the transport sector. 
However, many of the conclusions can be easily extrapo-
lated to the other TENs in energy, telecommunications 
and the environment. Energy transport projects tend to be 
commercially profitable. Some of the energy projects 
identified by the Christophersen Group will receive Com-
munity grant support on the grounds of cohesion consider-
ations, the latter enhanced by the need to create a single 
market for energy. Environment projects rely to a large 
extent on the 'polluter/user pays' principle, which should 
make them self-sustainable in the appropriate regulatory 
framework, though implementation problems may make 
some grant support inevitable (for more detail see Section 
IV.7 on financing of environment projects). Competition 
in the energy and telecommunications markets will tend 
to ensure an increasingly correct allocation of resources, 
where almost no grant support will be needed. However, 
the Community still has an interest in improving the 
overall competitiveness of its economy by making the 
channelling of financial resources to these easier. 
/. The priority projects 
and their financing situation 
The current estimates on the aggregate financial needs of 
the 11 most mature priority projects in the transport sector 
are in the same order of magnitude as the initial figures 
presented in SEC(94) 860 (June 1994). The initial priority 
list of transport projects has been slightly amended, 
following the decision of the European Council in Corfu to 
include the Øresund fixed link. Total estimated investment 
cost has risen from ECU 68 000 million to ECU 76 000 
million, while the amount corresponding to the period to 
the end of 1999 has moved from ECU 32 000 million to 
ECU 38 000 million (see Annex VLA). 
The above figures have an indicative character as the 
financial plans and detailed cost schedules for some of the 
projects (in particular a few large ones) have not yet been 
completed, or are currently under review. For these 
projects, assumptions had to be made about the identity of 
the promoter (public or private), the size and nature (loans, 
grants, equity, etc.) of public contributions (including the 
Community one), etc. Finally, it needs to be emphasized 
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that considerable uncertainties surround all cost estimates 
of such large infrastructure projects. 
Private involvement, ranging between 20 and 50% of 
project cost, is currently available in about half of the 
projects for which a complete financial plan exists; the 
EIB is expected to be involved in a majority of the 
projects. 
The aggregate figures on investment costs conceal the 
heterogeneity of the various priority projects, even if all 
of them meet the six criteria set out by the Christophersen 
Group (exceptional scale, common interest, economic 
impact, cohesion and other Union objectives, private 
investment, maturity). The round-table meetings and 
complementary contacts, notably with the project pro-
moters and the financial sector, have highlighted the 
differing characteristics in financial terms of each project 
and the difficulty of applying a common yardstick to 
measure the financing needs. Priority projects can be 
classified as follows in terms of the nature of their 
financial plans and progress made towards meeting the 
financing needs: 
(i) Mature public/private partnership projects: this cate-
gory covers projects relying on private sector 
involvement. The project promoters (or otherwise 
the procedure for assigning the promoter) have 
already been identified and the financial packages 
are almost structured. The projects are likely candi-
dates for support from the TEN budget line for 
transport, and will presumably also have recourse to 
the EIB and the EIF. Projects belonging to this 
category could act as role models for other less-
advanced projects involving public/private partner-
ships. 
(ii) Mature projects that are publicly financed on the 
basis of user charges with government guarantees: 
a single project is in a very advanced stage of 
development, has a well-defined public promoter and 
a positive outlook in terms of profitability. No 
specific financial problems exist. 
(iii) Conventionally financed national railway projects: 
private sector involvement in the ownership or the 
management of the infrastructure is not envisaged; 
private investors will only be involved as loan 
providers or through bond issues. Compared to other 
projects, the size of the financial gaps (i.e. the level 
of public support being requested) can usually be 
assessed in a relatively straightforward manner as the 
financing structure is relatively simple compared to 
other projects; the amount of Community support 
requested is also generally known. 
(iv) Projects for which Member States have requested 
substantial EU grant support for cohesion motives: 
most of the projects being implemented in the 
beneficiary countries of the Cohesion Fund belong 
to this category. The detailed negotiations on the 
financing needs will be carried out in the framework 
of the existing procedures applying to the Structural 
and Cohesion Funds, both of which are expected to 
be involved heavily in the implementation of these 
projects. With a single exception (involving a public/ 
private set-up), the projects belonging to this category 
will have to be executed in a purely public budget 
setting if further attempts at involving the private 
sector remain unsuccessful. 
(v) Projects with open financial plans: most of the largest 
projects of the priority list (representing 48% of total 
investment cost for the whole list of priority projects, 
and 27% of investment outlay up to the end of 1999) 
belong to this heading; their implementation will for 
the most part extend into the next century. The 
projects appear economically viable and financially 
feasible in the form of public/private partnerships. 
Few doubts exist that the projects will be carried 
out. The overall financing needs, including possible 
contributions from the Union budget, are not yet 
clear. Similarly, the likely degree (and form) of 
private involvement remains to be defined. 
Annex VLB classifies the priority projects according to 
the abovementioned typology and includes the estimated 
investment outlays during the periods up to 1999 and 
2010. 
2. Financial characteristics 
of infrastructure projects 
Compared to projects in the industrial sector, financing 
issues play a more prominent role in the design and 
realization of major infrastructure works, particularly in 
the transport sector, for several reasons: 
(i) Infrastructure projects are highly capital-intensive as 
fixed-asset costs far outweigh variable and operating 
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costs; the length of the construction period constitutes 
an added burden (in the form of capitalized interest 
charges and delays in revenue collection). The debt 
service and related financing costs thus typically 
represent the dominant part of the overall cost 
structure, certainly in the first decades of the project's 
life. The financing structure of the project, together 
with the cost of funds (notably the level of long-term 
rates, both nominal and real ones) has a crucial 
impact on its financial viability. 
(ii) The long economic life of the projects ensures an 
extended utility-type revenue stream, i.e. relatively 
stable, and increasing over time. At the planning 
stage, however, the size of these revenues is largely 
uncertain. As many projects produce large economic 
benefits — and costs — going beyond the scope of 
the project (externalities), these revenue streams do 
generally only reflect a fraction of the total benefits 
to society as a whole. In certain circumstances, 
however, revenue collection is virtually impossible 
in practice because of legal or regulatory constraints, 
for example, or otherwise because the project enters 
into competition with infrastructures provided at no 
direct cost to the user. 
(iii) Because of the long payback periods, the finance 
providers will necessarily keep a large exposure to 
the project for prolonged periods, which are often 
largely in excess of the usual repayment terms for 
bank loans or bond issues (need for refinancing). 
The large size of many projects, and the many 
uncertainties surrounding their realization, requires 
the involvement of many financing partners (for 
example, lending consortia) in order to spread the 
total financing needs and the risks. 
(iv) Outside the sphere of financing, the interplay of 
the many actors involved (promoters, contractors, 
construction companies, operators, public adminis-
trations, etc.) requires strong coordination and 
detailed legal arrangements. In many instances, the 
absence of a 'natural' promoter, representing the 
interests of the project as such, constitutes a sup-
plementary difficulty. 
(v) Public authorities are almost systematically involved 
to a significant extent, particularly in the early stages. 
The inherent complexity of many projects, combined 
with the political will to realize some of them quickly, 
has pushed the public sector into becoming the main 
builder and provider of transport infrastructures. 
Public financing is also generally believed to be 
'simpler' as all the major risks are effectively 
absorbed by public budgets. On the other hand, the 
ex post financial performance of public investments 
is less easily measurable in comparison with private 
ones. 
(vi) Before a fully fledged financial package can be put 
together, a project has to be properly structured and 
phased according to economic needs. This is one of 
the most crucial and time-consuming phases of a 
project's life in terms of possible cost savings and 
profitability enhancements. Partnership arrange-
ments between the public and private sectors can 
only be arrived at after lengthy examination of the 
project's financial components, and a proper sharing 
of risks between the partners. 
The TEN framework adds a particular dimension to this 
process as a significant part of the economic viability of 
individual TEN projects stems from their integration into 
the overall network. Individual links need to be appraised 
from a network perspective, extending far beyond national 
borderlines (and for some projects even beyond Com-
munity territory). The network approach introduces con-
siderable opportunities as the profitability of Union-wide 
networks exceeds the profitability of the individual links 
composing the network. 
This also introduces some specific difficulties as different 
legal and regulatory frameworks have to co-exist and as a 
supplementary level of coordination (between the Member 
States concerned) arises, particularly for cross-border 
projects. These transnational links often suffer from 
differing national preferences and priorities at each side 
of the border. 
Because of the interrelations between projects belonging 
to the same network, delays in the realization of certain 
key links have a significant impact on the revenues of the 
already existing links (through revenue shortfalls). A 
concerted, coordinated and accelerated build-up of the 
network, minimizing leads and lags in the realization of 
key links, is therefore bound to improve significantly the 
economic benefits for all parties involved. 
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3. Private sector 'involvement 
Before developing some of the implications which private 
financing might have in relation to TENs, a more precise 
definition of this particular notion is required; an attempt 
in this direction is made in Annex VI.C. It appears that 
private financing becomes particularly relevant when the 
private investors bear a meaningful part of the risks 
associated with their financial contribution. For the sake 
of simplicity, most of the discussion presented in Annex 
VI.C deals with pure forms of private financing, which 
are unlikely to materialize in the transport sector; public/-
private partnerships are covered in Section C of that 
annex. 
The increased involvement of the private sector in the 
financing of infrastructures has created a need for appro-
priate and innovative legal and financial constructions. 
The 'project financing' approach, whereby the project is 
financed on a 'stand-alone' basis, is a typical example. In 
contrast to industrial projects, none of the private partners 
involved is generally willing or able to take on all the 
liabilities associated with a given project. 
Project financing has introduced a high degree of sophisti-
cation in infrastructure financing, compared to the tra-
ditional public schemes. It has also enlarged the range of 
relevant financial instruments to all those being used in 
private corporate finance, and notably to equity and 
quasi-equity (subordinated loans). In the lending field, 
project financing calls for a different approach, which is 
predominantly based on the assessment of the cash flow 
generated by the project, as opposed to the credit quality 
of the promoter and/or the different partners involved in 
the project. Similarly, loan security is linked to the assets 
of the project ás opposed to those of the promoter(s). 
These developments open up new opportunities for the 
public sector as a project partner; they also require a more 
precise definition of the aims to be achieved through 
public support in each individual case. As financial 
packages are tailor-made for each project, the form of 
public intervention will have to be adjusted to the speci-
ficity of the projects. For projects which are not financially 
viable, grant support will remain indispensable to pull the 
project beyond the profitability threshold. The distribution 
and sharing of risks is one of the core elements, and 
several types of public involvement can be imagined 
(equity risk, guarantees for specific risks, guarantees for 
part of the loans, etc.). The possible impact of these new 
forms of public support on the use of Community funds is 
further discussed in Section 4. 
While the private sector concentrates exclusively on the 
financial profitability of a project, the public sector is 
taking a wider view on a project's economic viability 
because of the many external impacts of any sizeable 
infrastructure project. Even when confined to financial 
return calculations, public and private appraisals will 
almost systematically be carried out on different terms 
and hence lead to different results. The risk profile of the 
project constitutes one of the main concerns of the private 
sector; this will inevitably be reflected in the discount 
rates applied and in the thresholds as regards minimum 
levels for the internal rate of return. 
The private sector will thus generally favour short-term 
revenues, which are perceived as less uncertain than 
delayed income. Public promoters are typically less 
inclined to quantify the risk factors and tend to use lower 
discount rates (for example, based on the yields of 
government bonds) when discounting revenues and costs 
over time. 
As a result of this, the same project might be considered 
financially profitable by the public sector, while being 
judged financially unviable by the private one. This 
introduces a bias towards public financing solutions, while 
the public sector's objectives might in some cases have 
been better served by a private (or mixed) financing 
approach. 
Private investors are only interested in taking part in the 
financing of TENs to the extent that the profitability 
outlook of the projects is in line with the level of risk 
taken on. Private involvement is thus only feasible for 
projects generating sufficient revenues and, to the largest 
extent possible, caring for themselves by charging appro-
priate fees to the users of the infrastructure. These 
conditions are generally satisfied in the energy and 
telecommunications sector; most projects are self-
supporting in financial terms and can often be 
implemented without the need for extra public support. In 
the transport sector, however, users have come to think of 
certain infrastructures as free and as public goods. Some 
of the transport charges applied (for example, fuel tax, 
vehicle tax) bear no direct connection with the actual use 
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of a given infrastructure link, while others are lowered 
through operating subsidies paid to the operator. In those 
cases where charges do not reflect true costs, economic 
efficiency is likely to suffer, either in the form of a 
misallocation of economic resources or as an overcon-
sumption of scarce resources (for example, in the form of 
congestion). 
Because of the complexity of the issue, and the inter-
relations between different transport modes, structural 
improvements can only be achieved gradually. Users also 
need to be convinced that certain increases in direct 
charges (or a shift from indirect to direct ones) constitute 
a welcome development in their best interest, notably 
through an increased supply of infrastructures. 
For projects that are unable to generate revenues of their 
own, the payment of shadow tolls (i.e. tolls paid by public 
budgets on behalf of the users) constitutes a possible 
(although less desirable) alternative means of public 
support towards private financing approaches. For projects 
with significant uncertainties regarding revenues, mini-
mum traffic levels could be guaranteed, i.e. revenue 
shortfalls would be covered up to a certain level. In 
conjunction with this, the public sector should also 
contribute to improve the quality of traffic forecasts, 
particularly in relation to TENs. 
The round-table meetings have illustrated the diversity of 
ways in which the private sector can be usefully associated 
to the financing of the networks. This variety stems from 
the varying legal and administrative traditions in the 
Member States as well as from the characteristics of the 
individual projects. Private financing appears to be most 
beneficial when it takes over a genuine proportion of the 
risk. It appears that a number of conditions are necessary 
to achieve this aim: 
(i) The type of involvement expected from the private 
sector must be clear from the outset (for example 
main promoter or minority participant, operator only, 
etc.) as well as the amount of control which the 
public sector wants to exercise once the project is in 
place. 
(ii) Financing schemes must be geared towards private 
participation, the public sector becoming a partner 
among others. 
(iii) Early private involvement is necessary so as to ensure 
that the technical and financial set-up of the project 
allows for an adequate level of private participation. 
(iv ) The competition between private groups needs to be 
organized. 
Extending private involvement in infrastructure financing 
calls for a more comprehensive assessment on the specific 
role that the public sector will have to take on in the 
future, i.e. should it only be confined to those projects 
without financial profitability and, if not, which are the 
criteria justifying public promotership, etc. In any event, 
the role of the public sector will remain pre-eminent, even 
in relation with privately funded projects (feasibility 
studies, organization of bidding procedures, regulatory 
issues, competition aspects, etc.). 
4. Community financial 'instruments 
The Union has a role to support (by financial and other 
means) the emergence of projects which produce benefits 
at the European level; a range of financial instruments are 
available to contribute to this aim. In accordance with 
subsidiarity principles, the Union's financial support for 
TENs is used as a complement to the resources provided 
by Member States, the latter having a pre-eminent role in 
the definition and implementation of the individual pro-
jects. Recent progress made in the use and involvement of 
these financial support mechanisms is briefly described 
below, with a special reference to their application in 
respect of the priority projects selected by the Christo-
phersen Group. 
The Structural Funds follow a logic for intervention which 
is based on requests made by the Member States and 
focused on the specific objectives of the structural policies. 
The Structural Funds participate in the financing of 
development or reconversion policies under the initiative 
of Member States or their regions. 
While preparing the Community support frameworks 
(CSFs) for the period 1994-99, the Commission has very 
much taken into account the guidelines laid down in the 
White Paper, notably those regarding the trans-European 
networks. 
According to the CSFs for the period 1994-99, and in 
relation to Objective 1 regions, the Funds will make a 
very large financial effort to fund projects in the fields of 
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transport, energy and telecommunications. On the basis of 
the estimates currently available, their annual contribution 
could amount to ECU 3 800 million. 
As a result of the analysis of the first operational pro-
grammes available, it is foreseen that the Funds could 
reserve around ECU 1 000 million to ECU 1 600 million 
per annum to finance priority projects in the TENs. 
As to the Christophersen Group's first list of projects, the 
Patras-Thessaloniki motorway and the Lisbon-Valladolid 
motorway could obtain financing from the ERDF. 
Community initiatives: The Commission approved on 15 
June 1994 its guidelines for the next Community initiat-
ives. There are 13 such initiatives endowed with a total 
amount of ECU 11 850 million plus a reserve of ECU 
1 600 million. Of particular interest is the Interreg II 
initiative (1994-99), which is the continuation of Interreg 
I and REGEN; as such, it is divided into two different 
chapters, one for cross-border cooperation which obtained 
an indicative budget of ECU 2 400 million, and another 
of ECU 500 million to conclude the TEN projects for 
interconnection of gas and electricity networks undertaken 
under REGEN. 
Those projects which can be financed under the energy 
chapter of Interreg II have also all been selected by the 
Christophersen Group: the introduction of natural gas in 
Greece and in Portugal, the interconnection of the latter 
network with the Spanish one, and the interconnection of 
the Italian and Greek electricity networks. Among the 
actions which can be funded under the cross-border 
chapter are 'measures in the fields of energy, telecom-
munications and transport which complete the TENs'. All 
the inland cross-border areas (NUTS III) and some 
maritime ones are eligible under this chapter. 
The Cohesion Fund, which was formally established in 
May this year (Council Regulation (EC) No 1164/94), 
will play an important part in facilitating the development 
of trans-European network projects in the four beneficiary 
Member States: Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland. Over 
the period 1994-99, it could allocate around ECU 7 300 
million of assistance to transport infrastructure projects in 
these countries. 
Considerable progress has already been made since April 
1993, when the interim cohesion financial instrument 
came into force, with over ECU 1 100 million of grant 
assistance having been approved for transport projects 
directly related to the trans-European networks or giving 
access to such networks. Major road projects have been 
the main beneficiaries, but significant assistance has also 
been allocated to high-speed and conventional railway 
projects, and maritime projects, including vessel-traffic 
systems. 
As regards the Christophersen Group's lists, four of the 
eleven most mature projects are located in the cohesion 
countries: high-speed train South, the Greek motorways, 
the Lisbon-Valladolid road corridor and the 
Cork-Dublin-Belfast-Larne-Stranraer rail link. To date, 
some ECU 176 million of assistance has been approved 
for these projects under the Cohesion Fund, and a further 
ECU 900 million is the subject of formal applications 
which are at present being considered by the Commission. 
A proposal for a new financial regulation for financial 
support to TENs was adopted by the Commission on 2 
March 1994 (COM(94) 62). It is still being discussed at 
the Council and the Parliament (procedure 189C) and will 
possibly be approved by the spring of next year, though 
its entry into force will only take place after the adoption 
of the guidelines, foreseen by autumn. According to the 
Commission's proposal, the regulation will enable the 
Community to provide its financial support through feasi-
bility studies, interest rebates, subsidies for guarantee fees, 
and, by way of exception, through straight grants. 
This new regulation applies to the three TEN sectors the 
experience gathered by the previous Regulation setting an 
action programme in the field of transport infrastructure 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 1738/93 of 25 June 1993). 
The allocation for 1994 has been completed, while a 
number of CG projects will benefit from major support. 
The transport budget line has co-financed 68 studies and 
projects during the current year, for a total amount of 
ECU 200 million. Among these projects, 25 belonged to 
the lists set up by the Christophersen Group. 
It is estimated that for the period 1994-99 the TENs will 
be endowed with ECU 2 395 million, of which ECU 1 868 
million for transport, ECU 105 million for energy and 
ECU 422 million for telecommunications. Further 
strengthening of these budget lines is to be expected as a 
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result of the revision of the financial perspectives resulting 
from enlargement. 
After the Brussels Summit of December 1993, the EIB 
has enhanced its role as a provider of long-term financing 
for infrastructure, both in a quantitative and a qualitative 
way. In respect of the latter, the EIB identified, last May, 
six areas where it could make an additional effort to 
increase the flexibility of its lending: the financing of 
interest during construction, the provision of extended 
capital grace periods, the provision of long maturities, the 
possibility of fixing loan rates in advance of drawdown, 
the cofinancing of a project's debt after construction, and 
the establishment of framework credit-line agreements. 
Beyond its traditional role of provider of long-term 
finance, the EIB has offered to play an enhanced role in 
structuring contractual and financing arrangements in 
relation to TENs. The Bank is already carrying out the 
appraisal of each of the first priority transport and energy 
projects selected by the Christophersen Group. 
The Bank has already approved loans — or envisages to 
do so in the short term — for the following transport 
projects: Brenner axis (ECU 200 to 300 million), 
PBKAL-Belgium (ECU 500 million), Greek motorways 
(ECU 230 million), Lisbon-Valladolid motorway (ECU 
120 million), Cork-Lame railway (ECU 50 million), 
Malpensa airport (ECU 200 million), and the Øresund 
link (ECU 660 million). The EIB also participates actively 
in the financing of projects in Central and Eastern Europe 
and in the acceding countries. 
It has also approved loans — or is possibly going to do so 
soon — for the following energy priority projects: Spain-
Portugal gas interconnection (ECU 220 million), Portug-
uese natural gas network (ECU 350 million), and the 
introduction of natural gas into Greece (ECU 230 million). 
The laying-down of the new Iberian network relies on the 
pipeline being built in Algeria and Morocco with the 
support of the EIB (ECU 660 million). 
The EIB has almost completely allocated the financial 
package for TENs and other infrastructure projects known 
as the Edinburgh facility. This temporary credit facility 
had been decided at the Edinburgh Summit in December 
1992, as part of the growth initiative; six months later its 
initial financial envelope of ECU 5 000 million was 
increased by the European Council at Copenhagen to ECU 
7 000 million (plus ECU 1 000 million for SMEs). By the 
end of December, loans corresponding to the whole 
amount of the ECU 7 000 million package will have been 
approved. In combination with a further ECU 15 000 
million of standard EIB loans, this has contributed to the 
financing of ECU 48 000 million worth of infrastructure 
projects. 
The creation of the European Investment Fund was also 
decided by the Edinburgh Summit as a part of the growth 
initiative. It started operations in June 1994. It is due to 
provide guarantees for TEN infrastructure projects and for 
SMEs. Once in its third year of operation, the fund will be 
able to provide equity, if its governing bodies so decide. 
The fund has an authorized capital of ECU 2 000 million; 
it has a tripartite ownership structure as the capital is 
provided by the Community (30%), the EIB (40%) and 
financial institutions (up to 30%). It intends to provide 
about ECU 500 million in guarantees during its first 
(half) year of operation. The first priority project to 
receive an EIF guarantee will probably be the Malpensa 
airport project. 
In the light of the expiry of the ECSC Treaty in 2002, the 
Commission decided to stop new lending under Article 
54.2, for large projects of Community interest. Only loan 
applications introduced before 1 July 1994 will still be 
examined, and the maturity of loans decided from this 
date onwards cannot exceed 23 July 2002. An exception 
may be made for loans not requiring coverage by ECSC 
reserves. The Council invited the EIB to examine those 
other loan proposals with which the ECSC could no longer 
deal. 
The European Council at Copenhagen authorized the 
PHARE programme to spend a maximum of 15% of 
its existing programme's resources for investments on 
infrastructure projects; before this decision PHARE was 
only able to support infrastructure projects with technical 
assistance. Following the desires expressed by the 
countries concerned, the Commission proposes that the 
abovementioned ceiling be replaced by a more flexible 
regime. 
The appropriations set aside for 1994 amount to ECU 
835 million and include ECU 83 million (indicative 
programming) of PHARE financing for TENs in the 
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Central and East European countries, and ECU 130 
million for border-crossing facilities. 
The overall level of coordination between the different 
Community financing sources mentioned above is that 
derived from the establishment by the Community of a 
series of guidelines for the TENs, as established by Article 
129c of the Treaty. The same article, moreover, urges the 
Commission to take 'any useful initiative' to promote 
coordination among the Member States, in cooperation 
with the latter. 
The round tables organized by the Christophersen Group 
— and the Group itself — are the latest steps in the 
ongoing system of coordination within the Community. 
The main instance of coordination takes place, however, 
at Member-State level, as they are responsible for putting 
forward project proposals (or programmes in the case of 
the support frameworks) for Community grant support. 
5. Options for Community support 
Major infrastructures differ widely in the way they 
are financially engineered. Increased recourse to private 
financing or to partnership solutions is reinforcing this 
trend. The Community could help to underpin this evol-
ution, notably by ensuring that the rules which govern the 
extension of Community support do not unnecessarily 
constitute an obstacle to financial innovation or introduce 
an unnecessary bias in favour of traditional financing 
models. Whenever possible, public support should thus be 
prepared to adapt flexibly to the emergence of different 
needs. The impact of Community support will therefore 
not only depend on its size, but increasingly also on the 
form in which it is made available to projects of Com-
munity interest. 
The scarcity of public resources in relation to the overall 
size of the funds needed for TENs is another reason to 
optimize the use of public funds and look for improved 
cost-efficiency. Following this logic, and as a general rule, 
subsidies should never exceed the amount which is strictly 
needed to achieve a particular aim. Whenever appropriate, 
public funds should thus act as a catalyst for the mobiliza-
tion of funds provided by other parties. 
The present section focuses on a number of possibilities 
to tailor or adjust the use of Community funds to 
specific project needs. As Community support is typically 
extended in conjunction with other forms of public 
support, primarily at national or regional level, many 
suggestions put forward in this section can also be applied 
to other levels of public support. 
The various options presented below provide some practi-
cal illustrations on how Community resources could be 
used cost-effectively in relation to TENs. These examples 
are not to be interpreted as a list of measures on which the 
Union is invited to take immediate action, even if some of 
the proposals could eventually be transformed into con-
crete actions at a later stage. In many instances, their 
implementation could take place without the need for 
specific legislation. 
The options outlined below have been classified per type 
of financing instrument and cover in particular: 
grant financing, 
equity financing, 
loan financing, 
guarantees. 
These various instruments were all enumerated in the 
Commission's earlier communication on the financing of 
TENs (SEC(94) 860). The outline below provides some 
more detail on possible implementations; the legal impli-
cations need to be examined further. 
(a) Grant financing 
Grants obviously constitute the preferred means of public 
support from the point of view of the project promoter. 
Inversely, they are the most expensive way from a 
budgetary point of view. Under current rules, EU grants 
to projects are not repayable unless some contractual 
conditions have not been fulfilled (for example, absence 
of implementation of the project). Given the budgetary 
constraints in Member States and at Union level, it 
would therefore be attractive if instead of public grants, 
reimbursable advances could obtain the same results. The 
use of advances could, for instance, be justified if a project 
has a reasonable chance of achieving a highly positive 
financial outcome. LInion advances could then be used as 
risk-absorbers at a stage when the eventual outcome of a 
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project is still highly uncertain (for example, reimbursable 
grants for feasibility studies, financial support at the very 
early stages of a project, etc.), while the repayments would 
contribute to raising the volume of public funds available 
in favour of the networks. The legal set-up should 
encourage Member States to use advances instead of 
grants whenever appropriate. One way to achieve this 
would be to recycle the repaid advances at Member State 
level. Advances would then not flow back as EU budget 
revenues, but could be collected into revolving funds for 
future reallocation to subsequent projects. 'Advances' in 
this sense would be treated in exactly the same way as 
grants as far as the EU budget is concerned. 
Some projects need Community support spread out over 
several years, particularly when financial gaps are substan-
tial and when budgetary or other constraints prevent the 
commitment of the entire amount in any single year. In 
the case of Structural Fund appropriations, this difficulty 
is largely overcome by the existence of multiannual 
frameworks (CSFs). In the case of the TEN budget line, 
a similar system of multiannual frameworks could be 
envisaged to provide project promoters with the necessary 
assurance that Community support will be available over 
several years. 
(b) Equity financing 
The emergence of more sophisticated financing schemes 
for major infrastructures calls for new and innovative 
means of Community support. In many instances, the kind 
of public support which is expected by private partners is 
more related to the reduction and/or the sharing of risks 
than to the provision of subsidies. The structural shortage 
of equity resources for infrastructure projects has been 
repeatedly stressed by the private sector; non-recourse 
lenders are only willing to step in once an equity buffer of 
sufficient size has been put in place, as they can only rely 
on the revenues and assets of the project concerned. The 
equity shortage can be partly explained by the inadequacy 
of the financial returns which private investors can expect 
in return for the substantial risks they are supposed to 
bear. In addition, the role of the public sector as an equity 
provider to mixed partnership projects has remained 
underdeveloped. Capital ownership typically goes tog-
ether with control over the project's assets, although 
possibilities exist to weaken this link, for example subordi-
nated lending, preference shares without voting rights, 
etc., which allow for involvement in the risk-reward 
structure of the project without a transfer of decision-
making. 
Compared with grants, equity contributions have the 
advantage that the public sector can take part in the upside 
potential of the project and collect revenues which can be 
recycled into other projects. Once the project is up and 
running, and the financial performance of the project has 
become more predictable, the public sector could also 
decide to withdraw and make all or part of its shares 
available to other investors. 
The recent creation of the EIF (as a public/private 
partnership) constitutes a significant step forward in this 
direction as the Union now disposes of a specialized 
vehicle with the potential to provide equity finance to 
TEN projects. By providing equity to some of these 
projects, the fund will enhance and facilitate the involve-
ment of other investors, notably the private ones. Because 
of statutory constraints, the EIF will only be able to start 
its equity operations from June 1996 onwards, provided 
that the fund's general meeting lifts this particular con-
straint in relation to equity operations. 
Because of prudential constraints and the EIF's limited 
capital resources (ECU 2 000 million), certain limitations 
could apply to the size of the fund's involvement in very 
large TEN projects. The Member States could use part of 
the resources transferred to them by the Community 
budget to strengthen the role of the fund as a structural 
provider of equity resources, in particular for these large 
projects. One possibility would be to invite the fund, on a 
case-by-case basis, to invest certain volumes of equity 
(possibly on a pari passu basis, i.e. on identical terms and 
conditions) on behalf of one or several Member States, 
particularly when the fund is involved as an equity 
provider on its own account. The EIF would then act as 
manager or trustee of equity resources entrusted by 
Member States through the Community budget. The 
fund's involvement could prove particularly valuable 
when several Member States have a direct interest in 
the project, for example transnational projects and/or 
cross-border sections of such projects. 
For projects where the EIF is not involved on its own 
behalf, Member States could consider the possibility of 
using part of Union appropriations (extended through the 
SF, CF, TEN budget lines, etc.) for the purpose of taking 
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equity or quasi-equity holdings whenever appropriate. 
The technicalities of this are obviously a matter for further 
study; one possibility would be to create specialized 
national funds for equity investments in TENs, which 
would be owned and managed by Member States but 
partly capitalized through the Community budget. Rev-
enues would be reinvested in other TEN projects. Similar 
financial constructions could be considered for individual 
projects, especially when several Member States are 
directly involved (for example, equity vehicles for trans-
national or cross-border projects). 
(c) Loan financing 
Loan instruments are of particular relevance for TENs as 
the major part of the funds is typically provided in the 
form of loans. In view of the importance of overall 
financing needs, the Union's own borrowing and lending 
capacity could play a useful complementary role as 
suggested below. This could take the form of Union 
partnership loans with certain characteristic features, such 
as fixed rates combined with very long maturities; the 
partnership loans would only be used as a complementary 
lending instrument destined to facilitate and accompany 
the involvement of other forms of Community financing, 
EIB and EIF in particular. Moreover, recourse to such 
loans should remain limited to projects which can demon-
strate a duly justified need for such additional funds. A 
few options are described below. 
The long economic life of many TEN projects, particularly 
in the transport sector, combined with their high capital 
intensity, calls for lending instruments with very long 
maturities (30 or 40 years and possibly beyond). Fixed-rate 
lending of this type is typically in short supply, especially 
by commercial lenders, as the supply side of the market is 
limited in size and as access to such funds is generally 
restricted to borrowers with the highest creditworthiness. 
The EIB obviously falls within this category of borrowers; 
the Bank has, moreover, indicated its willingness to 
enlarge the scope for very long-term lending at fixed rates 
to promoters of TEN projects. The Union could enlarge 
the scope for raising long-term funds at fixed rates, 
notably because the investors willing to 'invest' in these 
instruments (institutional ones in particular) would be 
provided with a possibility of diversification. The exist-
ence of EU borrowings under two separate signatures will 
therefore enhance the volume of available funds, while 
exerting downward pressure on the funding cost. The 
scope for alternative and/or complementary forms of 
EIB-EU coordination on fund raising for very long 
maturities deserves further investigation. The actual lend-
ing to projects could be entirely managed by the Bank; the 
funds raised could be used as a source of co-financing 
(partnership loans) alongside the EIB's own lending for 
selected projects identified by the Bank and which are in 
particular need of such long-term resources. 
Limited access to very long-term funds restricts the 
potential involvement of financial institutions as commer-
cial lenders to TEN infrastructures. EU partnership loans, 
characterized by long maturities and low cost, could help 
to weaken this constraint, especially if commercial banks 
were allowed to have access to such long-term funds 
collected by the Union for onlending to TEN projects 
(alongside their own loans). The financial institutions in 
question would then act as (EU) intermediaries by onlend-
ing these funds (partnership loans), provided they commit 
these funds on their own behalf (thus also bearing the 
repayment risk) to the beneficiary projects together with 
an equal or larger amount of their own lending resources. 
Partnership loans and commercial bank financing could 
have different maturities and repayment characteristics 
and would thus be complementary. The risk to the 
Community budget would be limited as all project risk 
associated with the partnership loans would be borne 
by the intermediaries, all of which should be highly 
creditworthy banks. Here again, these provisions should 
preferably only apply for projects where the EIB is 
involved on its own behalf. The mechanism would result 
in a broader supply of long-term fixed-rate funds, while 
risks would be diversified over a larger number of lenders. 
In the context of the discussions on project financing in 
the Christophersen Group, the EIB has put forward a 
number of important suggestions for extending the Bank's 
involvement in the financing of the networks. The Bank's 
proposals respond in particular to typical financing prob-
lems related to long construction times, long pay-back 
periods, etc. and introduce considerable scope for 
additional flexibility in its interventions. Many of the 
proposed features could be integrated into a targeted 
facility in favour of TENs, which could perhaps succeed 
the former Edinburgh facility; the terms and conditions 
attached to the loans from this mechanism could be 
adjusted in the light of experience gained with Edinburgh 
loans. Provided the Bank's organs are prepared to consider 
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such a renewal or extension, the removal of ceiling or 
target amounts could lead to the transformation of a 
temporary mechanism into a more or less permanent 
window. 
(d) Guarantees 
The extension of guarantees is explicitly referred to in the 
Treaty (Article 129c) as one of the possible means of EU 
support in favour of TEN projects. Together with equity 
contributions, guarantees constitute an important means 
of public support for projects which call for a reduction or 
a sharing of risks. 
The Union budget currently guarantees a significant 
amount of EIB project loans for infrastructures; budget 
cover is, however, only provided to the Bank for the part 
of the Bank's own-resource lending which takes place 
outside the Community (for example, Central and Eastern 
Europe, Mediterranean basin, etc.). One of the essential 
purposes of the Union's guarantee is to reduce the Bank's 
exposure to political risk when it lends outside the Union. 
The European Investment Fund, which was set up in June 
1994, is going to be an important actor for projects within 
the Union as loan guarantees for TENs constitute a 
primary target area for the fund. The EIF operates on a 
commercial basis, which implies that the size of the 
guarantee premiums will be commensurate with the level 
of risk taken on. 
With the EIF now in place, the need for any direct Union 
budget guarantees for TEN projects within the Union 
needs to be examined and thoroughly justified. For very 
large projects, requiring guarantees going far beyond the 
fund's capacity, the extension of joint EU-EIF guarantees 
could be considered. This would, however, expose the 
budget to liabilities of considerable size and would 
possibly lead to the creation of a guarantee fund, similar 
to what has been done in relation to Community lending 
to third countries, so as to back up the budget in case of 
significant defaults. This guarantee fund could be partially 
capitalized through the premiums received for these EU 
co-guarantees. 
The EIF could also act as a channel for public support in 
favour of TENs, for example, when the cost of the EIF 
guarantee premium for selected projects is borne by 
the budget. The draft financial regulation relative to 
Community support for TENs (COM(94) 62) explicitly 
refers to this possibility. The fund also offers new 
opportunities for Member States as it allows them to 
provide loan guarantees to certain priority projects at a 
cost which is known in advance, instead of exposing 
national budgets to future liabilities of unknown size. 
While traditional public guarantees usually cover whole 
or part of a project's borrowings, irrespective of the 
underlying cause of default, such blanket guarantees are 
not necessarily appropriate, especially when the private 
sector gets involved. As discussed in Annex VI.C, private 
financing only becomes meaningful to the extent that the 
private sector is taking on an essential part of the risk 
related to the funds which it contributes to the project. 
Public guarantees should then only reach the level necess-
ary to allow private bankers and investors to step in, and 
be targeted to certain types of risks, essentially the ones 
which the private sector is unable to influence or control. 
Depending on the project, these risks could be related to 
the revenues of the project (for example, minimum 
guaranteed traffic), the full and/or timely completion 
of the project (completion guarantees), financial risks 
(exchange risk, interest-rate risk, refinancing risk), etc. A 
summary list of the most relevant risk categories applying 
to infrastructure projects is provided in Annex VLD. It 
should, however, be recognized that partial guarantees, if 
loosely defined, can easily transform into blanket guaran-
tees as project failures or financial difficulties are typically 
related to a multiplicity of causes and effects. 
In order to secure a significant supply of very long-term 
loans for TENs, refinancing guarantees could be of 
particular significance. To the extent that these long-term 
resources cannot be raised in sufficient quantities in the 
market, the possible creation of a Community mechanism 
extending refinancing guarantees (or providing compar-
able means for maturity lengthening) deserves further 
attention. In its earlier contribution to the work of the 
Group (see SEC(94) 860, Annex 5), the Bank had 
already suggested increased involvement on its part in the 
refinancing of project debt provided by commercial banks 
for the length of the construction period. Although the 
refinancing risk is generally hidden (although certainly 
not absent) in publicly financed projects (it takes the form 
of the regular and periodical renewal of public debt stocks 
at interest rates varying over time), this risk becomes all 
the more relevant for privately funded projects as it 
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introduces uncertainties on a project's future debt service 
levels. 
Refinancing guarantees, possibly extended at EU level, 
could give rise to either gains or losses, depending on the 
evolution of interest rates; a premium could also be 
charged (for example, in the form of a small margin on 
the lending rate). By pooling refinancing risks at a more 
global level, a larger diversification of risks would arise. 
Such a mechanism could, for instance, be confined to 
EIB loans with very long maturities, and should ideally 
associate the EIF as managing entity, acting under a 
mandate from the Community. In addition, the fund may 
want to share some of the risk as co-guarantor. A pooling 
of refinancing risks under a Union umbrella would not 
create new or additional risks at the overall Community 
level (Union and Member States), but simply provide a 
means to manage and monitor these risks more efficiently, 
while creating opportunities for enhanced private sector 
involvement in priority projects. 
(e) Conclusions 
The present section emphasizes the specific financing 
needs of TENs, specifically when these large infrastruc-
ture projects are implemented as public/private partner-
ships. Innovative and flexible means of Community 
support should be considered whenever appropriate and 
desirable to foster new forms of cooperation between the 
public sector and the private sector. Budgetary constraints 
at Member State and Union level constitute an additional 
reason to allocate scarce public resources in favour of 
TENs in the most cost-efficient manner. The various 
suggestions and examples proposed in this document do 
not constitute a call for additional budgetary resources at 
Community level. The emphasis lies on the possible scope 
for widening the forms of Community support currently 
available in favour of TENs within the existing financial 
perspectives, rather than on the need to raise the overall 
volumes of available support (although this possibility 
should not be excluded altogether). 
The work of the Christophersen Group has amply demon-
strated that individual projects differ widely in terms 
of their specific financing needs. Community support 
measures of the kind illustrated in Section 5 above should 
be tuned to these specific needs and therefore not be 
implemented as horizontal measures with predetermined 
target amounts. In those cases where a specific legal base 
would be required to allow for complementary action at 
Community level (for example, in the case of loans or 
guarantees), the actual decisions on the use of such 
facilities should always be taken case by case on the basis 
of proper justification at individual project level, and only 
to the extent that existing financial instruments at Union 
level (EIB, EIF, Community grants, etc.) cannot respond 
to these needs with the same effectiveness. 
New forms of financial support for TENs should be well 
integrated into the operations of the already existing 
instruments at Community level, and be defined in com-
plementary terms with the latter. Both the EIB and EIF 
would have to be closely associated at the initial stages 
(conceptual framework and design) and directly involved 
in the actual implementation and management (for exam-
ple, allocations to individual projects). 
The financial engineering relevant for the TENs must be 
considered project by project. Technically, the range of 
innovative possibilities for combining private involvement 
and public support from either the Member States or the 
Community is so large that it makes little sense to list 
individual options. What is needed, on the contrary, is 
flexibility in the forms by which public support can 
be extended, and procedures for efficient coordination 
between the potential financing sources when setting up 
the financial plans of projects. 
The options outlined above focus on enlarging flexibility 
in the forms of public support. In parallel with increased 
flexibility in the public sector's approach to the financing 
of TENs, the private sector can be expected to develop 
further the market mechanisms relevant for infrastructure 
financing. In view of the relative weakness of such 
markets in Europe, there is scope for such an evolution 
which should be welcomed. 
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TEN projects: Estimated financing needs for the period 1994-2010 
TEN projects: Estimated financing needs 
for the period 1994-20/0' 
Possible scheduling based on current plans and available information 
(l 000 million ECU) 
Transport: First list of priority projects 
Energy: First list of priority projects 
Total cost first list 
Total cost 
(constant prices) 
1994-2010 
75.80 
5.00 
80.80 
of which 
1994-99 
38.07 
4.25 
42.32 
Average 
1994-99 
6.3 
0.7 
7.0 
Transport projects (EU): 
Second and third lists 
Transport projects: 
Acceding countries 
Transport projects: 
Links with CEEC 
Other energy projects 
Total cost other lists
2 
Total cost 
(constant prices) 
1994-2010 
51.00 
4.40 
4.75 
25.00 
85.15 
of which 
1994-99 
20.80 
1.40 
2.70 
9.00 
33.90 
Average 
1994-99 
3.5 
0.2 
0.5 
1.5 
5.7 
1 Situation corresponding to the Corfu European Council; changes proposed in preparation for the 
Essen European Council not included. 
2 Figures for second and third lists are approximations as complete data for some projects have not 
been provided. 
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Classification of priority projects 
approved by the Corfu European Council· 
Investment outlays 
A — 
Β 
D 
E — 
Mature public/private partnerships 
PBKAL-NL 
Betuwe line 
PBKAL-UK 
Malpensa Airport 
(millin 
Up to 1999 
950 
2 340 
3 420 
990 
ι ECU) 
Up  ito 2010 
Π AO 
3 290 
5 360 
1050 
Total 7 700 
Mature projects which are publicly financed 
on the basis of user charges with government guarantees 
12 440 
Øresund fixed link
2
 
Conventionally financed national railway projects 
PBKAL-B 
German high-speed train 
(Berlin-Nuremberg and link with TGV-Est 
(high-speed train East)) 
TGV-Est (high-speed train East) 
Total 
Projects with substantial EU grant support 
for cohesion motives 
Athens-Patras (Rion-Antirion included) 
motorway 
Via Egnatia motorway 
Lisbon-Valladolid motorway 
Conventional rail Cork-Stranraer 
Total 
Projects with open financial plans
3
 
Brenner (high-speed/conventional train) 
Lyons-Turin (high-speed/conventional train) 
Madrid-Montpellier (high-speed train) 
Madrid-Vitoria-Dax (high-speed train) 
PBKAL-Germany 
Total 
Total 
3 070 
3 070 
4 470 
2 900 
10 440 
3 010 
2 460 
770 
240 
6 480 
860 
1 820 
3 250 
1 130 
3 320 
10 380 
38 070 
3 070 
3 700 
8 790 
4 100 
16 590 
3 890 
2 480 
1070 
240 
7 680 
12 400 
6 800 
8 370 
4 500 
3 950 
36 020 
75 800 
1 List of 11 transport projects approved by the Corfu European Council, June 1994. 
Projects proposed as new first priorities to the Essen Council: 
Nordic triangle (E) 
Øresund (Swedish access) (B) 
IRL-UK-Benelux road corridor (A) 
West coast main line (E) 
Turin-Milan-Venice-Trieste (E) 
(million ECU) 
1 400 4 400 
300 300 
1 580 2 680 
880 880 
2 100 6 750 
6 260 15 010 
2 Not including Swedish access routes. 
3 Of which. Brenner (access routes) and Barcelona-French border conventionally financed. 
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The concept of private financing 
in relation to TENs 
A — General 
1. From the outset, the financing of TENs has been strongly associated with private 
sector involvement. COM(90) 585 emphasizes that TENs — particularly in the telecom-
munications sector — show a potential for financial profitability as they respond to strong 
user needs. Market logic should therefore apply, notably through the application of user 
charges for the services provided, without, however, excluding public support in specific 
circumstances. 
The White Paper specifies that 'the major portion of finance for these investments will be 
raised at the level of the Member States, either through private investors (especially in the 
telecommunications sector) or via public enterprises'. In the conclusions of its provisional 
report to the Corfu European Council, the Christophersen Group advises favouring private 
participation whenever possible, while possible involvement of the private sector is 
mentioned as one of the criteria for selecting priority projects. The various forms which 
private involvement could take are discussed in greater depth, although still in very general 
terms, in the section of the report dealing with public/private partnerships. Finally, the 
Corfu conclusions emphasize 'the leading role of private funding'. 
2. The precise meaning of the concept has remained vague and ambiguous and has 
therefore given rise to diverging interpretations. The Treaties themselves remain neutral 
on the public/private issue as Article 222 EC and Article 83 ECSC specify that 'the Treaty 
shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property 
ownership'. In the field of competition, the Treaty provides that, subject to the carrying-out 
of certain public service obligations, public companies are subject to the same rules and 
must be treated on an equal footing with private companies (Article 90(2) EC). These 
Treaty provisions obviously deal more with the ownership question than they do with 
financing as such. 
This annex therefore attempts to provide some clarifications on the issue of private 
financing and to give some operational content to this notion. It needs to be stressed from 
the outset that, for reasons of simplicity, this annex will focus on 'pure' forms of private 
financing. Particularly in the transport sector, such genuine forms are highly unusual in 
practice because they are rarely feasible and often not desirable. Section C refers to the 
more common approach, whereby mixed financing solutions are generally worked out. 
The emphasis put on private financing is inspired by a number of benefits which are 
generally associated with this particular form of financing: 
(a) it diminishes the pressure on public budgets and on public debt levels (through a 
reduction in public investment expenditure, risk sharing, etc.); 
(b) it can therefore contribute towards increasing and speeding up the supply of new 
infrastructure or the upgrading of existing facilities through the availability of extra 
resources (although the complex institutional and financial set-up of individual projects 
often delays the implementation in comparison with publicly funded projects); 
(c) it increases efficiency, in both construction and operation; 
(d) it fosters competition, both between public and private sectors and between private 
groups; 
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(e) it improves market awareness and responsiveness to user needs. 
ß — Criteria and conditions 
If private financing is to produce any effect on public sector budgets (see point (a)) and/or 
on the total supply of funds in favour of TENs (see point (b)), the financing in question 
will have to be repaid, in the case of loans, or remunerated, in the case of equity, out of 
the revenues generated by the project itself, without recourse to public budgets. The notion 
of private financing, in the form of equity, loans or any other form, therefore implies that 
(at least a clear and meaningful part of) the risks associated with their financial contribution 
(for example, arising from revenue shortfalls, cost overruns, etc.) are borne by the private 
investor himself and not covered by the State or any other public body. 
A likely consequence, particularly if a public enterprise is involved (for example, the 
construction of a new railway link), is that the infrastructure project will necessarily have 
to be implemented in the form of an independent entity with separate accounts and with 
revenues and expenditure of its own. If this is not the case, the project will form part of a 
broader set of assets belonging to the promoter company, which implies that the financial 
performance and profitability of the project can no longer be separated from the rest of the 
promoter's assets. In addition, the project entity in question will have to operate on a 
commercial basis and be profit-seeking so as to maximize the likelihood of a full and 
timely repayment of the loans and to generate an adequate profit for the shareholders. 
The purest example, although rarely encountered in practice, is a project which is entirely 
built, financed and operated by a private promoter in return for a concession granting him 
the right to collect the revenues over a given period of time. Besides the equity capital 
brought in by the promoter, the loans will typically be provided on a non-recourse basis 
by a consortium of private banks. The public purse remains out of reach, particularly when 
the project fails or is unable to service its debts, as creditors cannot express claims beyond 
the project's revenues and assets. 
The advantages mentioned under points (c), (d) and (e) are associated with private sector 
management (as distinct from financing) of the projects concerned. In practice, however, 
private financing will almost automatically imply private management, as the private 
sector is in general unwilling to put its resources at risk in projects that it is not allowed to 
manage or control.' 
In those instances where the role of the private sector is limited to the provision of risk-free 
forms of financing (for example, provision of a State-guaranteed loan to a public entity for 
the construction of an infrastructure link), it is unlikely that any of the advantages 
mentioned in the above list will materialize and one can therefore conclude that this form 
of financing, even if extended by a private bank, is little different from the classical forms 
of public financing. 
The opposite situation, i.e. private management combined with public ownership, is perfectly 
conceivable, for example, a motorway built out of public funds and subsequently managed by a 
private operator. 
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If a particular TEN link is entirely built and financed by a public enterprise, none of the 
conditions set out above (private sector liability, separate entity seeking profit) are fulfilled 
and the notion of private financing is therefore not directly applicable. In other instances, 
the issue is less clear-cut, for instance when the public enterprise in question (or the State 
itself) decides to set up and capitalize a separate (private) promoter company for the 
project in question, possibly with equity contributions from other public or private 
partners. Assuming that the promoter company is entirely self-sustaining (i.e. the project 
generates sufficient revenues to cover the investment and operating costs) and is, 
moreover, operating on a commercial basis, the question arises to what extent a financial 
construction of this kind could be qualified as private financing. 
Referring to the criteria set out above, the risks associated with the funds provided to this 
private vehicle should be entirely borne by the public and private investors up to the level 
of their financial involvement. More particularly, no spillover effects should exist for the 
parent company (for example, in the form of blanket guarantees or other), as the latter 
then becomes the ultimate risk bearer; this will inevitably increase the funding cost, but 
confine the risks to the project company itself (for example, non-recourse lending). The 
extent of the public sector's involvement in the capital (majority share) and management 
is probably also a relevant element, as the likelihood of an eventual bail-out in case of 
financial difficulties will inevitably be linked to the overall level of public involvement. 
C — Combining private financing 
with public support 
The extension of public support in favour of a project is definitely not in contradiction 
with the concept of private financing. Public support will actually be indispensable for 
those projects which are not financially viable. This support can be justified on various 
grounds, such as the important socioeconomic benefits and externalities of the project, 
public service obligations imposed upon the operator, etc. 
Public support can take a variety of forms, depending on the objectives pursued: 
investment grants, reimbursable advances and support in kind (building of access roads, 
provision at no cost of an already existing infrastructure, etc.); 
equity contributions to the promoter company; 
interest subsidies; 
long-term loans; 
guarantees for specific risks, etc. 
In order to remain compatible with the private financing logic, the following conditions 
are relevant: 
(i) the private sector needs to bear (at least a meaningful part of) the risk related to its 
own financial contribution; 
(ii) the size of the public contribution needs to be minimal, i.e. not greater than necessary 
to involve the private sector, as the financial return to the private sector would 
otherwise be virtually guaranteed and the incentives would disappear. 
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The first condition is not incompatible with certain types of public guarantees, notably for 
risks which the private sector is unable to control or to insure elsewhere. However, they 
should not produce the effect of suppressing the liability of private funders while shifting 
the risks back to the State (for example, loan guarantees extended at no cost, guaranteed 
returns for the private sector, etc.). The second condition is the most difficult one to verify 
in practice and constitutes the main difficulty in setting up mixed financing solutions. A 
bidding procedure, whereby the project is assigned to the promoter requiring the lowest 
level of public support, is probably the only satisfactory means of testing this condition. 
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Categories of risks generally identified 
in relation to infrastructure projects 
A — Precommissioning period 
Administrative delays (planning, legislation, environmental, compulsory land 
acquisition, etc.) 
Construction cost overruns and delays 
Non-completion risk 
Non-completion by third parties of associated infrastructure (access roads etc.) 
Β — Post-construction period 
Revenue generation (market risk) 
Defects, design errors, etc. 
C — Financial risks 
Interest rates and inflation 
Exchange rates 
D — Political risks 
Taxation, accounting rules 
Construction of a competing infrastructure 
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A — Transport 
/. Mandate given and work done 
The Corfu European Council asked the Christophersen 
Group to examine transport infrastructure projects with a 
view to accelerating administrative, regulatory and legal 
procedures. 
This examination has been carried out in respect of the 
transport projects agreed by the European Council. It 
concerned the following aspects: 
political decision-making; 
studies, in particular environmental impact assessments; 
construction authorization procedures; 
establishment of legal arrangements for ownership, con-
struction and operation; 
compliance with rules on public procurement; 
application of competition rules; 
interoperability; 
transport policy measures, such as the charging of infra-
structure costs to users. 
Information sheets have been drawn up describing the 
situation of each project. 
On the basis of information supplied by the States 
concerned and discussions with experts, common prob-
lems have been identified for which solutions could be 
proposed following more detailed consideration. 
The first problem is the highly political nature of the 
decision to go ahead with a major infrastructure project. 
The higher the political profile of the decision, the more it 
puts a public stamp on the project. The political profile of 
the project can be an obstacle in itself if the project 
involves negotiations between different levels of autho-
rity. Such a situation can lead to the private sector losing 
interest in the project or setting a very high price for 
getting involved, on account of the associated risks. 
For a whole range of reasons, which can vary from one 
country to another, the national authorities responsible for 
transport infrastructure tend to regard themselves as the 
promoters of major infrastructure projects. This attitude 
goes hand in hand with the idea that such infrastructure 
can be built only with public funding or funding under 
public sector control. It almost naturally leads to arrange-
ments which fail to make optimum use of the potentialities 
of the private sector. 
In the case of cross-border projects involving two or more 
national authorities, such attitudes and the diversity of 
such attitudes can constitute major obstacles to the estab-
lishment of dynamic conditions for project implemen-
tation. 
These difficulties, the result of a long tradition and of a 
predominantly national approach, combine to make the 
political decision and the financing arrangements very 
complex and difficult. 
The solutions to these problems are not exclusively legal 
in nature: the first step is to recognize that national 
frontiers have given way to an area without internal 
frontiers, and that the various authorities must cooperate 
to manage this area and make it dynamic. All potentially 
interested parties must then be much more actively 
associated with the project rather than seeking to super-
impose the controls which each intends to exercise in its 
own territory. 
2. General comments 
It is not possible to dissociate regulatory problems from 
the conditions for private sector involvement in the 
financing of major transport infrastructure projects, as 
regulatory problems have a direct bearing on the very 
principle of private sector involvement and the nature of 
the risks which the private sector is prepared to accept. 
3. Scope for accelerating national procedures 
For obvious reasons relating to the protection of the 
general interest and of individual rights, each Member 
State has set up administrative procedures, accompanied 
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by judicial guarantees, to permit the implementation of 
infrastructure projects. These procedures concern the way 
the project fits into regional planning and the solutions to 
be adopted to minimize the environmental impact. The 
length of these procedures varies from one Member State 
to another, as the following examples show: 
(i) in France, the procedures for the preparation of major 
infrastructure projects take six to seven years, from 
the outline plan to the start of construction; 
(ii) in Germany, an average of six to seven years must be 
allowed from project identification to the construc-
tion licence; 
(iii) in the United Kingdom, a period of seven to nine 
years is needed from project planning to the start of 
construction; 
(iv) in the Netherlands, four to five years must be allowed 
for completion of the procedures. 
Such long lead times are common to all Member States, 
although some have recently endeavoured to reduce them 
by shortening procedures and by accomplishing several 
tasks in parallel rather than consecutively. 
Attempts to shorten lead times have been made in several 
countries, reflecting a desire to speed up the completion 
of infrastructure projects: 
(i) On 24 December 1993 Germany adopted a Federal 
Law (Planungsvereinfachungsgesetz) designed to 
speed up procedures by setting stricter deadlines for 
the authorities themselves, for the public enquiry and 
for the examination of objections, which rarely have 
a suspensive effect. It is now possible to complete 
the whole process in two years. 
(ii) In France, an administrative circular dated 
17 December 1992, on the conduct of major national 
infrastructure projects, emphasizes the need for high-
quality assessments (environmental impact, socio-
economic impact), the grouping of procedures and 
the organization of a democratic debate ahead of the 
public utility enquiry so that account can be taken of 
the concerns of all parties in advance. 
(iii) The Dutch law (Tracéwet, 1994) and the British law 
also permit the acceleration of procedures for major 
infrastructure projects. One of the means provided is 
the approval of major projects by act of parliament, 
thus limiting public debate to the duration of the 
parliamentary debate; however, this can itself be 
long where detailed examination by a parliamentary 
committee is involved. For example, the debate on 
the bill to be tabled in November 1994 on the 
Channel Tunnel rail link is expected to last 18 to 
24 months. 
Without a doubt, the most important thing is still to take 
account, from the outset, of all interests concerned by the 
project, in particular the interest of the regions and areas 
affected. 
The above finding leads to the following two conclusions: 
(i) States which still have long procedures could imitate 
the above examples, taking care to ensure that 
the accelerated procedures comply with Community 
rules on environmental impact. 
(ii) In the case of cross-border projects concerning a 
Member State having an accelerated procedure and 
another with no such accelerated procedure, project 
implementation will automatically follow the speed 
of the slower Member State, with all the negative 
consequences this may have. Greater synchronization 
of national procedures is therefore desirable. 
4. Lack of a common legal framework 
for cross-border projects 
In both legal and economic terms, cross-border projects 
are generally designed from a narrow perspective. A 
project of direct concern to two Member States will be 
pieced together by superposing two national projects, each 
of which complies with national law, with a minimum 
amount of joint work and often without any legal frame-
work, each Member State being responsible for its part of 
the project. The Øresund is a good example of the 
splintering of a single project into several parts for which 
different legal bodies are responsible (a Danish body, a 
Swedish body, and a jointly owned body solely for the 
fixed link (bridge/tunnel)). The TGV-Est (high-speed train 
East) is currently presented as a French section and a 
German section, with the result that it fails to cross the 
Rhine. 
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This minimalist approach tends to ignore the interest 
which other States can have in a given project in terms of 
the development of their own network and their economic 
activities. Why, not, then, find a way of involving them in 
the development and financing of the project'? 
There are several recent examples: 
(i) The Netherlands is prepared to participate in con-
tributing to the funding of the Belgian section of the 
TGV-Nord in order to advance this project, which 
has an impact on its own projects. 
(ii) In the context of the TGV-Est project, Luxembourg 
has given France an undertaking that it will contribute 
to the funding of the investment needed in France in 
addition to the work involved in adapting its own rail 
infrastructure. 
Luxembourg is also prepared to consider contributing 
towards the costs of developing the Belgian part of 
the Luxembourg-Brussels railway line, to upgrade it 
to high-speed standard, in accordance with pro-
cedures yet to be negotiated. 
Moreover, the absence of a joint structure does not 
encourage the optimal search for common solutions to 
problems, the lowest common denominator being the rule. 
Two examples can be quoted here: 
(i) PBKA (Paris-Brussels-Cologne-Amsterdam) is a 
project which, in terms of infrastructure construction, 
was planned as a juxtaposition of national projects, 
the European Community being kept out of the 
inter-State discussions. In terms of operation and 
revenue distribution, and hence return on investment, 
although agreement was reached on the principle of 
solidarity, this appears not to be sufficient, as it was 
not finalized within the period agreed in December 
1989 by the ministers of the States concerned and the 
project is still far from completion; 
(ii) Eurostar is a service offered jointly by the Belgian, 
British and French railways on the 
Paris-Lille-London and Brussels-Lille-London 
routes. A steering committee, and not a joint body, is 
responsible for resolving any problems concerning 
the operation of the service. The lack of a joint body 
means that each network defends its own interest on 
each question, such as the uniform worn by staff, 
the number of staff seconded by each network, 
timetables, etc. 
The approach to all cross-border projects is at present 
strictly intergovernmental, which considerably weakens 
them by allowing national interests to prevail over the 
common interest. It should be possible to find solutions to 
this major shortcoming by having recourse to legal entities 
pooling the interests concerned and promoting them in the 
common interest. The main aim would be to save the 
project from short-term or partisan considerations which 
could endanger it. Bringing the interested parties together 
within a specific body responsible for implementing the 
project would give it greater support and would reduce 
the risk of it being blocked by one of the parties. 
The body in question should be able to bring together the 
interested parties and yet have sufficient independence to 
promote the common interest effectively. A detailed legal 
study is needed to identify the instruments which could be 
used. At European level, two types of legal framework 
could provide the solution: 
(i) the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) 
could bring the interested parties together at the 
planning stage with a view to carrying out the 
necessary feasibility studies. 
The EEIG is a particularly appropriate instrument in 
this case. It is the legal form adopted by the SNCF 
and FS for the Lyons-Turin project studies, which 
demonstrates the usefulness of a single instrument 
bringing private and/or public partners from different 
Member States together for the purposes of a well-
defined project; 
(ii) the European company: although the regulation on 
the European company has not yet been adopted, the 
proposed articles of association would enable the 
partners in a major project to be brought together at 
the construction and/or operation stage within a 
commercial company complying with uniform rules 
applicable throughout the Community, the rules 
applicable at its chosen headquarters applying to 
aspects not covered by the Community regulation. 
Fiscal matters can be crucial in the choice of such an 
instrument. 
In order to facilitate cooperation between the public 
authorities concerned, other instruments have also been 
referred to by professional associations and by working 
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parties which have looked at the trans-European transport 
network. 
The idea of a European infrastructure agency responsible 
for promoting the construction of the infrastructure needed 
for the operation of the trans-European transport network 
has been put forward. To be worthwhile, such an agency 
would need to have sufficient powers to ensure the 
coordinated implementation of cross-border projects and 
to settle the conflicts liable to arise between partners. 
An independent (public-law) authority could also be set 
up for a project or a group of interdependent projects with 
the task of coordinating the project, defining the conditions 
for its implementation, and seeking the necessary partners 
and sources of funding. 
5. Competition imperatives 
Considerable economic interests are involved in the 
construction and operation of major items of infrastruc-
ture, and it is essential that interested economic operators 
should have equal opportunities to participate. The public 
interest also requires acceptance of the most economically 
advantageous offers in terms of costs (in particular to the 
public purse) and efficiency in the successive construction 
and operation stages. These requirements must be met in 
accordance with the procedures for public procurement 
which, in certain cases, could put off potentially interested 
private partners. 
At the project promotion and design stage, competitive 
tendering is essential for design studies and project 
promotion activities wherever a significant amount of 
national or Community public resources are devoted to 
the financing of the studies and activities in question. 
However, in cases where private promoters propose to 
fund all or virtually all of the promotion, study and 
implementation costs, or are recognized as having exclus-
ive rights in the field in question (as regards major 
transport infrastructure these are probably exceptional 
cases), the competitive tendering requirement could 
inhibit the formation of consortia and delay the implemen-
tation of projects of European interest. 
The public authorities could also hold competitions to 
come up with ideas for the implementation of specific 
projects on the basis of a detailed description of the 
objectives pursued. However, this method, which draws 
on the imagination and know-how of the private sector, 
must be sufficiently well organized to ensure real compe-
tition. 
At the construction stage of an infrastructure project, 
competitive tendering between the firms or groups of 
firms responsible for project management or for the 
implementation of various parts of the project is always 
desirable in order to guarantee the quality of the infrastruc-
ture, compliance with the constraints imposed by the 
contracting authority and compliance with the minimum 
construction deadlines. Community rules require competi-
tive tendering for all work carried out under the responsi-
bility of the public authorities or of a concession-holding 
company subsidized by the public authorities or partly 
publicly owned. It is not compulsory for infrastructure 
built by a concession-holder whose capital is exclusively 
private, who receives no public subsidies and no public or 
Community cover for the financial risks involved. 
At the operation stage of an infrastructure project, when a 
concession is to be granted for the operation of the 
infrastructure, the procedure for selecting the concession-
holder must comply with the same rules as for the 
implementation stage, unless the concession covers both 
stages (construction and operation). Moreover, the con-
ditions for access to the infrastructure, once it has been 
completed, can have a decisive impact on the search for 
private funding at the design and construction stages. 
Under Community law, infrastructure must generally be 
open to all operators who meet the necessary technical 
and legal conditions for the provision of transport services. 
This general principle does not preclude the conclusion of 
specific agreements, particularly where transport under-
takings participate directly or indirectly in the financing 
of the infrastructure. In view of the investment costs, such 
agreements may prove essential. 
However, transport undertakings can only make a finan-
cial commitment if they receive guaranteed access to the 
infrastructure to provide their own services. 
It is therefore conceivable that the infrastructure operator 
may give a contractual undertaking to reserve part of the 
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available capacity for these undertakings. The lawfulness 
of such agreements must be assessed in the light of the 
competition rules on a case-by-case basis. However, two 
general principles can be identified: 
(i) the restriction on competition, i.e. the reservation of 
capacity, cannot go beyond what is strictly essential 
for the success of the project; 
(ii) the agreement in question must not eliminate compe-
tition on a substantial part of the market, which in 
principle precludes the reservation of all available 
capacity for one undertaking or group of undertak-
ings. 
In any case, competition imperatives must be reconciled 
with the specificities of major infrastructure works: very 
long time-scales and construction risks, difficulties of 
forecasting traffic, insufficient financial profitability, 
operating risks, etc. 
In this context, transport undertakings may consider 
concluding cooperation agreements for the operation of 
European services, the lawfulness of which must also be 
assessed in the light of the competition rules. 
When examining such agreements, the Commission will 
take account of the fact that the trans-European networks 
have been designed from the outset from a European 
perspective and that commercial use thereof must be 
considered from the same perspective. 
It is also necessary to examine in each case how: 
(i) the need for transparent and open public procurement 
can take account of arguments relating to the taking 
of initiatives and risks by a given promoter; 
(ii) potential competition problems can be identified and 
dealt with satisfactorily at an early stage of project 
development. 
6. Interoperability 
Divergences in technical and operational rules are charac-
teristic of many projects. Superposing technical solutions 
rather than adopting common standards is a widespread 
and deplorable practice. It has a considerable impact on 
costs, especially in the rail sector. By way of example, in 
order to be able to run on the three networks concerned 
and in the Channel Tunnel, Eurostar must be able to use 
three types of power supply and four types of signalling. 
The PBKA train will not be able to run on the Eurostar 
network. The Spanish gauge is another problem to be 
resolved. The elaboration of common technical solutions 
and the corresponding standards is a slow process which 
is under way. The projects examined have not revealed 
any new problems not already covered by the proposals 
which the Commission has formulated, in particular for 
the construction of a high-speed train network (see 
proposal for a Directive on the interoperability of the 
European high-speed train network). 
Telematic developments applied to transport require the 
definition of joint standards, whether for the introduction 
of road-use charges or for the control of shipping. 
Air-traffic control also requires the application of joint 
standards for the establishment of a unified system. 
Developments in the common 
transport policy 
The Community wishes to develop a transport policy 
which makes the best possible use of each mode of 
transport. This implies fair competition between transport 
modes and the charging of costs to infrastructure users. 
Developments under way will have a not inconsiderable 
impact on the way the operation of infrastructure is 
organized. 
Charging for the use of transport infrastructure can provide 
a means of generating new funds with which to finance 
the new infrastructure which the Community needs. The 
implementation of a consistent policy in this field meets 
with strong resistance linked to long-standing traditions 
and the debate on the fiscal nature of infrastructure 
charges. 
In the road transport sector, Directive 93/89/EEC estab-
lishes the basic conditions for the development of charges 
for the use of road infrastructure. The means of collecting 
road-use charges must be sufficiently harmonized to avoid 
splits between national networks, and telematics should 
provide appropriate solutions. 
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The possibility of collecting such charges is being studied 
more frequently, even in the peripheral countries: the 
search for optimum private funding of the Greek PATHE 
(Patras-Athens-Thessaloniki) project involving a toll is 
evidence of this. 
In the rail transport sector, Directive 91/440/EEC calls for 
a separation between infrastructure provision and service 
operation. The Council reached political agreement on the 
two subsequent Directives — on the licensing of railway 
undertakings, and on the allocation of railway infrastruc-
ture capacity and the charging of infrastructure fees — at 
its meeting on 26 September 1994. The adoption of these 
two Directives should bring new dynamism to the railway 
sector, making it easier to finance trans-European infra-
structure. 
The approach followed for the TGV-Est in France does 
not make use of these possibilities: French law does not 
permit any operator other than the SNCF on the French 
network. The structure of the project results in consider-
able public financing requirements. 
8. Conclusions 
Trans-European infrastructure projects suffer from a host 
of uncertainties which make them harder to implement 
and more costly than traditional national projects. 
These uncertainties stem from: 
the difficulty of taking the political decisions enabling the 
project to be implemented; 
the splintering of the project into several parts; 
the lack of a single promoter; 
the fact that the status of network operators is under 
revision; 
technical difficulties. 
To these uncertainties, which discourage the private 
investor, increase lead times and increase costs, must be 
added an attitude on the part of the national authorities — 
who are used to infrastructure being publicly funded and 
to a national environment — which does not really 
encourage an international partnership of private and 
public bodies. Several actions can be taken, in technical 
terms, to solve the problems examined, but none of them 
will be fully effective unless there is a real desire to 
cooperate on the part of all parties concerned by a 
cross-border project. The European dimension of the 
projects also requires them to be designed, implemented 
and operated from a truly European perspective. 
Recommendations can be formulated. They call for more 
detailed consideration of the subjects examined with a 
view to facilitating implementation of the projects. A 
pragmatic approach would involve testing some of these 
proposals on one or other of the feasibility projects. 
(a) The Member States 
The Member States should: 
(i) consider each cross-border project in its entirety and 
not as an amalgam of national subprojects; 
(ii) examine the scope for reducing the time taken to 
obtain administrative authorization in the light of the 
experiments already undertaken by a number of 
Member States; 
(iii) ensure that the national procedures to be followed for 
the implementation of a cross-border project are 
synchronized; 
(iv) set up joint bodies bringing together the partners 
interested in the promotion of a given project and 
capable of embracing both public and private bodies; 
(v) as far as possible, associate the national, regional and 
local interests affected by a project from the project 
design stage; 
(vi) adopt a positive attitude to the association of private 
capital with the legal persons responsible for project 
promotion. 
(b) The European Union 
The Union should: 
(i) actively contribute to bringing together partners who 
may potentially be interested in a cross-border pro-
ject; 
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(ii) adopt the regulation on the European company as 
soon as possible so that it can be used by project 
promoters; 
(iii) be able to increase the degree of legal certainty which 
promoters need prior to the adoption of a project as 
regards the scope for cooperation between partners 
and possible ways of operating the infrastructure; 
(iv) encourage the European Investment Fund to play a 
more active role in the legal and financial organiza­
tion of projects, in particular by taking a holding in 
promotion companies bringing together the partners 
interested in a project; 
(v) speed up work on the Directive on the interoperability 
of high-speed trains and on technical specifications 
and standards in the field of telematics applied to 
transport; 
(vi) implement the various measures to ensure that infra­
structure users bear more of the infrastructure costs. 
Β — Regulatory framework for the 
energy sector 
/. Mandate given and work done 
The Group also examined the scope for accelerating 
administrative, regulatory and legal procedures for energy 
network projects. 
It focused on two aspects: 
(i) administrative procedures leading up to the authoriz­
ation to carry out projects; 
(ii) establishment of a legislative framework for the 
electricity and natural gas markets compatible with 
the internal market. 
The Group would emphasize that the rules laid down 
pursuant to Community policies, including public procure­
ment and competition rules, must be complied with in the 
case of energy network projects too. 
2. Administrative procedures 
In its proposal for a decision on a series of actions aimed 
at creating a more favourable context for the development 
of trans-European networks in the energy sector, ' which 
accompanied its proposal on a series of guidelines, the 
Commission emphasized the problems of the duration 
and complexity of the administrative procedures for 
authorizing projects and of delays in such procedures. 
These problems are particularly severe in the case of 
electricity transmission line projects. 
Analysis of the problems encountered in the Member 
States shows that they are quite diverse in nature and that 
the solutions which may be envisaged range from the 
amendment of national legislation to informing the public 
of the advantages of the projects in question. 
Eurelectric, the association representing the electricity 
sector in the Union, agrees with this analysis and proposes 
that deadlines be laid down for the completion of the 
procedures, that the legal procedures and environmental 
requirements in the Member States be harmonized, and 
that the public be properly informed so as to increase 
public acceptance of this kind of project. 
The Group suggests that the European Council 
recommend to the Member States, who, in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity, are responsible for the 
administrative procedures: 
(i) that they take the necessary measures to avoid delays 
in the administrative procedures for priority projects; 
(ii) that they cooperate among themselves and with the 
European Commission with a view to simplifying the 
administrative procedures that apply to all the energy 
network projects, and to ensuring that they are 
completed within a reasonable time-scale. 
3. Operating conditions for energy networks 
The Union has a duty to place its energy networks at the 
service of the common interest, which implies integrated 
operation of the networks in the framework of the internal 
market. 
COM(93) 685 final. 
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The Directives on transit already ensure that the operators 
of all major networks can use any interconnected network 
to buy or sell energy (provided such trade is across a 
national boundary) and to gain access to energy produced 
in another Member State or in a third country. 
The Commission's proposals for common rules for elec-
tricity and gas will enable a major consumer or a 
distribution network to have direct recourse to the trans-
port capacities made available by the network in order to 
buy electricity or natural gas in other Member States. The 
operation of the internal market depends on energy 
transport infrastructure being developed and adapted in 
line with the new demand that this system will generate. 
These Commission proposals for new market rules, which 
were amended following the opinion of the European 
Parliament, are still being discussed by the Council. 
Progress has been made on certain aspects, including the 
opening-up of electricity generation and 'unbundling'. 
The Group suggests that the European Council reiterate 
the importance of rapidly completing the internal energy 
market, on account of the synergy with the physical 
development of energy networks and so that the con-
sumers and the economy of the Union can benefit from 
the anticipated advantages of the single market in the 
energy sector and the improved interconnection of existing 
networks and the creation of new trans-European networks 
does not strengthen the dominant positions of operators of 
major energy networks. 
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Trans-European inland waterway network 
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Trans-European railway network outline plan (2010 horizon) 
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EUROPEAN ROAD NETWORKS 
(as proposed at the second Pan-European Transport Conference, Crete, 14 to 16 March 1994) 
EFTA States: Roads of the European Agreement on main international traffic arteries (layer 1) 
Other non-European Union States: Roads of the European Agreement on main international 
traffic arteries and other main roads (layer 1) 
European Union: Council Decision 93/629 of 29 October 1993 on the creation of a trans-European 
road network (layer 2) 
Priority corridors in Central and Eastern Europe 
Including part of the TEM network (layer 2, 2010) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Talin-Riga-Warsaw 
Berlin-Warsaw-Minsk-Moscow 
Berlin/Dresden-Wroclaw-Lvov-Kiev 
6
! 
7 
8' 
Bertin/Nuremberg-Prague-Budapest-Constanta/Thessaloniki/lstanbul Q I 
Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest-Bratislava-Uzgorod-Lvov 
Gdansk-Warsaw-Ziílna 
Danube (waterway corridor) 
Durres-Tirana-Skopje-Sofia-Varna 
Helsinki-Kiev/Moscow-Odessa/Kishinev/Bucharest-Plovdiv 
Port belonging to a corridor 
103 Annexes 
1 ! 
2 
3 
4' 
5' 
EUROPEAN RAILWAY NETWORKS 
(as proposed at the second Pan-European Transport Conference, Crete, 14 to 16 March 1994) 
Non-European Union/EFTA States: Railways of the European Agreement 
on main international railway lines and other main railways (layer 1) 
European Union and EFTA States: Report of the ad hoc group of the Commission 
(DG VII, October 1993; layer 2) 
Priority corridors in Central and Eastern Europe 
Including part of the TER network (layer 2, 2010) 
Talin-Riga-Warsaw 6 ■■■ Gdansk-Warsaw-Zillna 
Berlin-Warsaw-Minsk-Moscow J ^^" Danube (waterway corridor) 
Berlin/Dresden-Wroclaw-Lvov-Kiev 8 ' 
Berlin/Nuremberg-Prague-Budapest-Constanta/Thessaloniki/ 
Istanbul 9
!
 
Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest-Bratislava-Uzgorod-Lvov 
Durres-Tirana-Skopje-Sofia-Varna 
Helsinki-Kiev/Moscow-Odessa/Kishinev/ 
Bucharest-Plovdiv 
Port belonging to a corridor 
104 o 
l/l 
i» 
3 
3  fl> 
X  re Annexes 
106 Annexes 
Christophersen Group — Natural gas network priority projects (List A ) 
PRIORITY PROJECTS 
OTHER PROJECTS 
EXISTING NETWORKS 
107 Transport project descriptions 
Annex A 
Transport project descriptions 
Part I — Priority projects 
High-speed train/combined transport North-South 
• Berlin-Nuremberg 
• Brenner axis Munich-Verona 
Project 
Under construction 
Conventional lines 
Other lines of the 
trans-European high-speed 
train network outline plan 
Berlin 
Warszava 
Kassel 
Zürich 
Milano 
Bologna 
Project description  The Berlin-Munich-Verona axis forms part of a strategic European rail corridor which 
links Scandinavia, Germany, Austria and Italy; it is also important for connections with 
Greece. It consists of two parts: the Berlin-Nuremberg line and the Brenner axis 
Munich-Verona. The Nuremberg-Munich section is already under construction; adminis-
trative procedures have been completed and (public) financing is secured; it was therefore 
excluded from the project dealt with by the Christophersen Group. 
The entire link has been included in the Commission's proposal for the development of 
the trans-European transport network, submitted in April 1994. It is planned to allow both 
high-speed and combined transport services. In the very first trans-European network in 
the transport sector, that for high-speed rail, which was adopted by the Transport Council 
in 1990, the Brenner axis was already identified as being of great significance; it formed 
part of 15 key links requiring particular effort in studying their feasibility and in laying the 
foundations for their construction. 
The implementation of this large-scale project, demanding investments of more than ECU 
20 000 million, should lead to marked improvements in the competitive situation of rail 
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transport over the whole of the almost 1 000 km long line. Increases in speed — up to 
250 km/h — and capacity will render rail transport more attractive. Passengers and 
hauliers should therefore gain a decisive advantage over the use of roads when choosing 
the rail mode, especially over medium and long distances. Road traffic, which causes 
particularly negative effects on the natural environment (various emissions, etc.) is 
expected to be reduced and, by so doing, an important contribution to achieving sustainable 
mobility can be made. 
Exhibiting, as they do, a number of specific differences with respect to financing, political, 
administrative and technical issues, the two parts Berlin-Nuremberg and Munich-Verona 
will hereafter be dealt with separately. 
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High-speed train/combined transport North-South 
• Berlin-Nuremberg 
Project description  The Berlin-Nuremberg railway line traverses to a large extent the new German Länder. 
which still face a difficult economic situation. The implementation of the project is 
expected to give an important impetus to regional development and economic upturn. It is 
estimated that, during the construction period, employment of about 300 000 man-years 
can be created. 
The total length of the line amounts to 552 km, 40
c/c of which has to be newly constructed 
whereas 60
c/c represents upgrading of an existing line. 
Indicative costs and construction period 
Section 
Berlin-Halle/Leipzig 
Halle/Leipzig-Erfurt 
Erfurt-Nuremberg 
Total 
Length 
(km) 
195 
161 
196 
552 
Cosi 
(million ECU) 
1 600 
2 450 
4 380 
8 430 
Construction period 
1993 to after 2000 
1995-2003 
1995-2000 
State of maturity 
Thanks mainly to the expected benefits to regional and economic development, the project 
shows good prospects regarding socioeconomic profitability. The benefit-cost ratio has 
been evaluated at more than 3; consequently, the project was included in a list of priorities 
(vordringlicher Bedarf) in the framework of the German infrastructure master plan 
1992-2010. 
As regards the financial profitability of the project, no data has been released as 
yet. Unfavourable rates of return, however, may be found because the costs of the 
Berlin-Nuremberg line are relatively high. 
All relevant political decisions have been taken. Because this project is included in the 
abovementioned infrastructure master plan, and in addition in the law on the construction 
and upgrading of railway infrastructure (Schienenwegeausbaugesetz), as a priority project, 
commitments by the government are likely to be secured to the necessary extent. 
Whereas construction has already started on the Berlin-Halle/Leipzig section, the relevant 
administrative procedures are in progress for the remaining sections. As regards 
Erfurt-Nuremberg, the public inquiry has revealed some objections by people concerned: 
however, no major delay is to be expected as a new law on the simplification of planning 
procedures (passed in 1993) made special provisions for priority projects and introduced 
deadlines both for the filing of objections and for the treatment within public adminis-
trations. 
No financing plan has been identified as yet; however, the availability of sound data 
regarding profitability is a prerequisite for this. The recent transfer of the railways 
(Deutsche Bahn) from a public service to an entity with the legal status of a joint-stock 
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company has caused some delay in the financial analysis of the project: the railway 
company and government have since announced that they intend to make progress on this 
matter in the very near future. For the time being, they envisage conventional financing, 
based on 50
c/c State support and 509Í- contributions from Deutsche Bahn AG. Deutsche 
Bahn AG is still publicly owned but intends, in the medium term, to sell shares to private 
investors. 
The abovementioned high cost of the project (about double the average for railway lines) 
is largely linked to technical particularities: the topographical situation, for parts of the 
project, requires extensive earthworks: also, the envisaged technical standard of the 
infrastructure is expensive. It seems advisable to examine alternative solutions. 
The work done in the context of the Christophersen Group has helped to increase 
understanding of the project. Whereas administrative procedures, thanks to progressive 
legislation that has recently been adopted by the German Parliament, are unlikely to 
become a delaying factor, the critical financing issue is still to be solved. The envisaged 
financing plan, 100% based on public funds, should be subject to further analysis; efforts 
should be made to enhance profitability of the project and to include private partners. 
On the basis of financial data to be provided by the project promoter, the Commission 
should further encourage an innovative financial scheme. The experience gained from the 
analysis of the other priority projects during the last year should enable valuable 
conclusions to be drawn for this project. Further meetings between national authorities. 
the project promoter, the Commission and, if appropriate, private sector representatives, 
should therefore be organized. By exploring the scope for private capital involvement, 
they could contribute to accelerating the financing and, by so doing, the completion of the 
project. 
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High-speed train/combined transport North-South 
• Brenner axis Munich-Verona 
Project description  The discussions on the construction of a new transalpine railway line between Munich and 
Verona, comprising a base tunnel under the Brenner pass, were started more than a decade 
ago. Stimulated mainly by the fact that road traffic, and freight traffic in particular, causes 
considerable damage to the natural environment and affects the living conditions of the 
people concerned, this project developed steadily over the years. Recent political events, 
such as the democratization in Central and East European countries and the forthcoming 
EU membership of Austria, are very likely to generate additional demand for traffic on the 
Munich-Verona link; this, in combination with the 'normal' traffic increase, will test the 
capacity of the existing infrastructure. Environmental considerations in this sensitive area 
do not permit significant motorway extensions; as regards the rail mode, traffic forecasts 
indicate that the existing Brenner line will reach its capacity limit by the year 2010 at the 
latest. If congestion and irregularities in the provision of services are not to lead to 
negative economic effects, the implementation of the new Brenner project needs to be 
considered as a matter of urgency. 
Especially over medium and long distances, the new Brenner axis should establish a 
competitive alternative to road traffic. It is planned that freight services, including 
piggy-back, will account for 80% of total capacity. This should decisively contribute to 
increasing quality and attractiveness in this sector. Passengers going from Munich to 
Verona will in the future enjoy the benefit of a 50% saving in journey time as compared 
to the present situation. 
The implementation of the Brenner project is a technical challenge: due to the 
topographical situation and environmental requirements, it is envisaged that almost 70% 
of the line will go through tunnels; this concerns mainly the southernmost part which 
traverses the Trentino-Alto Adige region. The 55 km long base tunnel, being situated both 
on Austrian and Italian territory, represents the core element of the project. The total 
length of the new line amounts to 409 km; it will be constructed, in addition to the existing 
Brenner axis, as a new double-track line. Whereas the old infrastructure will continue to 
be used for conventional services, the new link will provide high-speed services for 
passengers as well as highly efficient transport of freight. 
Indicative costs and construction periods (taken from Brenner General Consult) 
Section 
Munich-Innsbruck 
Brenner, access north 
Innsbruck-Fortezza 
Brenner, base tunnel 
Fortezza-Verona 
Brenner axis, access south 
Total 
Length 
(km) 
165 
55 
189 
409 
Cost 
(million ECU) 
2 800 
4 400 
5 200 
12 400 
Construction period 
1995-2000' 
and after 2008 
2001-2010 
in stages from 2002 
onwards 
1 About ECU 2 100 million up to the year 2000. 
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State of maturity 
Although a detailed socioeconomic analysis for the project still has to be conducted, it is 
expected to entail important positive effects; improvements regarding the environment in 
particular will generate external benefits which should motivate the States concerned to 
make commitments to this project. 
By relying exclusively on public funds, this large-scale project is unlikely to be completed 
within the necessary time horizon. Private sector involvement is needed, and potential 
investors have already shown much interest in the new Brenner axis. The establishment of 
a public/private partnership seems therefore appropriate — on the basis of an adequate 
risk-sharing between the partners. This in turn presupposes the sound assessment of the 
financial profitability. The internal rate of return (IRR), a commonly used indicator of the 
profitability of a project, has been calculated for several scenarios: differing from each 
other mainly in traffic forecasts and interest rates for borrowing, the most optimistic 
assessment results in a 12.5% IRR whereas the most pessimistic one leads to a 3.4% IRR. 
In the past, the States concerned gave different priorities to the project: for Austria, the 
Brenner project was of first priority while this was not the case for Italy and Germany. 
In such situations, transborder projects are likely to run into difficulty and consequently 
may suffer from a shortage of public funds. 
A breakthrough was reached in November 1994 when the three States involved in the 
Brenner axis arrived at a political agreement as to the common implementation of the 
entire Munich-Verona link. The Commission contributed decisively to achieving this 
result, which is a landmark in the construction of this new railway line. The memorandum 
on the development of the project was signed by the Commissioner for Energy and 
Transport, Mr Oreja, and by the Ministers for Transport of Germany, Italy and Austria. It 
was made possible thanks to intensive preparatory work, the cornerstones of which were 
Joint Declaration No 20, attached to the Act of Accession of Austria to the European 
Union, and a relevant agreement between the Ministers for Transport reached at the 
ministerial conference in Montreux in June 1994. 
The Innsbruck bypass, as a part of the Austrian section, is already completed; construction 
works in the Lower Inn Valley (also situated in Austria) are likely to start soon. The three 
sides have conducted common feasibility studies on the base tunnel (1987/89), the 
northern and southern access routes (1992/94) and on safety and interoperability issues. A 
first environmental impact assessment has formed part of these studies; the results confirm 
that negative effects will be noticeably reduced. All this preliminary work resulted in a 
Munich-Verona route proposal which was submitted by an independent consultant in 
March 1994 and acknowledged by the three Ministers for Transport in June 1994. 
The necessary administrative procedures for certain sections will be launched in the very 
near future (for example the land-use planning procedure 'Raumordnungsverfahren' for 
the Lower Inn Valley section). As it is envisaged that the project will be implemented in 
stages — according to economic needs — further procedures should be carried out 
correspondingly. It appears that, in some regions, public information on the project 
preparation has so far been given too little attention; the people directly concerned should 
therefore be consulted as soon as possible in order to integrate their concerns in the further 
considerations and to avoid delays once procedures have been started. 
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Austria plans to start construction works in the Lower Inn Valley — where, due to the 
coincidence of the Brenner axis and an important east-west axis, capacity problems are 
particularly grave — in 1997. Germany intends to start upgrading works on the northern 
access route (German territory) very soon; it aims at ensuring a capacity of 270 trains per 
day in both directions, which would be sufficient to meet the needs while the base tunnel 
is not yet in operation. 
In response to capacity constraints, Italy intends to upgrade the existing line between 
Verona and the Brenner pass as a first phase of the long-term improvement of rail 
infrastructure on the Brenner axis. Work includes the construction of four new tunnels (34 
km of track, 31 km of which make up the tunnels themselves) as well as the improvement 
of power supply and signalling systems. 
To optimize the financing of the project on the basis of a public/private partnership, it is 
crucial to treat the new Brenner axis as a single project. Germany and Italy declared their 
willingness to facilitate the financing of their respective parts by the provision of public 
funds (loan guarantees, budget); however, they intend to limit their involvements to their 
territory. In order to make decisive progress with the project as a whole (and to ensure the 
construction of the particularly expensive base tunnel, large parts of which will be on 
Austrian territory), a joint financial arrangement is imperative. The financial commitment 
which should be made by the three States depends on the results of further sound financial 
studies; these in turn have to be based on common traffic forecasts that take account of 
recent political developments. According to the present state of knowledge, it can be 
estimated that about 30 to 40% of the total cost will have fo be provided by the three 
States in order to make the project feasible for private investors. 
The EIB (European Investment Bank) will provide a loan of ECU 360 million for the first 
phase of the upgrading work on parts of the Italian access routes, referred to above. 
Such a joint approach calls for the creation of a body which brings together all interested 
partners, namely governments, railways and private sector representatives. Such a body 
could take on the form of a European Economic Interest Grouping. 
The reconsideration of some technical aspects, such as the reduction in the maximum 
speed, may improve the profitability prospects. The technical solution of the base tunnel 
also appears to permit cost savings. The alignment, on the other hand (high tunnel 
proportion) seems unlikely to allow modifications. A difficulty of another type is caused 
by the non-availability of identical power-supply systems in Germany and Austria, on the 
one hand, and Italy, on the other. This interoperability problem is likely to be solved by 
the operation of multisystem locomotives. 
The work of the Christophersen Group has produced a real breakthrough for the Brenner 
project as it has contributed significantly to reaching an intergovernmental agreement; it 
has also helped to identify obstacles to the financing of the project, as well as problems 
regarding regulatory aspects. 
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High-speed train (PBKAL) 
(Paris-Brussels-Cologne-Amsterdam-London) 
Project 
Other lines of the 
trans-European 
high-speed train 
network outline plan 
*Π_ 
Hamburg 
London 
Bretagne 
Bordeaux 
Situation/routeing  The Paris-Brussels-Cologne-Amsterdam-London (PBKAL) high-speed train project is 
one of the most important projects of the Union's transport infrastructure programme; it 
represents a total investment of about ECU 13 000 million. 
The PBKAL consists of the following sections: 
Paris-Lille-(Channel Tunnel)-London, 
Brussels-Lille (western branch), 
Brussels-Amsterdam (northern branch), 
Brussels-Cologne (eastern branch). 
Noticeable reductions in travelling time for passengers between European capitals and 
other important cities can be expected as soon as the project is completed, for example 
Brussels-London: 4 hours 55 minutes reduced to 2 hours 5 minutes; Brussels-Paris: 2 
hours 25 minutes reduced to 1 hour 20 minutes. It thus establishes an attractive and 
competitive alternative to short-haul flights. 
By creating new, high-quality links for passenger traffic, the existing conventional railway 
network will be relieved; this will contribute to improved conditions for freight traffic 
using the conventional network. Consequently, the quality of services can be increased 
(for example, improvement in punctuality) thus rendering rail transport more attractive 
and helping further to stimulate the switch from road to rail. In view of the enormous 
negative effects which medium- and long-distance freight traffic by road especially causes 
to the environment, this can be considered an important step towards sustainable mobility. 
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With the entry into operation of the Paris-Lille section in 1993 and, in particular, of the 
Channel Tunnel in 1994, the first important steps towards the completion of the PBKAL 
project have been taken. 
However, the analysis of this large-scale project, conducted during recent months, 
revealed a number of problems which might slow down further progress. Therefore, 
appropriate action is called for, and the identification of these difficulties is a 
prerequisite to overcoming them. It is crucial to treat the PBKAL as a single project. 
A workshop held in September 1994 laid the foundations for the establishment of a 
permanent high-level working group which should bring together all Member States 
concerned, the railway companies, the European Commission and the European 
Investment Bank as well as a financial adviser. The main objectives of this group's 
work should be to coordinate the action of all partners involved, to optimize the 
financing of the entire project, to help accelerate its completion and to give particular 
attention to key border-crossing links. 
The Brussels-Luxembourg link can be considered to be an extension of the PBKAL; 
Luxembourg has declared its readiness to consider its participation in the financing. 
The project is described in more detail below. As political, technical, administrative and 
financial matters differ significantly in the Member States concerned by the PBKAL, this 
description is made country by country. 
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Project description 
State of maturity 
PBKAL: Belgian section 
This project is the core of the North European high-speed railway network. It consists of 
three subsections, the total length of which amounts to 312 km. Almost 50% of this will 
have to be newly constructed, whereas the remaining part represents existing lines to be 
upgraded. Tunnels of about 10 km total length form part of the project. 
Indicative costs and construction period 
Subsection 
Brussels-French border 
Brussels-German border 
Brussels-Dutch border 
Total 
Length 
(km) 
88 
145 including 
8 km tunnels 
79 
312 
Cost 
(million ECU) 
1 271 
1648 
815 
3 734 
Construction period 
1992-97 
1992-99/2004 
entry into operation: 2000 
NB:ECU 1 = BFR 39.5. 
The financial profitability for the entire Belgian project has been calculated at 6.1%. This 
is based on the assumption that the operators who will use the new line (Belgian, Dutch, 
French and German railways) share the generated revenues according to a basis already 
suggested for an international agreement. The socioeconomic profitability has not yet been 
evaluated. 
The project preparation and implementation is considerably affected by political problems 
which result largely from discussions between the Belgian regions. Significant delays 
have already been caused because of that: the Paris-Brussels section was originally 
planned to enter into operation in 1993, then 1996 was envisaged and now it is clear that 
it will not be opened before 1997. 
The further preparation of the Brussels-Dutch border-(Amsterdam) section suffers also 
from political difficulties. No agreement has been reached yet between the governments of 
the Flemish region and of the Netherlands as regards the alignment. Although two possible 
routes have been identified, neither of them gets the support of both parties. This is delaying 
the adoption of the New Line Bill by the Dutch Parliament (see Dutch section below). 
Administrative procedures are not yet completed for an important part of the 
Brussels-French border and the Brussels-German border sections; they were started in 
1993. Technical and environmental issues in particular entail delays; they are likely to 
lead to noticeable cost increases. 
A conventional financing scheme is envisaged: the Belgian State Railways (SNCB/NMBS) 
will finance the project by benefiting from public grants to be provided by the Belgian 
State and the Union. EIB loans of ECU 500 million have been approved. However, the 
financing is not secured for all sections; this is for instance true for the 
(Brussels-)Liège-German border section, which shows high costs and low traffic (only in 
the long term can a noticeable traffic increase be expected). Due to cost escalations 
(around 20% or more), financial difficulties are likely to occur. 
The work of the Christophersen Group has helped to identify delaying factors; they cover 
political, financial and administrative issues. 
The international working group which is to be established in the near future should be the 
appropriate body to advance the project as a whole; problems related to Belgium could 
then be dealt with in a wider context, which brings more opportunities to compensate 
diverging interests (such as the different preferences regarding the alignment in the 
Belgian/Dutch border area) and to combine the limited public funds in such a way that 
they produce the most efficient leverage effect for the involvement of private capital. 
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PBKAL: Dutch section 
Project description 
State of maturity 
The section from the Belgian/Dutch border to Amsterdam is about 130 km long. The 
major part of the line is to be newly constructed. However, the final decision on the 
alignment has not yet been taken; this is due to ongoing negotiations with Belgium with 
respect to the border area (as described in the Belgian section of the project). 
The total investment for this part of the project amounts to ECU 2 740 million; construction 
work is planned to start in 1997 and the entry into operation of the line is envisaged for 
2003. 
The discounted financial profitability has been calculated at 6.5%. This is based on the 
assumption that the State and the European Union contribute to the financing of the 
project. 
The preparation of this project is subject to a new law, the New Line Bill, which authorizes 
the construction of the line and by doing so contributes to accelerating administrative 
procedures. It is expected that the Parliament will adopt this bill in the spring of 1995. 
The lack of political agreement between the Dutch and Flemish Governments on the 
alignment is a major obstacle to further progress; it may delay the adoption of the New 
Line Bill. The new Dutch Government declared, in its coalition agreement in mid-1994, 
that it will abide by the decision of the former government to build this new railway line. 
Once the New Line Bill is adopted by the Parliament, further administrative procedures 
can be launched. They include public consultations as a major part and will result in 
building permission being granted by regional and local authorities. This process is 
expected to last about two years so that construction, theoretically, could start by 
mid-1997. 
A public/private partnership is envisaged with respect to the financing of the project. In 
this partnership, the government will take on the responsibility, including the full risk, of 
construction; it envisages providing 75% of the total investment, whereas 25% is to be 
contributed from private partners. 
Under a particular form of concession agreement, at a certain point during the construction 
period a private partner will start investing in the project (without assuming risk). Risk 
transfer to the private sector will be subject to discussions at a later stage. 
High-speed and conventional railway lines will be operated separately. The operator of 
the new line will be obliged to pay an infrastructure fee to the concessionaire for the use 
of this line. 
Technical problems related to the operation may cause considerable additional cost: 
Belgian, Dutch, French and German railways have invested heavily in special rolling-stock 
which can be used on existing and new railway lines in the four countries. This 
rolling-stock will, however, not be compatible with the future European control-command 
norm (ERTMS), and modification at a later stage will be necessary. 
Future action regarding this project needs to be embedded in the joint work which aims at 
the accelerated implementation of the whole PBKAL project. 
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PBKAL: German section 
Project description  This project consists of the extension of the existing railway infrastructure to enable it to 
meet future needs. It includes the link between Cologne and the industrial area around 
Frankfurt-on-Main (Rhine/Main). The section from the Belgian/German border (Aachen) 
to Cologne has been excluded from the project dealt with by the Christophersen Group; 
its implementation will start this year. 
On the Cologne-Rhine/Main section, an additional high-speed double-track line, to be 
exclusively used for passenger traffic, will be constructed. Once it is completed, the 
existing conventional line will allow for the provision of improved services for freight and 
regional traffic. 
The line is 216 km long; its main part will be newly constructed. Total costs amount to 
ECU 3 950 million; the construction work is planned to start very soon and the entry into 
operation is envisaged for the year 2000. 
No information is available on the financial profitability. It is not yet clear whether the 
Deutsche Bahn AG will be ready to act as project promoter. 
State of maturity  Germany and Belgium follow diverging objectives as regards the year for the entry into 
operation of the Brussels-Cologne-Rhine/Main link. Belgium intends to complete the 
border section Liège-Aachen in 2002 to 2004 at the earliest. 
The international working group,which is expected to become effective in the near future, 
should not only help to solve cross-border problems with Belgium but also to gain deeper 
insight into financial aspects on the German side. 
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PBKAL: UK section 
Channel Tunnel access-London 
Project description  The implementation of this project is particularly important in order to ensure the 
continuation of the high-speed link Paris-Lille-Channel Tunnel and to allow full benefit 
to be drawn from the entry into operation of the first fixed link between the British Isles 
and the European mainland. The existing railway line between the Tunnel and London is 
not able to meet future demands regarding speed and capacity. The proportion of 
international traffic is expected tö increase noticeably, and rail freight traffic, in particular, 
should benefit from the best possible conditions so that the use of roads by heavy goods 
vehicles may be limited. As regards passenger services, the new link, once completed, 
allows a competitive — and more environmentally friendly — alternative to air, especially 
for the Paris-London link. 
State of maturity 
The length of the new Channel Tunnel rail link (CTRL), to be constructed completely 
from scratch, will amount to 108 km. In addition to international passenger and freight 
services, the new line will also be of significance to national traffic. 
The total cost of the project is estimated at ECU 5 239 million; this amount includes about 
ECU 2 000 million which has already been spent (mainly on studies); it also takes account 
of the cost of land acquisition and interest payments during the construction period. The 
UK Government has based its present financing scheme on the expectation of Community 
support of ECU 970 million. 
It is planned to start construction work in 1997; the entry into operation is envisaged for 
2002. 
The socioeconomic profitability of the project has been assessed at 9 to 10%; the calculated 
financial profitability (internal rate of return) amounts to 4%. 
The project enjoys strong political support from the UK Government. The construction 
and operation of CTRL is to be authorized by an Act of Parliament. At present, the 
government is preparing the relevant legislation, the Hybrid Bill. It intends to submit this 
by the end of 1994. Adoption by Parliament is expected by the end of 1996. 
This special law confers powers to build the whole length of the railway line; by so doing, 
it reduces conventional administrative procedures (largely to be carried out by regional 
authorities) to a minimum and contributes decisively to acceleration. Both the concerns of 
people affected by the project and environmental aspects are dealt with during the 
discussion phase in Parliament: Parliamentary Committees will be charged with the 
solution of those questions. Only details in design, etc., still need to be approved by 
regional and local authorities once the Act of Parliament is adopted. 
A public/private partnership will be established with respect to the financing of the project. 
The State is ready to participate with up to 50% of the total cost; it aims, however, at 
minimizing its contribution. Important steps with a view to the involvement of the private 
sector have already been taken. 
A consortium of private investors shall contribute about 50% to the construction of the 
line. In order to accelerate procedures further, the government has decided to carry out the 
corresponding tender procedure in parallel with the authorization procedure in Parliament. 
120 Port / — Priority projects 
Annex A 
Such an approach entails that the government is ready to assume risk. Having been started 
earlier in 1994, the tender procedure has already resulted in the pre-selection of four 
consortia; the final selection of the successful bidder is foreseen for mid-1995. The 
government will then make provisions for the sharing of capital risk. 
The successful bidder will be given European Passenger Services (EPS), a government-
owned company responsible for the operation of international lines, and the project 
developer Union Railways Ltd, which is at present owned by the British Railways Board. 
Furthermore, the government will grant to the winner of the tender procedure a 999-year 
leasehold interest in the land on which the CTRL will be built. Government and the 
successful bidder will conclude a project development agreement which constitutes a 
public works concession contract and corresponds with the relevant Community legislation 
(Council Directive 93/37/EEC). 
EPS will be required to ensure infrastructure access for the Belgian and French railways; 
negotiations on this matter are still in progress between these partners and the European 
Commission. Domestic passenger services have also to be provided capacity on the 
Channel Tunnel rail link by European Passenger Services. 
The UK Government is very much interested in cooperating with the European 
Commission, in order to take account of all relevant Community legislation and to benefit 
from experience gained in other countries. During the work of the Christophersen Group, 
therefore, a number of meetings took place and the Commission was closely involved in 
the project development (for example, tender procedure, competition matters); this has 
contributed towards advancing the project. 
National authorities and the Commission are willing to continue their fruitful cooperation 
and sharing of knowledge; this should help to implement this innovative private/public 
partnership scheme under the best possible overall conditions. The development of the 
Channel Tunnel rail link project, where the government is ready to transfer a large amount 
of risk to the private sector, could be exemplary to other countries. 
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High-speed train South 
• Madrid-Barcelona-Montpellier 
• Madrid-Vitoria-Dax 
Project 
Other lines of the 
trans-European 
high-speed train 
network outline plan 
Mulhouse 
The project will link the Iberian peninsula with the French high-speed train network, 
thereby contributing to social and economic cohesion within the European Union. It 
consists of two parts: 
(i) Madrid-Saragossa-Barcelona-Spanish/French border-Perpignan-Montpellier 
(Mediterranean branch); 
(ii) Madrid-Vitoria-Spanish/French border-Dax (Atlantic branch). 
Both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic branches of the project form key elements of fast 
rail connections between Madrid and Paris: one by establishing the link with the French 
TGV Méditerranéen (Paris-Lyons-Marseilles) and the other with the TGV Atlantique 
(Paris-Bordeaux). 
Large parts of the new high-speed railway line, especially on Spanish territory, will be 
used for both passenger and freight traffic; the Madrid-Barcelona section, however, will 
exclusively serve passenger traffic. The completion of the line will lead to noticeable 
capacity increases (i.e. Madrid-Barcelona by 400%) and reductions in travelling time (i.e. 
Madrid-Barcelona by three to four hours). Therefore, the project makes an important 
contribution to the improvement of commercial relations between Spain and the central 
part of the Union, and it has a positive impact on the economic development in the regions 
concerned. 
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The length of these future high-speed railway lines amounts to 1 450 km, of which 1 200 
km have to be newly constructed. Existing tracks will be upgraded between Valladolid 
and Vitoria, so that speeds of up to 200 km/h can be reached. A particularly difficult 
section of the new line is the Pyrenees crossing (of 170 km of new line, 40% will go 
through tunnels). 
A significant benefit of the completion of this project is the extension of the European 
standard gauge to the Spanish network. This avoids track/vehicle-related stops at the 
border crossings, thus contributing towards solving interoperability problems. 
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High-speed train South 
• Madrid-Barcelona-Spanish/French 
border-Montpellier 
Project description 
State of maturity 
The implementation of the project will allow the completion of the high-speed axis 
Seville-French border. The two most important cities along the line, Madrid and 
Barcelona, represent 30% of the Spanish population as well as 40% of GNP. 
The project consists of a 750-km-long line which has to be newly constructed, in European 
standard gauge. The maximum speed on the new line will amount to 350 km/h. It will be 
exclusively used by passenger traffic between Madrid and Barcelona, as well as between 
Perpignan and Montpellier; between Barcelona and Perpignan, both passenger and freight 
traffic will use the line. 
The total cost of the Madrid-Barcelona-Montpellier line amounts to ECU 8 430 million, 
of which ECU 6 300 million concerns Spain and the remaining part France. 
Construction work will start on some sections of the Madrid-Barcelona link, as well as on 
the border section Barcelona-Perpignan, in 1994/95. The line will be completed in stages, 
and the entry into operation of the entire Madrid-Montpellier link is planned for the year 
2005; it is envisaged that the international section Barcelona-Perpignan will be opened 
earlier, namely in 2002. 
The socioeconomic profitability of the Madrid-Barcelona section has been evaluated at 
8 to 10%. The financial profitability varies from one section to another: for the Madrid-
Barcelona section, it amounts to 3.5 to 5%, for the section Barcelona-French border to 
9% and for the section Spanish border-Perpignan to 5%. 
On the occasion of meetings of the Heads of State of Spain and France, in Albi ( 1992) and 
Toledo (1993), an agreement in principle was reached as to the implementation of the 
project. In Foix (1994), the two Ministers for Transport decided to create a European 
Economic Interest Grouping (bringing together the two railway companies — SNCF and 
RENFE), with the aim of finalizing the studies on the international section between 
Barcelona and Narbonne. According to the latter agreement, the international section 
should be completed between 2002 and 2005. 
The French authorities consider it to be important that construction work on this route 
should start with the Barcelona-French border section. They are, therefore, hoping for a 
corresponding priority setting by the Spanish authorities. 
The Spanish transport infrastructure master plan provides for the construction of two key 
sections of the Madrid-Barcelona link (being, at present, still single-track lines) as priority 
projects: Calatayud-Ricla and Saragossa-Lleida; the traditional RENFE gauge will be 
maintained but the track will be equipped with adaptable sleepers so that it can, at a later 
stage (in the framework of the construction of the entire Madrid-Barcelona link), be 
changed to standard European gauge. Work on these sections is still expected to begin in 
1994. 
Feasibility studies for the Spanish part of the project are almost completed and show 
positive results; administrative procedures, including public consultations, are being 
carried out in phases; the project is supported by local and regional authorities. 
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The enquête d'utilité publique for the section from the Spanish/French border to 
Montpellier is still likely to start in 1994; this would mean that work could start at the 
beginning of 1996. 
The Spanish Government will finance the upgrading of the subsections Calatayud-Ricla 
and Saragossa-Lleida. As regards the new line, it intends to involve the private sector. For 
the Madrid-Barcelona section two hypotheses are being considered in this context: 
(i) a private investor would build and operate the line; in order to be profitable, he would 
need to capture 70 to 80% of the traffic of the corridor, as well as to receive a public 
subsidy amounting to 65 to 70% of the total investment; 
(ii) in the case of a concession agreement covering only the operation of the line, the 
State would fully finance the construction and, in addition, it would have to contribute 
between 30 and 40% to the operation. 
For the section from Barcelona to the French border, the Spanish Government envisages 
traditional budgetary financing. 
As far as the French part is concerned, SNCF at present acts as the promoter; the railway 
company intends to finance the project. However, France is open as far as the operation of 
the international section by a private partner is concerned. 
In the framework of the Christophersen Group, a workshop was held which enabled the 
identification of a number of obstacles to the further progress of the project. These 
obstacles are, in particular, diverging results of traffic forecasts carried out in France and 
Spain and the lack of a legal entity for the development of the international section of the 
project. 
The Commission is ready to support the decisions which have been taken by the Ministers 
for Transport on the occasion of the Toledo Summit, and to coordinate future common 
actions. It envisages organizing further workshops and examines possibilities of co-
financing financial studies as well as studies on legal aspects related to public/private 
partnership in this transborder project. 
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Project description 
State of maturity 
High-speed train South 
• Madrid-Valladolid-Vitoria-
Spanish I French border-Dax 
The project includes the construction of a new line on the sections Madrid-Valladolid and 
Vitoria-Bilbao-Dax. On the remaining section, Valladolid-Vitoria, the existing line will 
be upgraded. The maximum possible speeds on the new line will be 300 km/h, and 200 
km/h on the upgraded one. 
In a first phase, the new lines will be constructed to the traditional RENFE gauge; the 
tracks will, however, be equipped with adaptable sleepers which will allow them to be 
changed to the European standard gauge at a later stage. 
Both passenger and freight traffic will use the Spanish part of the line; no decision has 
been taken yet regarding the French part. 
The total cost of the Madrid-Valladolid-Vitoria-Dax line amounts to ECU 4 500 million. 
The main stages of the project implementation are: 
(i) 1994: First construction work (subsection Valladolid-Burgos) 
(ii) 1997: Beginning of construction work on the Madrid-Valladolid and 
Vitoria-Bilbao sections 
(iii) 1999-2007: Entry into operation (in stages) of the section Madrid-Valladolid-
Vitoria-French border. 
The financial profitability of the project has been estimated at 9% for the 
Madrid-Valladolid section, at 5% for the Valladolid-Vitoria section and at 3% for the 
Vitoria-French border section. Traffic forecasts and financial profitability for the 
international section Vitoria-Dax are, at present, being studied by a Spanish/French 
working group. 
Although France acknowledged, on the occasion of the Corfu European Council, the 
strategic importance of this project, it has not yet decided on the construction period. It 
appears to give priority to the Mediterranean part of the high-speed train South project. 
In the French Basque region, administrative procedures are affected by some environmen-
tal problems. 
On the French side, due to constraints in the State budget, no public funds have been 
foreseen for the project so far. 
To reduce interoperability problems, it would be important for the Spanish side to adapt 
the line to European standard gauge as early as possible. 
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High-speed train East 
Paris-eastern France-southern Germany 
(including Metz-Luxembourg branch) 
Project 
Under construction 
Conventional lines 
Other lines of the 
trans-European 
high-speed train 
network outline plan 
·-
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Project description  With the Paris-eastern France-southern Germany project an important European 
east-west axis will be implemented. It will be of great significance, not only for the 
connection of such important centres as Paris and Frankfurt (seat of the future European 
Central Bank) but also for connections between the European institutions as well as with 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
Included in the project is the construction of a new line from Paris to the eastern border of 
France where, at two points, the French and German high-speed railway networks will be 
interconnected: at Forbach/Saarbrücken and Strasbourg/Kehl. Furthermore, a branch will 
be constructed which links Metz with Luxembourg. 
Connecting the French and German networks would allow noticeable reductions in 
travelling time for such important connections as Paris-Munich (8 hours 40 minutes 
reduced to 4 hours 25 minutes) and Frankfurt-Paris (5 hours 55 minutes reduced to 3 
hours 10 minutes). 
The French part of the project consists of the construction of 472 km of new line. The 
German part includes two branches: French/German border-Saarbrücken-Ludwigshafen/ 
Mannheim (128 km to be upgraded for speeds of up to 200 km/h) and 
(Strasbourg-)French/German border-Kehl-Appenweier (17 km to be upgraded for speeds 
of up to 200 km/h). 
The project should be seen in a larger context. The northern branch is intended to be 
continued via Berlin; the section Mannheim-Frankfurt is already under construction; the 
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extension to Berlin is subject to the German infrastructure master plan. Further studies are 
however necessary. The southern branch continues from Appenweier to Karlsruhe, 
Stuttgart and Munich. Besides the east-west connection, the project also envisages an 
extension to the south (Basle). The line thus links a number of important cities of the 
Union. 
The project belongs to the key links which have been identified in the first trans-European 
network in the transport sector, the high-speed railway network, acknowledged by the 
Council in 1990. 
The cost of the project amounts to ECU 4 460 million (ECU 4 100 million French part 
and ECU 360 million German part). The first phase of the French part will cost ECU 
3 300 million (1992 prices). 
The construction work on the French part is planned to start by the end of 1995 or the 
beginning of 1996 (first phase); the entry into operation is envisaged for 2001. The second 
phase is to be completed by the year 2010. Germany also envisages the completion of 
construction work around 2000/2001. 
The socioeconomic profitability of the French part of the project has been evaluated at 
9.7%; the financial profitability at 4.0%. 
State of maturity  On the occasion of the French-German summit in La Rochelle, in May 1992, the Ministers 
for Transport of the two States signed an agreement which constitutes the political basis 
for the implementation of this project. The agreement stipulates, in particular, that the 
German and the French high-speed railway networks are to be interconnected via 
Saarbrücken (northern branch of the project) and Strasbourg (southern branch). Further-
more, it lays down that a new line is to be constructed between Paris and Vendenheim 
(near to the German border) and that, on German territory, several lines are to be upgraded 
in order to permit the continuation in southern, eastern and northern directions. 
The French authorities declared the TGV-Est project to be the first national priority. The 
project is often referred to as a major 'Aménagement du Territoire' project, i.e. a project 
with a major structuring effect for the eastern part of France. 
Administrative procedures are in progress for the French part of the project; they are much 
more comprehensive and time-consuming than for the German part. This is due to the fact 
that the Paris-German border link will be newly constructed whereas the German branches 
will only be upgraded. 
For the French part, the public inquiry has been launched; it is expected to be completed 
by 31 October 1995. In parallel, the studies with regard to the pre-design phase 
(avant-projet détaillé) are being carried out. On the basis of the results of this study and 
the public inquiry, the Conseil d'État should endorse the project; this is, in turn, the 
precondition for the Declaration of Public Utility (Déclaration d'utilité publique) which 
constitutes the permission for land acquisition and, subsequently, for construction. 
For the German part, no further procedures need to be conducted. 
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The main part of the investment for the French section will be borne by the railway 
company SNCF. The State intends to contribute ECU 530 million to the financing of the 
project; the regions concerned plan to provide another ECU 530 million. Furthermore, the 
French State has decided to subsidize the project in such a way that an 8% profitability 
rate can be achieved on the commercial capital element. This means that, in addition to 
the abovementioned contribution, further State support may be required to ensure the 
financing of the project. The French Government bases the financial scheme on the 
expectation of Community support of ECU 530 million. 
It would be recommendable for the French authorities to explore unconventional ways 
which could lead to an enhancement of profitability (such as the inclusion of associated 
developments). This could be a first step towards the inclusion of private partners; even at 
a later stage, it should still be possible to establish a public/private partnership. 
As regards the German part, joint financing by State and railways is foreseen. 
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Conventional rail/combined transport: 
Betuwe line 
Rotterdam-Dutch/German border 
(-Rhine/Main) 
Project 
Under construction 
Other lines of the 
trans-European combined 
transport network outline plan 
Hamburg 
Bruxelles 
Project description  The Betuwe line will connect major European industrial and consumer centres (Rhine/-
Main; Rhine/Neckar) with the port of Rotterdam. It will be a conventional railway line 
with a total length of 160 km, 75% of which will be newly constructed; on the remaining 
sections, existing lines will be upgraded. 
While the Betuwe line project covers only Dutch territory — from Rotterdam to the 
German border — on the German side, efforts are being made to ensure the continuation 
towards the Rhine/Main area. A governmental agreement, signed by the Ministers for 
Transport of the two States in August 1992, stipulates that the link from the Dutch border 
to Oberhausen will be completed in the same time as the Betuwe line. Further projects to 
be implemented in Germany will allow connections between Rotterdam and the south and 
east of Europe. 
The project is of great importance to the development of the integrated trans-European 
transport network. The new line will be used, almost exclusively, by freight traffic; it will 
extend modal choice in a corridor where, at present, only road and inland waterway 
infrastructure exist. For medium- and long-distance freight traffic in particular, it should 
thus stimulate the switch to environmentally friendly transport chains, for example 
rail-maritime transport. By so doing, it contributes to reducing such negative effects as 
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emissions and noise pollution caused by heavy goods vehicles on roads. To facilitate 
transhipments an intermodal container terminal will be constructed in the context of the 
project. 
The new line should contribute towards improving the punctuality of freight transport to 
and from the port of Rotterdam; the existing infrastructure, especially road, is no longer 
able to meet the demands made of it. 
The implementation of the Betuwe line project also establishes the basis for improving the 
standard of passenger services. By freeing the existing lines from freight traffic, it would 
allow a reduction in delays and journey time. 
A noticeable impact on economic development can be achieved by building the Betuwe 
line: the execution of construction works requires about 75 000 man-years of employment; 
after completion, 5 000 to 7 000 additional permanent jobs will be created (direct and 
indirect effects). 
The total investment, including cost for studies and land purchase as well as payments of 
interest during construction, amounts to ECU 3 291 million. 
At present, it is planned to start construction work in 1995; the intended year for entry into 
operation of the line is 2001. 
According to estimations made by the Dutch Government, the project will show a 
discounted financial profitability of 6.5% (internal rate of return). 
The Dutch Parliament adopted the project (at a scale plan of 1:25 000) early in 1994. The 
government has now suspended its approval for six months. It has launched a new political 
initiative with the aim of exploring alternative ways of financing the line. It is now 
expected that the final decision will be made in March 1995. 
Administrative procedures are in progress; however, their completion depends on further 
political decisions. Provided that the green light for the Betuwe line is given next March, 
construction could start in the same year, as authorization procedures are being carried out 
in stages and are almost complete for some sections. The entry into operation of the line, 
on the other hand, may be delayed because of reconsideration within the government. 
The environmental impact assessment was conducted and brought positive results; 
alternative configurations for the line are now being discussed, and in this context a new 
study might become necessary. 
According to the current state of knowledge, the financing of the project will largely be 
ensured by the State. Parts of the investment are already provided for in budgetary 
planning. The national infrastructure fund, which is amongst others fed by benefits from 
the export of natural gas, will also contribute to the financing of the project. 
In a similar way as for the Belgian/Dutch border to Amsterdam part of the PBKAL 
high-speed train, the government intends to involve the private sector at a later stage; 
initially, it will bear the major part of the investment and assume the full construction risk; 
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subsequently, a concessionaire will participate by paying a concession fee and operate the 
line after its completion. 
It is now intended to conduct a study on the financial matters, with the aim of identifying 
more efficient solutions. 
During the work of the Christophersen Group, cooperation between the Dutch authorities 
and the Commission became increasingly close. Progress was made in particular as 
regards the analysis of risks involved in the project. 
As soon as the government has made its decision to go ahead with the project, the joint 
efforts should be continued; amongst other things, the issue of risk-sharing in a 
private/public partnership (possibly with Community support) should be dealt with 
thoroughly. 
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High-speed train/combined transport France-Italy 
• Lyons-Turin 
• Turin-Milan-Venice-Trieste 
Project 
Tunnel 
Conventional lines 
Other lines of the 
trans-European 
high-speed train and 
combined transport 
network outline plans 
Project description  This east-west railway line, the total length of which amounts to approximately 680 km, 
consists of two parts: 
• the Lyons-Turin axis; 
• the Turin-Milan-Venice-Trieste axis. 
Whereas the construction of a new Alpine crossing link between Lyons and Turin would 
contribute to the facilitation of commercial and social exchanges between France and 
Italy, its continuation towards Trieste via the Po valley would help to improve contacts 
between the Community and Eastern Europe. 
Lyons-Turin 
The project consists of approximately 250 km of new railway line between the Lyons area 
and Turin. The line would be constructed to handle both high-speed passenger trains 
(although with their maximum speed somewhat reduced — 220 km/h — in the tunnel 
section) and freight trains. The possibility of including a provision for a 'rolling road' 
operation (with lorries carried on trains) is being examined. The potential advantages of 
this system would be in environmental savings and in the possibility of reducing road and 
tunnel investments. The project forms part of the high-speed network examined by the 
Council in 1990 (key link No 8). It would form a vital link in the trans-European rail 
network and is an international link par excellence. 
For the Italian authorities, this project is seen as a vital part of a wide-ranging scheme to 
improve contact with the rest of the Community and via the east-west continuation of the 
route towards Eastern Europe. 
On the French side, it is underlined that the development of the TGV network is now well 
advanced and when the project comes into service the network will include links to the 
UK and the Benelux; this will generate extra traffic on the new link to and from Italy. 
The project involves the construction of a new line to high-speed standards, but including 
the movement of freight trains on certain sections; 54 km of tunnel under the Alps plus 
other tunnels will be called for. If the 'rolling motorway' option is adopted, the facility to 
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load/off-load lorries and a wide loading gauge will need to be provided. Technically, the 
project should not pose new problems, although the costs of tunnels are always subject to 
some risk. 
The new transalpine rail link will allow growing traffic demand to be met and, in 
particular, the share of rail traffic to be increased — which serves the overall objective of 
achieving an efficient and environmentally friendly transport system. The existing rail line 
is inadequate in terms of capacity and quality and only a new tunnel can improve the 
situation. 
The total cost of the project amounts to ECU 6 800 million; the option that includes the 
rolling motorway will cost ECU 7 450 million. These figures represent an estimate of the 
maximum costs for the entire project; there are still various options under examination 
that have different costs. 
The implementation of the project will be divided into two basic phases: 
(i) the section between Lyons and Montmélian: scheduled for completion in 2002; 
(ii) the section between Montmélian and Turin:  completion of tunnel: envisaged for 
2005; 
— completion of access routes: envis-
aged for 2010. 
These dates depend on a rapid start and also on the results of further research. Various 
options are also being studied that could affect the timing. 
According to the present state of knowledge, construction work on the Montmélian-Turin 
section is envisaged to start in 1995 and on the Lyons-Montmélian section in 1996 (trial 
bore). 
Taking into account external factors, the socioeconomic profitability (rate of return on the 
project) varies from 9.4 to 11.4%. This includes only the transport benefits (time savings, 
etc.). As regards the benefits in terms of increased economic activity in the regions 
concerned, it has been estimated that 170 000 man-years work will be generated in the 
construction period. During operation, over the life of the project, the number of permanent 
work years generated is estimated to be 60 000. 
The financial rates of return on the project vary, for the different options, from 5.4 to 9.1 % 
(the latter including a 30% contribution from public sources). 
State of maturity  There is general political agreement between the French and the Italian authorities on the 
need for the project. The local and regional authorities are also involved. The French 
authorities give priority to the TGV Est (high-speed train East) in their planning, and this 
may have consequences for the timing of the Lyons-Turin project. On the Italian side, the 
government is preparing proposals that would make up to ECU 50 million available for 
the development of this and the Brennero project from January 1995. 
Administrative procedures are under way. In this context, an environmental impact 
analysis has been undertaken on the section Lyons-Montmélian, where the options are 
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clearly defined, and has produced results that are judged positive. In the light of the further 
work needed to define the rest of the project, environmental studies have not yet been 
undertaken. 
The section between Lyons and Montmélian is now being examined by a joint body of 
public and private sector organizations (a French public interest grouping). It is simpler 
and more profitable than the tunnel section and could go ahead first with a view to 
completion in 2002. 
For the development of the cross-border section, a European economic interest grouping 
consisting of the two railways SNCF and FS has recently been established. 
The more complicated international tunnel section could be opened by 2005 but requires 
extensive studies and preliminary work in order to establish the costs and reduce the risks 
involved. In particular, the rolling-road option for combined transport requires considerable 
analysis. 
A number of administrative/legal questions have to be resolved, notably the form of a 
cross-frontier grouping which might undertake the project, and the question of the special 
rights that might be assigned to any concessionaire appointed. 
The overall profitability and the risks seem to rule out the possibility of a pure private 
sector financing scheme: this would in any event not be in keeping with the philosophy of 
the authorities concerned. However, if the risk factor could be quantified and an injection 
of public funds be granted, early in the project, it appears to be a suitable case for exploring 
the possibility of some form of public/private partnership. A question to be adressed is 
whether the preliminary work for the 'rolling road' should be included: this question can 
only be answered if the full possibility of making savings in the construction of road 
facilities is known. On the basis of the economic and other studies it will be necessary to 
define the optimum project in terms of its financeability; this would involve the question 
of scope: should the whole section from Lyons to Turin be included, and should the rolling 
road be included in the main project or not? 
The contacts and work undertaken in the course of the examination of this project in the 
framework of the Christophersen Group exercise have allowed the project to be better 
understood and many aspects have been clarified. 
Overall, the project appears to justify further work and support at Community level. 
Initially the support could be concentrated upon: 
(i) refining the economic and financial analysis to establish the range of rates of return 
with greater certainty and measure the risks involved; 
(ii) supporting engineering and other studies leading to the construction of a trial gallery; 
(iii) examining the combined-transport possibilities in detail. 
It would seem to be useful to include private-sector parties in the next stages of the project 
to address the financing issue; the whole question of the 'rolling motorway' should be 
studied in detail and the creation of a working group with the motorway and tunnel 
authorities should be considered. 
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For the Italian authorities, this project is seen as a vital part of a wide-ranging scheme to 
improve contact with the rest of the Union and via the east-west link through the Po valley 
towards Eastern Europe. They plan, as a direct extension of the Lyons-Turin link, to build 
the Turin-Venice-Trieste high-speed railway line. The construction of the first section of 
this 430-km-long new line — Turin-Milan — is envisaged for the period 1995-2001. 
Turin-Milan-Venice-Trieste 
Some sections of the existing line are not able to meet present-day demands on capacity. 
The construction of a new line between Turin and Trieste is necessary to meet future 
traffic growth — both national and international. 
The construction of this new line would allow noticeable increases in rail traffic: on the 
Turin-Venice section, passenger traffic is expected to increase by 30% and freight traffic 
by 100% once the line has entered into operation. Passengers would benefit from 
considerable time-savings: 2 hours and 45 minutes on the section between Turin and 
Venice. 
With a total length of 430 km, the construction of the new line will be divided into three 
phases: the Turin-Milan, the Milan-Venice and the Venice-Trieste sections. 
The Turin-Milan subproject is the most mature one; construction work is envisaged to 
start at the beginning of 1995, and the line is planned to enter into operation by the year 
2000. 
As far as the Milan-Venice subsection is concerned, a process is currently under way 
regarding the adoption of a law on the financing of this project; this proposal was discussed 
by the Senate on 5 December 1994. Its adoption will allow 60% of the work to be financed 
by TAV (the entity in charge of promotion and development of the Italian high-speed 
railway network) and 40% by the State. Thanks to efforts made by the Italian authorities, 
work is expected to begin during the course of 1995 instead of 1998 as originally planned. 
The Venice-Trieste section, on the other hand, has not as yet been scheduled. 
Total investment costs for the entire link amount to ECU 6 750 million, of which 
ECU 2 100 million concern Phase 1 (Turin-Milan). 
State of maturity  As far as the implementation of the Turin-Milan subproject is concerned, the Italian 
Government and FS (Italian railways) concluded an agreement in 1992; administrative 
procedures, including a public inquiry, have almost been completed. 
Outstanding procedures will be launched in due course. 
The State concluded a concessionary agreement with TAV; this agreement is to last 
50 years. 
While 60% of the total investment will be borne by the concessionare, the State will 
contribute to financing the remaining 40%. 
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Greek motorways 
PATH E and Via Egnatia 
Project 
Other roads of the 
trans-European road 
network outline plan 
Project description  The project will form the backbone of the Greek road system and is crucial to the transport 
infrastructure development in Greece. Directly or via branches, it connects this isolated 
EU Member State with all of its neighbours: Albania, Bulgaria, FYROM and Turkey. 
The project consists of two axes: 
(i) PATHE, the north-south axis: Rion-Antirion, Patras-Athens-Thessaloniki-
Promahon (Greek/Bulgarian border) 
(ii) Via Egnatia, the east-west axis: Igoumenitsa-Thessaloniki-Alexandroupolis-
Ormenio (Greek/Bulgarian border-)Kipi (Greek/Turkish border). 
The project belongs to the trans-European road network and the trans-European motorways 
(United Nations). In addition, the northern section of the PATHE axis forms part of a 
European road corridor identified by the Crete pan-European transport conference, which 
passes through several South European countries and connects to Germany. Via the sea 
ports of Igoumenitsa and Patras (ferry services), the Greek and Italian motorway networks 
will be interconnected. 
The implementation of the project will entail noticeable reductions in travelling time 
between important Greek cities, and it will lead to marked improvements in road safety. 
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About 70% of the Greek population is distributed along the PATHE-Egnatia axes. 
Consequently, the new infrastructure is expected to contribute decisively to stimulating 
commercial exchanges; it will thus be significant with respect to economic development. 
About 270 000 man-years of employment will be needed during the construction period 
of the motorway; in addition, an important number of permanent jobs should be generated 
after its completion. The project also plays a vital role in regional development and social 
cohesion; it improves in particular the accessibility of the remote northern regions of 
Thrace, Epirous and Macedonia. 
The two parts of the project display the following features: 
PATHE will be 860 km long; the project consists mainly of upgrading an existing road to 
motorway standard (dual carriageway with 2x2 lanes; 2x3 lanes are being built near 
Athens and Thessaloniki). The existing alignment needs only minor modifications; mainly 
widening is foreseen. One quarter of the axis has already been upgraded; work is at present 
in progress over 100 km; 316 km are to be ameliorated with Community support and the 
remaining 224 km with private means. 
The Egnatia part includes the construction of 780 km of new motorway. Technically the 
project features a dual two-lane motorway that bypasses large cities and some single 
carriageway sections in the mountainous area from Igoumenitsa to Thessaloniki. 
The total cost is estimated at ECU 3 880 million for PATHE and ECU 2 480 million for 
Egnatia. 
Work on PATHE and Egnatia was started in 1990 and is scheduled to finish before 2002. 
As regards socioeconomic profitability, existing studies show positive results; the expected 
socioeconomic rate of return for Egnatia, for example, amounts to 8.8%. Further analysis 
on this matter should be carried out; the positive impact on cohesion and the exceptional 
scale of the project indicate promising results. 
As far as financial profitability is concerned, only preliminary data is available for the 
time being: whereas PATHE appears to show promising rates of return, the prospects for 
Egnatia are less optimistic. However, a detailed study on the financing of the entire 
motorway has been launched, and the results are expected to be released by the end of 
1994. 
State of maturity  The Greek Government has given political support to the preparation and implementation 
of the project, including the establishment of public/private partnerships. All political 
parties in the parliament endorsed the motorway project. 
Conventional administrative procedures can be accelerated thanks to the new legislation 
passed by the parliament. It is expected that all procedures will be concluded by the end 
of 1997. 
Environmental impact assessments have been carried out and approved for large parts of 
the project. As regards the Via Egnatia, some environmental problems have been 
identified. In the River Nestos region, for example, special effort will be necessary to meet 
the requirements. Since work on PATHE mainly concerns upgrading, minimal negative 
effects are likely to be caused; only the Tempi Valley section is environmentally sensitive. 
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Three subprojects have already been selected as candidates for private financing: 
(i) Rion-Antirion fixed link; 
(ii) external ring road of Athens; 
(iii) Malliakos Bay fixed link. 
The tendering procedure for the Rion-Antirion project has already been completed, with 
the announcement of the successful candidate; the tendering procedure for the Athens ring 
road has been launched. As regards the Malliakos Bay fixed link, on the other hand, 
various technical solutions are still under consideration. 
The financial study launched by the Greek Government is expected to bring valuable 
information regarding the self-financing potential of the motorway. Several scenarios are 
under consideration. The back-to-back approach seems to be more promising. The 
self-financing principle has been firmly adopted by the Greek Government, although the 
toll levels (existing tolls average DR 5/km on expressways and DR 10/km on motorways) 
and the distribution of revenues (public/private) are still to be assessed. 
For PATHE, of the total costs (ECU 3 880 million), the Greek Government has stated its 
willingness to contribute ECU 970 million (25%) from the national budget and to ask for 
23% of the total investment to be covered by Community funding (ERDF, Cohesion Fund 
and the trans-European networks budget line). For the remaining part, private funding will 
be sought. 
As regards Egnatia (ECU 2 480 million total costs), the Greek Government has stated its 
willingness to contribute ECU 790 million to the project, and to ask for ECU 900 million 
(36%) to be covered by allocations from the ERDF and Cohesion Fund. For the remaining 
part (ECU 790 million), private funding will be sought. 
The existing legislation provides for the involvement of the private sector; improvements 
in the regulatory framework for private financing of projects are, however, being 
examined. 
A new law for public works (No 2229/94) solved problems regarding competition rules. 
New legislation has been approved to raise the quality of construction plans, economic 
bids, budget estimates and timetables. 
The average daily traffic varies considerably along the roads in question (10 000 and 
30 000 vehicles per day in 1994). With a view to the determination of the necessary 
technical standard of the motorway, traffic forecasts were carried out. On some sections 
of the Egnatia (traversing mountainous areas), construction is particularly expensive; in 
these cases, a reduced standard appears to be appropriate. 
The Christophersen Group exercise has contributed decisively to the progress made with 
this project. Two workshops were organized, and the Commission played an active role 
with respect to the financial study by giving financial support and technical advice. 
The Community should continue accompanying the implementation of this motorway 
project. The exceptionally high proportion of Community financial support should 
stimulate both the national authorities and the Community to identify innovative ideas, 
implement an optimal financing scheme and integrate as much private funding as possible. 
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Lisbon-Valladolid motorway 
Project 
Other roads of the 
trans-European road 
network outline plan 
Sevilla 
Project description  This project is of great importance for the interconnection of the Portuguese and Spanish 
motorway networks; it also facilitates the link between the networks of the Iberian 
peninsula and France and, by so doing, it contributes to social and economic cohesion 
within the Union. In the regions directly concerned, the new motorway will stimulate 
development: it is estimated that the construction of the road itself will require about 
25 000 man-years of employment and that, directly and indirectly, a considerable number 
of permanent jobs will be created. The improved infrastructure should enhance the 
competitiveness of the industries of the Iberian peninsula — particularly of the Portuguese 
area north of Beira Baixa and Ribatejo. 
The motorway comprises the following sections: 
(i) Portugal: Lisbon-Torres Novas-Castelo Branco-Guarda-Vilar Formoso (Spanish 
border); 
(ii) Spain: Fuentes de Onoro (Portuguese border)-Salamanca-Tordesillas-Valladolid. 
The connection with the French network is ensured via existing roads (Burgos-Spanish 
Basque region). 
As a result of the project implementation, marked improvements, especially for inter-
national traffic, will be achieved; journey times will be noticeably reduced and road safety 
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will be decisively increased; thanks to capacity increase and consequently less congestion, 
negative environmental impacts such as noise pollution and emissions will be limited. 
The total length of the motorway amounts to 585 km; parts of it will have to be newly 
constructed whereas the remaining parts already exist and will be upgraded: 363 km 
traverse Portugal; the remaining 222 km concern Spain. In all, 123 km of the motorway 
are already in operation, thus leaving 492 km to be completed. 
In Portugal, the project will be implemented as a dual-carriageway expressway with 2x2 
lanes (3 lanes per direction near Lisbon); it includes the construction of the tunnel of 
Gardunha. Spain plans the construction of an expressway (autovía) with two lanes per 
direction. 
Indicative costs and construction period 
Section 
Lisbon-Torres Novas (P) 
Torres Novas-Vilar 
Formoso/Spanish border (P) 
Fuentes de Oñoro/Portuguese 
border-Salamanca (E) 
Salamanca-Tordesillas (E) 
Tordesillas-Valladolid (E) 
Total 
Length 
(km) 
93 
270 
117 
75 
30 
585 
Cost 
(million ECU) 
530 
300 
240 
1070 
Construction period 
completed 
in the mid-1980s 
1993-99 
completion after 2004 
1995-98 
completed at the 
beginning of the 1990s 
No data on financial and socioeconomic profitability are available as yet; considering the 
external effects such as economic and environmental benefits, positive socioeconomic 
results can be expected. According to the Spanish authorities, the project does not show 
sufficient financial profitability to attract private sector involvement; at present, the 
average daily traffic amounts to 8 000 to 9 000 vehicles. 
State of maturity  Tolling is an issue to be promptly assessed in both countries on a political level. While it 
facilitates, on the one hand, the financing of motorways it may, on the other hand, produce 
traffic diversion to the regional network, which counteracts the goals of both reduction of 
negative environmental effects and cohesion. 
The whole axis is part of the trans-European road network. The entire route from 
Valladolid to the Portuguese border is included in the Spanish infrastructure master plan 
as a toll-free express route. The Salamanca-Tordesillas link forms part of the road 
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priorities programme for the period 1993-95 adopted by the Spanish Government. The 
Portuguese section is also included in the national plans. 
Environmental impact assessments are in progress for the various sections. No major 
problems have been encountered so far, except for the tunnel of Gardunha. 
As regards financing, the Spanish authorities see only a limited possibility of private 
involvement due to low traffic volume and profitability prospects. They envisage public 
funding for the entire project and are not considering the levying of tolls. 
In Portugal, the current traffic densities do not exceed those of the Spanish sections. 
Unlike in Spain, the completed motorway section is tolled; it is, however, operated by the 
national road administration. With respect to the sections to be newly constructed, the 
Portuguese authorities also show openness to tolling. 
Community financial support has already been provided for the construction of some 
Spanish and Portuguese sections: Spain received ECU 3.1 million from the budget line for 
trans-European networks and the Community initiative Interreg; in Portugal some sections 
in construction are co-financed by the Cohesion Fund (in combination with funds from the 
State budget). The European Investment Bank has contributed to the financing of the links 
Atalaia-Abrantes, Castelo Branco-Soalheira and the tunnel of Gardunha. 
In Spain, the project is promoted by the State, and in Portugal by the Ministry of Public 
Works and Communications through Junta Autonoma de Estradas. In Portugal, some 
problems regarding tendering procedures have emerged. 
It would be recommendable to conduct specific studies in order to explore possibilities for 
public/private partnerships. The European Commission may act as coordinator with a 
view to a joint proceeding in this respect, and organize further workshops or informal 
meetings. As both Spain and Portugal have already gained experience with concessions 
for motorways and with tolling, there should still be a possibility for integrating the private 
sector and reducing the public funds to be spent on this project. 
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Conventional rail link: 
Cork-Dublin-Belfast-Larne-Stranraer 
Project 
Other lines of the 
trans-European railway 
network outline plan 
Project description  The Cork-Dublin-Belfast-Larne axis — which is already in operation — constitutes the 
spine of the Irish railway network. Being the only cross-border line in the network, it 
provides a crucial transport link between Ireland and Northern Ireland and is vital to the 
connection with the British network. It serves a key economic corridor and is of great 
importance for both passenger and freight traffic. 
The line complements the trans-European rail link 
Holyhead-London-Channel Tunnel-Benelux countries. 
(Cork-)Dublin-(Belfast-) 
As the existing line shows marked signs of underinvestment in infrastructure (track, 
signalling) and rolling-stock assets, improvements are urgently called for. Increasing 
demands require appropriate infrastructure, both in terms of capacity and quality. The line 
needs to be upgraded; after completion of these works it should attract more traffic. By so 
doing, it contributes towards developing an efficient and environmentally friendly 
transport system; modal choice will be increased and an interesting alternative to road and 
air traffic will be established. 
The implementation of the project will have a positive effect on the labour market in 
Ireland. 
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State of maturity 
The project consists of the gradual upgrading of the 502-km-long existing line, as well as 
of the improvement of the corresponding rolling-stock; the line will be adapted for speeds 
of around 200 km/h. Several ferry lines provide the connections with the British rail 
network, in particular to Stranraer and to Holyhead. 
Construction work on sections of the project started in 1992. 
The project is divided into two basic phases: 
(i) 1992-96: upgrading of the Dublin-Belfast line for speeds of up to 160 km/h; 
(ii) 1996-99: upgrading of the remaining part. 
The total costs of the project amount to ECU 238 million; this sum covers track works, 
civil works, signalling, rolling-stock as well as interest payments during the construction 
period. 
On the basis of a 5% discount rate, a net present value of ECU 12.6 million has been 
calculated. 
The socioeconomic profitability was estimated at 8%. 
A political agreement on the implementation of the project was reached between the Irish 
and UK Governments as well as the European Commission in 1991. Ireland gives the 
highest priority to the railway project. The link of the railway line to the port of Larne, 
and via ferry to Stranraer, is of particular importance to Northern Ireland. 
Neither technical nor environmental feasibility studies needed to be conducted for this 
upgrading project. Work is already in progress, and no particular problems have been 
encountered. Administrative procedures are required only to a minimal extent. 
No significant scope for private sector involvement has been identified so far; the Irish 
authorities are, however, willing to explore such possibilities as the franchising of retailing 
space at the main railway stations along the route. This may enhance the profitability of 
the line. 
For the time being, it is intended to finance the project with public funds only. It has 
already benefited from Community support (Cohesion Fund, Structural Funds), and further 
significant Community contributions are envisaged. The project has been included in the 
Community support framework and operational programme on transport 1994-99. The 
remaining part of the investment will be provided by the Irish Government. 
On the occasion of a project workshop held at the end of November 1994, the UK and 
Irish authorities proposed to extend the Cork-Stranraer railway project to Londonderry 
and Limerick, respectively. This extension might be subject to further examination over 
the next few months. 
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Malpensa airport (Milan) 
• Community connecting points 
Regional connecting points 
* Accessibility points 
Γ~| Part o( an airport system 
Milano-Malpensa 
Mil:  m 
Trieste/Ronchi Oe'Legionari 
jlilano-Bergamo (Orio Al Serio) 
¿VA HI S 
m κ, a i _ πι 
12J ■ Venezia-Tessera 
Venezia Treviso (San Angelo) 
Torino-Caselle 
Milano-Uñate 
Verona-Villafranca 
Bologna-Borgo Panigale 
■ Genova-Sestri 
Ancona-Falconara 
Project description  Malpensa airport forms part of the existing Milan airport system, which also comprises 
Linate airport as well as the relatively small Bergamo airport. 
For technical and environmental reasons, it is not possible to extend airport capacity at 
Linate. In order to meet increasing demand at Milan and promote efficient distribution of 
air traffic, the intention is to develop Malpensa airport as an international hub for northern 
Italy. By concentrating on intercontinental and intra-Union flights, the new Malpensa 
airport will thus contribute to connecting an important commercial and cultural centre of 
the European Union with the rest of the world. Linate airport, on the other hand, will 
mainly serve limited short-haul traffic. The development of Malpensa airport will not only 
increase capacity, but should also lead to noticeable improvements in the quality of 
services for the entire Milan airport system. 
The transfer of airport activities from Linate to Malpensa — that is from a location close 
to the centre of Milan city to a location at a distance of 50 km — will make it possible to 
contain better the environmental impact, particularly in terms of noise pollution. 
The completion of the extension of Malpensa airport is envisaged by the year 2000. The 
main features of the 'Malpensa 2000' project are: 
(i) the doubling of the runway capacity; 
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(ii) the construction of a completely new terminal so as to increase the overall terminal 
capacity (including the existing one) by 350%, bringing it up to 18 million passengers 
per year; 
(iii) the development of new apron and cargo areas; 
(iv) the construction of technical buildings and facilities to meet the needs resulting from 
the airport extension; these facilities also include high-standard safety systems. 
The related access infrastructure forms an integrated part of the airport project: a rapid rail 
service — the Malpensa express — will link Milan city centre with Malpensa; access 
roads will ensure the connection of the airport with the national network. The Malpensa 
project is thus entirely in line with the objectives of the trans-European transport network: 
it allows for the efficient interconnection of rail, road and air transport and is thus to 
become a major European intermodal connection. 
The new Malpensa airport will have a significant impact on regional and economic 
development: it will generate 6 000 direct permanent jobs; the indirect effect is estimated 
at another 12 000 to 18 000 jobs. During the construction period, approximately 20 000 
man-years of employment will be generated. 
Indicative costs and construction periods 
Phase 
I 
II and III 
Characteristics 
Runways — aprons — Passenger ter-
minal access 
Runways — aprons — Passenger ter-
minal cargo area 
Total 
Cost 
(million ECU) 
615 
320 
935 
(construction) 
+ 112 (other) 
1 047 
Construction 
period 
1993-97 
1997-2000 
Data regarding the socioeconomic and financial profitability are dealt with confidentially. 
They have been made available to the European Investment Bank. 
State of maturity  Politically, the Malpensa project has the firm backing of the Italian Government as well as 
that of the regional and local authorities. 
The Italian State has decided to grant a substantial subsidy for the construction of the rail 
link between Milan city centre and Malpensa airport. This support was approved by the 
parliament and represents a key element in completing the rail access. 
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Administrative problems have been solved thanks to the two workshops held in June and 
October 1994. 
The project will be financed by a public/private partnership. The Italian State envisages a 
contribution of 47% of the total investment, whereas 53% will be provided by the private 
sector. These private funds will come mainly from SEA, the Milan airport authority. In 
addition, the participation of other investors is envisaged. Possibilities of reducing the 
State contribution should be explored. 
The financing of the rail access will be finalized by a State subsidy of ECU 240 million. 
In its 1995 budget, the Italian Government plans to make provision for the construction of 
the road access to the airport. The European Investment Bank has agreed in principle to 
grant a loan of ECU 200 million. The EIF has agreed in principle to contribute to the 
project through loan guarantees on a loan up to an amount of ECU 50 million to ECU 75 
million. Italian banks have expressed interest in participating in the financing of the 
project and are waiting for requests from SEA. The European Union is ready to co-finance 
feasibility studies for the rail access. 
The outstanding issue with respect to the Malpensa airport project concerns the 
redistribution of air traffic within the Milan airport system. This problem should be solved 
by the end of autumn 1994 with the presentation of a new scheme by the Italian Civil 
Aviation Authority. The Commission has been asked by the CAA to take part in working 
out this new scheme. 
In the context of the work of the Christophersen Group, two workshops have been 
organized so far. They have contributed to unblocking a number of long-standing 
problems. Three issues were identified as the main obstacles to rapid completion of the 
project: the redistribution of air traffic within the Milan airport system, the completion of 
the land-side access to the airport, in particular the rapid rail link, and the financial set-up. 
Recommendations have been made with a view to overcoming these problems and firm 
political commitments have been made by the relevant authorities, thus ensuring the 
necessary basis for rapid progress. The project is now well launched. 
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Fixed rail/road link between Denmark and Sweden 
Øresund fixed link (including access routes 
for road, rail and air) 
Project 
Swedish access link 
Submerged tunnel 
Artificial island 
One low-level bridge and 
two high-level bridges 
Project description  The Øresund link will be the first fixed link between the Scandinavian mainland and 
continental Europe. Once complete, international freight and passenger traffic will be able 
to enjoy considerably improved conditions. Long-distance traffic coming from Finland 
and Sweden and going to Germany, as well as regional traffic commuting between the 
areas around Copenhagen and Malmö, will be noticeably facilitated: waiting time and 
embarkation problems linked to the crossing by ferry boat will be minimized; this is of 
particular importance to rail traffic. 
It is expected that the entry into operation of the Øresund fixed link will lead to a marked 
increase in the proportion of rail traffic; passenger traffic by rail is expected to go up by 
450%. In view of the fact that road traffic causes enormous negative environmental effects 
and that, especially for long-distance traffic, the comparative advantages of rail traffic 
should be further developed, this project makes an important contribution to achieving 
sustainable mobility. 
The Danish rail access, which connects Copenhagen with the Øresund bridge-tunnel 
combination, is directly linked to Copenhagen Airport; at present, the airport has no 
connection with the railway network. The road link between the Øresund crossing and the 
city centre of Copenhagen will also contribute to the improvement of the access to the 
airport. These enhanced conditions, together with the expected additional traffic from and 
to Swedish regions as a result of the implementation of the Øresund fixed link, entail the 
necessity to expand Copenhagen airport, the intermodal character of which will be 
strengthened. 
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Plans to further develop Denmark's central international airport near Copenhagen are also 
closely related to the construction of the fixed link across the Øresund. Copenhagen airport 
is a natural hub for communications in air transport to and from Scandinavia and the Baltic 
region. The development plans for Copenhagen airport involve a number of significant 
investments in the range of ECU 1 000 million including the construction of a terminal in 
connection with the coming railway station at the airport. The first phases of the 
development plans are at an advanced stage and will be implemented within the next few 
years. 
The Øresund fixed link, as the key element of the project, bears a four-lane motorway and 
a double-track railway line; it consists of three main parts: a 4-km-long tunnel under the 
sea (starting from the Danish coast), a 4-km-long artificial island and a 7.5-km-long bridge 
starting from the Swedish coast. Both on the Danish and the Swedish side, four-lane 
motorways and double-track railway lines will ensure the connection with Copenhagen 
and Malmö, respectively. 
The fixed link is being designed and will be built and operated by a Danish/Swedish 
consortium which is owned by the two States in equal shares; this consortium has been 
legally entitled to levy direct user charges on the road part of the fixed link. The revenues 
generated will also contribute to financing the access routes. 
It is expected that the project (not including access routes) will be amortized after a period 
of 22 years; among other things, this is based on the assumption that the toll level equals 
the fare to be paid for the Øresund crossing by ferry. The ferry line will continue operating 
after the entry into operation of the fixed link; modal choice will thus be improved. 
Indicative costs and construction period (current prices) 
Section 
Danish access routes 
Fixed link 
Swedish access routes 
Total 
Length 
motorway: 9 km 
railway line: 18 km 
16 km 
motorway: 10 km 
railway line: 26 km 
motorway: 35 km 
railway line: 60 km 
Cost 
(million ECU) 
825 
2 240 
300 ! 
3 366 
Construction period 
1993-97 
1993-98 
1995-2000 
1995-2000 
1 To be included only after the accession of Sweden to the European Union. 
The figures for the Danish access routes and the fixed link include studies, land purchase 
and interest payments during construction. 
State of maturity  In 1991, the Swedish and Danish Governments reached a political agreement as regards 
the joint preparation, financing, construction, maintenance and operation of the Øresund 
fixed link. The relevant contract was ratified by acts of parliament in the two States; it 
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provided also for the construction of access routes towards Copenhagen and Malmö. 
The minimization of negative environmental effects was dealt with explicitly in this 
intergovernmental agreement. 
Administrative procedures for the fixed link were completed both in Denmark and in 
Sweden in mid-1994; they resulted in building permission being granted. However, in 
both countries some court proceedings (mainly concerning environmental issues) are still 
pending. A major objective pursued during the preparatory period has been to ensure that 
waterflow to and from the Baltic Sea would not be affected by the construction of the 
fixed link; the two governments consider the option which has now been adopted to be a 
zero solution. The Danish access routes were approved in 1993, and construction is now 
in progress. Procedures regarding the Swedish access routes are still under way; they are 
expected to be completed by mid-1995. 
Pursuant to their 1991 political agreement, the two governments set up the bi-national 
Øresundkonsortiet: in 1992, each of them established a limited liability company, the 
Swedish one (called Svedab) being owned by the national railways and the road 
administration, the Danish one (called Øresundforbindelsen) by a holding company; these 
companies are fully owned by the respective State. Being, on the one hand, responsible 
for financing and building access routes in Sweden and Denmark respectively, they 
established, on the other hand, the Øresundkonsortiet. 
The two States will guarantee the Øresundkonsortiet's borrowing on the market so that the 
latter benefits from the best possible conditions. Public ownership of the consortium as 
well as the assumption of risk by the States will thus considerably facilitate the financing 
of the project. The 'user pays' principle will not only be applied for the road part of the 
fixed link but also to the railway line: both the Danish and Swedish railways will have to 
pay a yearly flat rate to the Øresundkonsortiet for the use of the infrastructure. As far as 
the Swedish access routes are concerned, the government and Svedab envisage starting 
construction work as late as possible in order to minimize capital cost. Unlike the Danish 
access routes, which are of significance to the development of Copenhagen airport, the 
Swedish ones are exclusively linked to the Øresund crossing; for this reason, there is no 
need to open these routes before the completion of the fixed link. 
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Nordic triangle
1 
Project 
Project description  The Nordic triangle project is a joint proposal put forward by Finland, Norway and 
Sweden. Interconnecting the peripheral Nordic countries with both continental Europe on 
the one side and third countries on the other, the upgrading and improvement of routes on 
this triangular corridor will create important new opportunities for economic and political 
development within the extended European Union. 
This multimodal corridor is divided into four sections: 
Oslo-Copenhagen, 
Oslo-Stockholm, 
Copenhagen-Stockholm, 
Turku-Helsinki(-Russian border), 
comprising the following distances to be covered by the project: 
roads: 1 300 km (out of a total of 1 800 km) 
rail: 2 000 km (out of a total of 2 000 km). 
Some subprojects have already been identified by the States involved, for instance: 
— high-speed railway line Göteborg-Malmö (total investment ECU 400 million; 1994-
2003) 
— railway upgrading Turku-Helsinki (ECU 300 million; to be completed in 1995). 
The Norwegian part of the Nordic triangle is subject to future cooperation between Norway and the 
European Union. 
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An integral part of the Nordic triangle concept is the Øresund rail/road fixed link to 
Copenhagen and continental Europe. It constitutes a key element in this triangle, forming 
a direct inner Community physical link between mainland Europe and Scandinavia. 
Indeed, it is already one of the Christophersen Group's priority projects. 
It is Finland's intention to extend the corridor up to the Finnish/Russian border. Norway's 
proposal also makes mention of a direct link across the Oslofjord between the El 8 (on the 
west coast of the fjord) and the E6 (on the east coast), which would thus form a bypass of 
the city of Oslo, drawing transit traffic away from the capital. 
The project represents the most important mainland corridor for freight and passenger 
traffic coming from Scandinavia, Finland and third countries; it allows the integration of 
areas that are, geographically speaking, both landlocked and situated on the periphery of 
the Community. The Nordic triangle project is the natural continuation of the fixed 
rail/road link between Denmark and Sweden (Øresund fixed link), with the added benefit 
of relieving pressure from the expected growth resulting purely from the new possibilities 
offered by the Øresund crossing. Its implementation will bring a noticeable reduction in 
travelling time, both by road and by rail, leading to improved traffic flows and considerable 
improvements in environmental and safety considerations. Major urban centres are linked 
by high-quality infrastructure. 
The total investment costs for the Nordic triangle project are expected to total ECU 4 400 
million. This is divided as follows: for Finland, ECU 700 million costs are envisaged for 
road sections and ECU 800 million for rail lines, making a total of approximately ECU 
1 500 million (it should be noted that these figures include the section up to the 
Finnish/Russian border); for Norway, costs are estimated at ECU 775 million and ECU 
325 million for road and rail upgrading work, respectively, making ECU 1 100 million 
altogether; for Sweden, a total of ECU 1 800 million is envisaged, although no precise 
financial breakdown is available as yet. 
For some sections, the socioeconomic and financial feasibility studies have been assessed 
by means of technical feasibility studies; nonetheless, more detailed analysis is needed. 
State of maturity  Norwegian and Swedish road authorities have reached an agreement on a new bridge 
planned to be built at Svinesund (the natural border between the two countries on the E6 
route) as a joint Swedish-Norwegian toll project. However, the regional authorities of 
Halden have vetoed the project, leading to an objection being raised to this decision. The 
Ministry for the Environment will have the final say, in cooperation with the Ministry of 
Transport. 
The east-west axis (Oslo-Stockholm-Helsinki) is given lower priority by Norway than 
the one running from Oslo to Copenhagen, with construction work expected to begin in 
1997 at the earliest; however, this does not appear to hamper the project's progress. 
In accordance with the provision on environmental impact assessment (EIA) of the 
Norwegian Planning and Building Act, when investment costs in any one project exceed 
ECU 24 million then the Directorate of Public Roads or the Norwegian State Railways 
(NSB) decides whether or not an EIA should be elaborated on for the central authorities 
or become part of the regular planning process. 
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In Norway, the Public Roads Administration and Norwegian State Railways are 
cooperating on the planning of a new motorway and double-track railway line for a 
10-km-long section in Vestby. This is a common corridor linking construction work on 
both modes of transport between 1993 and 1995. 
The Norwegian State (through the Public Roads Administration and the Norwegian State 
Railways) owns and operates all national roads and main railway lines, regardless of 
whether or not they are financed by tolls or public funds. 
It would be advisable to investigate possibilities of financing from the private sector. 
However, due to generally low traffic flows, traditional private concessions are not 
considered appropriate on the whole, with the exception of bridges, tunnels, certain 
stretches of road, as well as road-pricing in major cities. As regards the rail sector, the 
levying of infrastructure fees is also under consideration. 
The annual budgeting for the first two years of the Norwegian railway plan (1994 and 
1995) shows that it will be difficult to fulfil more than the basic programme of ECU 
285 million: this could obviously have a significant effect on the financing of Norwegian 
railway sections within the Nordic triangle. 
Corresponding appropriate information is still lacking from the other two countries. 
No problems regarding competition, tendering, fiscality, etc. have been identified so far; 
however, it is essential to ensure interoperability in cross-border rail systems. 
As it was included in the Christophersen Group's programme at a relatively late stage, a 
great deal more intensive research still remains to be carried out. More comprehensive 
data are still being gathered. There is a great deal of work still to be done, which could be 
greatly helped by the Commission's support. 
Construction and upgrading throughout the corridor is at varying stages of development, 
on some sections ranging from being under construction to expected completion in 2003. 
More detailed information is needed on most parts of the corridor. 
Very little detail is available regarding financing issues; a preference has, however, been 
shown for partial toll financing coupled with State Funding. 
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Ireland-United Kingdom-Benelux road link 
Project 
Ferry link 
Other roads of the 
trans-European road 
network outline plan 
Project description  The corridor connects the three main cities in Ireland — Belfast, Dublin and Cork — by 
road and ferry links with Scotland and Wales, and southward, diagonally through the road 
system in England, with the Felixstowe/Harwich ferryport; via the English Channel 
crossing, it provides the connection with the road network of the Benelux countries. The 
link is included in the trans-European road network adopted in October 1993, and in the 
European Commission's proposal for the development of a trans-European transport 
network, submitted in April 1994. A coordinated development of the link facilitates access 
from Ireland/Northern Ireland to and through Scotland, Wales and England to continental 
European and external markets. 
The implementation of the project will lead to a significant reduction in travelling times, 
for transit traffic in particular; it will contribute towards relieving occasional very severe 
traffic congestion and thus to reducing exhaust emissions. Traffic safety will be enhanced. 
In the regions directly concerned, economic and regional development will be stimulated. 
The total length of the corridor is 1 455 km, of which 827 km are already included in 
various road development schemes. 
The various sections of the corridor will be at motorway, expressway or high-quality 
single carriageway standard, depending on regional traffic density. In some cases, the 
projects on the corridor involve new construction, in others realignment or road widening. 
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Cost-benefit analyses conducted for various sections produced positive results. 
Estimated construction costs 
Work is planned on various individual schemes as follows: 
Section 
England 
Ireland 
Wales 
Northern Ireland 
Scotland 
Total 
Length 
(km) 
381.5 
377.9 
37.9 
30.6 
na 
827.9 
Cost 
(million ECU) 
1 730-1 740 
930-940 
160-170 
80-90 
18-20 
2 920-2 960 
Construction period 
beginning of work: from 
1996 on 
122 km: completed; 
55 km: under construc-
tion; 
remaining part: begin-
ning of work from 1996 
on 
30.6 km: completed; 
remaining part: still to 
be determined 
beginning of work: from 
1996 on 
still to be determined 
State of maturity  The UK and Irish Governments, and the European Commission recognize the importance 
of the Ireland-United Kingdom-Benelux road-corridor concept. The Cork-Dublin-
Belfast-Larne link will play, in particular, a major role in the context of developing closer 
North-South economic cooperation as a component of the wider process of enhancing 
economic, political and social contacts between the two parts of Ireland. 
A broad framework for cooperation between the five road administrations involved has 
been agreed upon; detailed coordinated project planning will be undertaken. A considerable 
number of subprojects have already been completed as part of local upgrading programmes. 
The work has fully complied with the requirements of Directive 85/337/EEC on 
environmental issues. 
United Kingdom: The central government carries the responsibility for the design and 
management of the trunk road system whereas other roads fall within the domain of local 
authorities. A national priority system has been established for the various planned 
schemes, and some adjustments may be necessary in the existing priorities, in order better 
to support the Ireland-United Kingdom-Benelux link. 
Ireland: The management and administration of the national road network has recently 
been assigned to a new National Roads Authority. The overall planning remains centralized 
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at governmental level. The corridor includes two of the four strategic sections identified 
as priorities in the 1989-93 operational programme for peripherality and further sections 
in the 1994-99 operational programme for transport. Several major projects have already 
been completed or are at an advanced stage of planning. 
No significant problems are expected in the future as regards the implementation of new 
projects on the Ireland-United Kingdom-Benelux link; however, some administrative 
obstacles may arise from the necessity to complete statutory procedures in an appropriate 
sequence in the various regions involved. 
In the United Kingdom, opportunities to include private financing and concessions are 
worked out on a scheme basis. Possibilities for electronic tolling are under investigation. 
In the meantime, a system based on 'shadow tolls' — operation involving payments by 
the central government to concessionaires in proportion to the traffic volume — is being 
promoted (design-build-finance-operate concession). Private-sector funding is also a 
policy goal in Ireland, despite the impact of low traffic densities on profitability. 
Preliminary finance schemes propose a combination of national budgetary resources, 
Cohesion Fund assistance (Irish projects), EIB loans and private sector investment funds. 
There is a need for a corridor overview study. 
No significant problems of a technical nature or of interoperability are foreseen. All 
individual projects along the corridor have been estimated to be technically feasible. All 
major road-improvement projects are undertaken by competitive tender and meet EU 
requirements for public sector procurement. 
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West coast main line 
Project 
Conventional lines 
Other lines of the 
trans-European 
high-speed train 
network outline plan 
[} ' Glasgow Edinburgh 
Project description  Forming part of the existing UK railway network, the west coast main line (WCML) is 
one of the most important InterCity routes. It is a vital artery between five of the greatest 
conurbations of the United Kingdom, and serves a catchment area of about 15 million 
people (outside of London) which covers important industrial zones. The line is included 
in the Commission's proposal for the development of a trans-European transport network; 
via the ports of Holyhead in north Wales and Stranraer in Scotland, it provides access to 
the corresponding Irish railway network, in particular the Cork-Dublin-Belfast line. 
To enable the west coast main line to meet future demand, it is absolutely necessary that it 
be upgraded in the foreseeable future. International traffic especially is expected to 
increase as a result of the entry into operation of the Channel Tunnel. With a view to the 
construction of a new high-speed rail link between the Channel Tunnel and London (this 
project is also amongst the priority projects dealt with by the Christophersen Group) 
within the next decade, the international importance of the WCML will continue to 
increase; in fact, it represents the northward prolongation of this link. To allow a 
comparable quality of services on the entire north-south axis, the WCML project aims at 
infrastructure improvements which entail increases in speed (up to 225 km/h) and capacity. 
Besides enhanced conditions for passenger traffic, the implementation of the project will 
bring significant advantages for freight traffic; combined transport services, including 
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State of maturity 
piggy-back, will play a significant role in this context. By leading to higher attractiveness 
of the rail mode and a reduced volume of heavy goods vehicles on roads, the project 
makes a valuable contribution to achieving an environmentally friendly transport system. 
The existing west coast main line is 850 km long; the upgrading work to be done consists 
to a large extent of line re-electrification and modernization of signalling systems and in 
improvement and replacement of the track; some relatively minor changes of the alignment 
may transpire to be necessary. As regards electrification, the southern part requires more 
effort than the northern one, which was renewed more recently. 
The modernization project itself is expected to generate directly and indirectly 2 500 
man-years of employment. In the longer term, improved passenger and freight services on 
the line may encourage the location of industries in depressed areas and thus contribute to 
the creation of employment for several thousand persons. 
The British authorities estimate that the WCML upgrading project shows higher-than-
average profitability prospects; however, figures regarding this have not yet been released. 
It is expected that the private sector participation in the financing of the project could be 
significant and would take the form of an innovative package involving significant risk 
transfer. 
The UK Government, wishing to see private funding in the railways, announced in the 
November 1993 budget statement that it was asking Railtrack pic, the owner and operator 
of Britain's national railway infrastructure, to take the WCML modernization project 
forward in partnership with the private sector. 
A feasibility study into the modernization of WCML is now under way and will be 
completed by the end of 1994. Some planning permission and compulsory purchase 
powers may be required for realignments and bridge modifications. However, these should 
not delay the implementation of the main works. Where planning permission and 
compulsory purchase powers are required, these will probably be sought under either the 
UK Planning Act or Transport and Works Act. Assuming draft orders are issued in early 
1995, the necessary powers could be obtained by mid-1996. 
The costs of the project depend on the final decision on the definition of the modernization 
works. Current expectations are that costs will be as follows: 
(i) ECU 5 million for the current feasibility study; 
(ii) ECU 45 million for land purchase; 
(iii) ECU 300 million to ECU 500 million for construction work, including improvement 
of track, signalling, electrification and other equipment; 
(iv) ECU 250 million for engineering work. 
The total investment of ECU 600 million to ECU 800 million is intended to be spread over 
the period between 1995 and 1999. Significant expenditure may be possible during 1995. 
The investment cost will be borne by the publicly owned Railtrack pic and a private 
partner; the UK Government has, however, declared that it may be prepared to pay capital 
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grants direct to Railtrack to help to secure non-user benefits arising from railway 
infrastructure. 
Railtrack pic is the promoter of the WCML project. After an EU-wide tendering procedure 
in April 1994, WCML Development Company, a wholly private sector-owned company 
possessing a wide range of engineering and finance skills, has been selected to conduct 
the feasibility study. It is intended that a further tendering procedure, to select the private 
sector partner for carrying out the project itself, will take place early in 1995. 
A joint effort between Railtrack, the UK Government and the Commission should facilitate 
the establishment of a stable framework for the incorporation of the private sector. 
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Combined transport 
Project description  Combined transport is a goods transport service that uses various transport modes to carry 
an individual consignment (swap bodies, containers, semitrailers or lorries). Most of the 
journey is by rail, inland waterway or sea, while the initial and/or terminal (i.e. distribution 
to the consumer) sections are by road and are kept as short as possible. 
This service continues to make the best possible use of the comparative benefits of the 
individual modes of transport. By establishing efficient transport chains it takes advantage 
of synergies and in particular minimizes the negative impact of road transport emissions. 
Combined transport is perfectly compatible with a multimodal transport network, and is 
in fact an important basic component. 
In October 1993, the Council of Transport Ministers decided on a trans-European 
combined transport network. This network consists of all the infrastructure required for 
combined transport services, namely rail and inland waterway links which, together with 
any road sections required, are of major importance for long-distance goods transport, and 
the equipment required for transhipment between rail, inland waterway, road and sea, as 
well as specialized equipment. 
The combined transport project under consideration by the Christophersen Group contains 
features relating to all modes (but obviously only the specific combined transport aspects). 
The Commission has quite a choice of projects, such as the France-Spain rail link via 
Irun/Hendaye, the two north-south coastal lines in Italy, and smaller projects designed to 
constitute a European network of multimodal terminals. 
The total cost of the projects proposed by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Portugal and 
Spain is some ECU 3 000 million. 
State of maturity  In all Member States, combined transport features very prominently in the countries' 
transport policies, emphasizing its benefits to their national economies and to the 
environment. The States are earmarking considerable sums to improve combined transport 
infrastructure. 
As this combined transport project consists of a large number of subprojects of different 
kinds, the degree of preparation varies from one project to another; nevertheless, 
constituting a transport chain, each project is necessary regardless of its size. 
For most projects, the Member States concerned are planning public financing. A large 
proportion of the projects in the abovementioned countries will benefit from financial 
support from the Community (under the trans-European network budgetary heading). 
However, it would seem worth recommending that, in the near future, they consider the 
possibility of involving the private sector much more closely. It would be very useful for 
Member States to report on their experiences and for the Commission to play a 
coordinating role. 
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Spata airport (Athens) 
• Community connecting points 
■ Regional connecting points 
* Accessibility points 
♦ Location of new Athens airport 
not yet decided 
Project description  The idea of building a new airport in Athens to replace the existing one has been mooted 
for many years. A site at Spata, 25 km north-east of the city, was selected in 1974. Land 
was acquired by the State between 1978 and 1980. 
As a result of political and economic difficulties, the project was shelved for many years. 
It was not until 1991 that the Greek authorities revived the project to replace the existing 
airport as a result of the growing congestion of infrastructure that is difficult to extend 
because of the small size of the existing airport site. Since, in addition, the airport is 
situated within the urban area, the increased noise to which the inhabitants are subjected 
as a result of the growth in air traffic militates in favour of constructing a new airport 
further away from the city. 
The first phase of the new airport project comprises two runways, the terminals and the 
equipment needed to handle 10 to 12 million passengers. Ultimately, the airport should be 
able to handle 50 million passengers, in particular as a result of the construction of a third 
runway. 
Indicative costs  The total project cost is put at around ECU 2 000 million. 
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The method of funding is not yet clearly established. The previous government had 
considered entrusting the construction and operation of the new airport to a consortium 
under a concession, with the Greek State to hold 40% of the shares of the concessionary 
company. The present government has questioned the proposed arrangement. 
State of maturity  Action within the context of the Christopherson Group hinges on the official decision of 
the Greek Government on the legal and financial arrangements for the new airport project. 
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Berlin airport 
• Community connecting points 
■ Regional connecting points 
* Accessibility points 
ΓΊ Part of an airport system 
♦ Location of new Berlin airport 
not yet decided 
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Project description  At present, the Berlin airport system consists of three airports: Tegel, Tempelhof, 
Schönefeld. 
These three airports will not be able to handle the increase in demand for capacity in the 
Berlin/Brandenburg region, expected as a result of the new role of Berlin as federal capital 
and the growth in commercial and other relations with Central and Eastern Europe. 
Furthermore, environmental considerations will put additional pressure on the closing-
down of the two inner-city airports. 
Therefore, the construction of a new airport, 'Flughafen Berlin Brandenburg International', 
is envisaged. Three potential sites are at present under consideration: Jüterbog-Süd, 
Sperenberg and Schönefeld-Sud. 
Indicative costs  The total investment is estimated at ECU 4 100 million (ECU 2 600 million for actual 
construction. ECU 1 400 million for land acquisition and preparatory works on the site 
and ECU 100 million for studies). Means of financing have not yet been discussed. 
State of maturity  The procedure for site planning (Raumordnungsverfahren) has been finalized and was 
made public on 17 November 1994. 
The conclusions drawn do not include a decision on the location of the new airport, but 
give important indications on which to base such a decision. The economic assessment of 
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the project, on the basis of the Raumordnungsverfahren, and the possibilities for road and 
rail access will now have to be refined. 
Of the three alternatives under examination, two will necessitate the construction of an 
entirely new airport (Jiiterbog-Siid and Sperenberg), whereas in the case of Schönefeld-
Süd, the existing infrastructure at the present Schönefeld airport would be incorporated 
and extended. 
A proposal for the location of a site is expected at the beginning of 1995. Until then the 
Commission is not in a position to take further initiatives. 
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Maurienne motorway 
Project 
Other roads of the 
trans-European road 
network outline plan 
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Project description  The Maurienne motorway will connect the French motorway network with Italy via the 
Fréjus tunnel. Completion of the Maurienne motorway will provide a direct motorway 
link between the North and South of Europe through one of the most important Alpine 
passes. In fact, of the European motorway link between Denmark and Northern Germany 
and Sicily, only the section between Aiton and the Fréjus road tunnel is not complete. 
Completion of this section should also open up the Maurienne valley, which is an 
important route for transalpine traffic through the Mont Cenis pass and the Suze valley, 
and should contribute towards the economic development of this part of the Rhone-Alps 
region. 
The section is 63.6 km long and, because of the special topography of the area, will require 
19 special construction projects, including 8 viaducts across the river Arc and its 
tributaries, together with improvements to Route nationale 6 and 3 tunnels (Aiguebelle, 
Hurtières and Orelle). 
Traffic forecasts range from 6 000 to 9 000 vehicles a day by the year 2000 and from 
8 000 to 12 000 by 2010, depending on the particular subsection. 
The cost of the project is put at ECU 1 000 million. The relatively high cost is due to the 
very difficult terrain (the rocky spurs, the deep valleys and the rivers that have to be 
crossed). 
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Work has already started. The motorway will be opened in stages between December 
1997 and December 1999. 
State of maturity  In the national road improvement plan, adopted on 1 April 1992, it was agreed, in 
principle, to build a motorway through the Maurienne valley under concession. 
A decree of 17 November 1992 recognized the 'utilité publique' of the project. The 
concession for this section was granted to the Société française du tunnel routier du Fréjus 
(SFTRF) by decree of 31 December 1993. 
Various technical modifications may require a new 'déclaration d'utilité publique' (for 
instance for the Orelle tunnel). 
The project is being financed by the SFTRF, the company holding the concession, by 
borrowing from banks. The first loans were from the Caisse nationale des autoroutes and 
the European Investment Bank (ECU 25 million in 1993 and ECU 99 million in 1994). 
User charges will depend on the particular subsection (between FF 0.7 and FF 1.3 per km 
for cars and between FF 1.8 and FF 5 per km for heavy goods vehicles). Charges will keep 
pace with inflation. 
Land acquisition is already in progress and should be completed by the middle of 1995. 
The first part of the tendering procedure is already completed and contracts have been 
awarded for the lower and central part of the motorway. 
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Marateca-Elvas motorway 
Project 
Other roads of the 
trans-European road 
network outline plan 
Sevilla 
Project description  The objective of the project is to ensure a short, high-standard road link between the two 
capital cities of the Iberian peninsula, Lisbon and Madrid. 
A motorway (2x2 lane dual carriageway) of 204 km length was planned between these 
two cities. Large parts of its Spanish section have already been completed, and on 
Portuguese territory the 50-km-long stretch between Lisbon and Marateca has entered into 
operation. 
In order to draw full benefit from the infrastructure sections of the Lisbon-Madrid link 
which are already open, the missing links should be established as rapidly as possible. 
This means, in particular, that the link between Marateca and Elvas (situated at the Spanish 
border) has become a matter of urgency. 
Although traffic volumes, at present, range only from 3 600 to 8 500 vehicles (average 
daily traffic), they are expected to rise to 11 000 to 22 000 by the year 2020 (forecasts 
concern the entire Lisbon-Madrid link and vary for the different sections). 
Besides its importance to international long-distance traffic, the new motorway is vital for 
the areas directly concerned; its completion should, in particular, contribute to the regional, 
economic and social development of the less-favoured areas on both sides of 
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the border. Marked improvements in road safety, which should result from the implemen-
tation of the project, are also worth mentioning. 
Thanks to these benefits, the project is expected to show a good socioeconomic profitablity. 
The total investment needed to construct the Marateca-Elvas motorway section has been 
estimated at ECU 396 million. 
It is planned to complete work by the end of 1997. 
State of maturity  About 65 km of the Marateca-Elvas motorway are already under construction. For the 
remaining section, feasibility studies have basically been completed and produced positive 
results; some additional studies, however, are yet to be made. The environmental impact 
assessment has been carried out in this context; all necessary compensation measures can 
be ensured. 
Land acquisition procedures are still in progress. 
The financing of the sections already under construction is provided for by Community 
funds (Cohesion Fund, ERDF or Interreg) and national budgetary sources. 
The government stance is in line with the self-financing principle; consequently, the 
subject of toll collection for the road is a matter for further investigation. 
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High-speed train in Denmark 
Project 
Other lines of the 
trans-European railway 
network outline plan 
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Project description  In Cooperation with its neighbours, Sweden and Germany, Denmark is currently planning 
to build fixed high-speed rail links. In addition, a project to build a fixed link between two 
Danish islands (the Storebælt link) has already started. Completion of these projects 
should result in considerable improvements for rail transport (replacement of ferries and 
reduction of journey times). In this context it will be necessary to take measures to bring 
the national rail network into line with this improvement. 
To this end, the Danish Government has put forward the Denmark high-speed train project 
which is in four parts: 
• the Copenhagen-Ringsted section (the east-west corridor which is particularly 
important in terms of completing the Øresund and Storebælt fixed links); 
• the Fredericia-Aarhus section (improvements; this is part of the single north-south 
line that crosses the whole country linking northern Denmark and the German border; 
this also includes electrification of some sections of the line); 
• Rødbyhavn-Storstrøm bridge; 
• possibly also the Vordingborg-Køge section. 
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These two sections are a direct continuation of the planned Fehmarn Belt fixed link. A 
feasibility study is under way for the Copenhagen-Ringsted section which is expected to 
take around two years. The Danish Government will take a decision based on the results 
of this study. 
The total cost of the high-speed train in Denmark is put at ECU 1 800 million; for 
individual sections the estimated costs are as follows: 
• Copenhagen-Ringsted, varying according to the option chosen, with a minimum of 
ECU 700 million; 
• Fredericia-Aarhus: ECU 400 million; 
• Rødby bridge of Storstrøm and Vordingborg-Køge: ECU 300 million and ECU 
400 million respectively; these costs refer to a specification allowing the journey time 
between Copenhagen and Hamburg to be reduced to 2 hours. 
It is planned to open some sections in 2002; the first works should be started on the 
Fredericia-Aarhus section in 1996. 
The socioeconomic rate of return on all sections has been estimated to be 5%. 
The Danish Government considers public financing to be the most realistic option. 
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Transapennine highway 
Bologna-Florence 
Project 
Other roads of the 
trans-European road 
network outline plan 
Project description  The project concerns the construction of 59 km of new motorway which will run parallel 
to the existing link between Bologna (Sasso Marconi) and Florence (Barberino di 
Mugello), i.e. the Apennine section of the existing Al motorway (Milan-Rome). The 
existing section has an average daily traffic volume of 40 000 vehicles and it is frequently 
in need of extraordinary maintenance with high inherent costs. 
As regards traffic split, it is expected that the new motorway will attract almost all heavy 
traffic, whereas light traffic will mainly be directed to the existing link. By eliminating 
congestion, negative environmental impacts will be reduced; consequently, the project 
will be beneficial to the economic development of the Apennine area. 
The infrastructure shows the following technical dimensions: a dual two-lane carriageway, 
29 km of tunnels, and 10 km of bridges. The new link will have a pass altitude 300 m 
lower than that of the existing motorway, thus contributing to a smoother running of traffic 
and to improvements in road safety. 
In the European context, the project furthers the goal of cohesion by facilitating the 
transport flows between southern and northern Italy. The Al runs from Milan via Bologna, 
Florence and Rome to Naples, and is the only central north-south connection in the 
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State of maturity 
country; it forms part of the E35 north-south transport axis traversing Italy, Switzerland 
and Germany. 
The total cost, including interest during construction, has been estimated at ECU 3 158 
million; the foreseen construction period is 1995-2000. 
No data on financial and socioeconomic viability are available. 
The project is included in the national and regional transportation plans. 
The environmental impact assessment and the technical design of the motorway have been 
successfully concluded. 
The project is promoted by the Italian Ministry of Public Works; the operator will be the 
Autostrada Company. Commitments from the national budget and by the private sector 
are yet to be determined. 
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Project description  With a total length of over 400 km, this high-speed railway line is the most important 
east-west rail axis within Austria, connecting Salzburg (on the German border to the 
west), through to Linz, Vienna and both the Hungarian and Slovakian borders to the east. 
Only sections on Austrian territory are covered here; as the project was included in the 
priority list at a late stage, no information was available regarding the continuation on 
German territory. 
Between Salzburg and Attnang-Puchheim, the construction of a new four-track railway 
line is deemed necessary, as, due to topographical difficulties, the existing line cannot be 
adapted to high-speed travel. As regards the section Attnang-Puchheim to Wels, the 
existing double tracks are to be upgraded to allow speeds of up to 200 km/h. There is at 
present no apparent need to widen this section to four tracks. 
The main core of the project lies between Wels and Vienna. Work on the Wels-St Polten 
section is already under way, consisting of the creation of a four-track railway line. This 
is essentially made up of two double-track lines adapted for mixed transport, which are 
then interconnected at intervals of 25-30 km. At the moment it is planned that at least one 
of these double-track lines be capable of allowing speeds of up to 200 km/h, the other 
possibly supporting local traffic. The construction of a new four-track section between 
St Polten and Vienna is also deemed necessary due to topographical difficulties with the 
existing route. 
With the construction, in Vienna, of the new 15-km Lainzer tunnel and a four-track section 
for transit traffic being added to the station, journey times for transit traffic should be 
reduced by up to 30 minutes. 
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New track is to be laid on the section from Vienna to Nickelsdorf, in order to allow speeds 
of 140 km/h (in some cases 160 km/h). On the line between Parndorf and Kittsee the 
existing track is to be upgraded for speeds of 160 km/h; from Kittsee to the bordei 
upgrading work is expected to allow speeds of 140 km/h. 
Forecasts carried out by the Austrian Railways show that freight traffic is expected to rise, 
on average, by approximately 26% between the years 1990 and 2000. This means an 
increase from 70 to almost 90 million nett tonnes per year. As regards passenger traffic, it 
is estimated that traffic between Vienna and Linz will increase by approximately 9% to 
101 million passengers per year (including local traffic) by the year 2010. 
Total investment needed for this line is expected to be in the region of ECU 4 700 million; 
the completion of construction work is foreseen for the year 2010. 
State of maturity  More than 200 km are already under construction; the section Vienna-Nickelsdorf, for 
instance, is expected to be completed by 1996. For the remaining sections (notably 
Salzburg-Attnang-Puchheim and St Pölten-Vienna) studies are now under way regarding 
the exact route to be followed or concerning improved technical and safety measures. 
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Nice-Cuneo motorway 
Project 
Other roads of the 
trans-European 
road network 
outline plan 
Project description  As a result of sustained increase in commercial exchanges between France and Italy, a 
suitable cross-border transport infrastructure is called for. To this end, the authorities of 
these neighbouring countries plan to build two new links across the Alps: the Lyons-Turin 
railway line (included in Part I of the projects) and the Nice-Cuneo motorway. The latter 
project aims to interconnect the motorways of the French Mediterranean coastal area with 
those of the Italian Piedmont region (towards Turin and Milan). 
The new Nice-Cuneo motorway will be about 100 km long; it will include a tunnel under 
the Isola 2000 massif (length 16 to 17 km). Approximately 30 km of existing road on 
French and 40 km on Italian territory still need to be upgraded to dual two-lane standard. 
The tunnel section of the road will consist of two lanes only. 
It is expected that the traffic volume in the year 2010 will reach 5 000 to 6 000 vehicles 
per day: between 25 and 30% of this will be heavy goods traffic. 
The total cost of the project has been estimated at ECU 1 900 million (ECU 615 million 
for the tunnel. ECU 515 million for the Italian access routes and ECU 770 million for the 
French access routes). 
Construction work is envisaged to start at the end of 1996 or the beginning of 1997; it is 
foreseen that the tunnel will enter into operation between 2005 and 2010. 
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State of maturity  On the occasion of the 1993 French-Italian Summit, an agreement in principle was 
reached as to the implementation of the project. An intergovernmental commission was 
set up which took over responsibility for the completion of preliminary studies and the 
preparation of a bilateral international contract. 
This commission is also preparing the tendering procedure planned to be launched after 
the French-Italian Summit of November 1995. Special working groups are examining 
technical questions as well as legal and financial matters. 
A BOT (build-operate-transfer) scheme is envisaged for the project; the future concession-
aire would be allowed to levy user charges on the tunnel section. In comparison with other 
cross-border projects, this one appears to be unique in that both national authorities have 
agreed to grant one single concession for the entire Nice-Cuneo link. 
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Fehmarn Belt fixed link 
Project 
Other lines of the 
trans-European 
high-speed train 
network outline plan 
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Project description  While the Channel Tunnel is open for regular services, a tunnel-bridge construction over 
the Storebælt is in progress and another, namely that over the Øresund, is in the last stage 
of preparation, the project of a new fixed link over an important European strait is 
developing: the Fehmarn Belt fixed link. 
This fixed link would enable high-speed trains to operate between Hamburg and 
Copenhagen, provided that the access railway lines on the Danish and the German sides 
are upgraded appropriately (including the removal of bottlenecks); time-consuming 
crossings by ferry, linked with the embarkation of trains, would no longer be necessary. 
The Copenhagen-Hamburg link has been included in the trans-European high-speed 
railway network, endorsed by the Transport Council in 1990. The importance of this link 
is expected to increase in the coming years: increasing commercial relations between 
Nordic countries and the European Union call for a fast and direct link, which could be 
ensured by the route Øresund fixed link-Copenhagen-Fehmarn Belt-Hamburg; the 
construction of the Øresund fixed link will, in all probability, generate a great deal of new 
traffic on this route, especially as regards the rail mode. The construction of the Fehmarn 
Belt fixed link would thus make a significant contribution to providing a land infrastructure 
link which meets the high quality and capacity requirements for decades to come. 
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So far. no decision has been made with respect to the technical features of the Fehmarn 
Belt fixed link. 
An initial cost evaluation by the Commission has produced a figure of about ECU 4 500 
million. 
State of maturity
 I
n
 1991·
 th
e Fehmarn Belt Consortium, composed of Danish. German and French 
construction companies and banks, was established. During the years that followed, this 
consortium undertook feasibility studies on the fixed link; it based its considerations on 
the rail-road option and analysed different technical solutions: a bridge, two different 
tunnel constructions and a combined bridge-tunnel. The studies addressed safety issues 
and included a first evaluation of the environmental impact. The combined bridge-tunnel 
solution would, according to the results of the study, be most advisable from an 
environmental point of view. 
Besides the members of the Consortium, other banks have also shown interest in the 
Fehmarn Belt project. 
All options, tunnel, bridge and bridge-tunnel, would require the construction of a crossing 
of about 19 km length. 
The Danish and German Governments still aim to study the feasibility of the project in 
more detail; they consider an agreement on the construction of the link to be premature. 
Recently, they decided to launch a common feasibility study which will cover technical, 
socioeconomic and financial aspects. Relevant tender procedures will be completed before 
the end of 1994, and work on the studies is planned to start early in 1995. Community 
support has been made available for this study. 
No information is available so far as regards the profitability prospects of the project. The 
level of potential user-charges is likely to be approximately the same as the fare currently 
paid for the crossing by ferry. It may be assumed that the implementation of the project 
contributes to enhancing the competitiveness of the Baltic Sea area. 
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Bari-Brindisi-Otranto motorway 
Project 
Other roads of the 
trans-European road 
network outline plan 
Project description  The Bari-Brindisi-Otranto motorway is to follow the Adriatic coast in southern Italy. It 
will link the major sea ports, which have services to Greece, Albania and former 
Yugoslavia, and thus play a key role in the development of a multimodal transport 
network. In particular, present and future demand for transport between two Member 
States of the European Union, Italy and Greece, will require improved road infrastructure. 
Most of this traffic uses the ferry service between Otranto and Igoumenitsa, but completion 
of this project is required to meet not only international traffic needs but also regional 
needs. 
The purpose of the whole project is to upgrade an existing 207 km stretch of road into a 
high-quality route, which will significantly improve road safety and journey times. 
Moreover, by reducing congestion, the project will help to limit environmental impact (by 
reducing emissions). 
The motorway will help to improve the economic development of the regions directly 
concerned. Its construction will create 3 000 man-years of work and, once in use, it will 
encourage trade and thus help directly and indirectly to create more jobs. 
Improvement work has been completed on some 50% of the total length of the Bari-
Brindisi-Otranto route. 
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State of maturity 
The investment required to complete the project, that is to improve the remaining 102 km 
of road, is ECU 290 million. 
The main work on the project should start in 1998: the motorway should be ready for use 
by 2003. 
The project is to be prepared in stages. It has been estimated that all the administrative 
procedures will have been completed by the end of 1997. 
The Italian Government has decided to finance the motorway from the budget. To date, a 
third of the total investment required for the project has been covered by budgetary 
decisions. The section already completed was financed from separate funds. 
The motorway will be operated by the National Roads Authority which does not plan to 
charge a toll. Nevertheless, traffic forecasts indicate a strong likelihood of financiai 
profitability. On the north Bari-Brindisi section, for example, average daily traffic is 
already approaching 50 000 vehicles; and it has been estimated that it will reach 64 000 
vehicles by the year 2010. Traffic volume is almost as high on the remaining section. 
It is recommended that consideration be given to the possibility of involving the private 
sector since conditions are favourable. This is a low-risk project because it concerns a 
road already in service and used by a high volume of traffic. 
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Rhine-Rhone link 
Project 
Other waterways 
Saône 
Moselle 1 
W Chalon-sur-Saône 
Nancy 
Rhin / 
Strasbourg Λ 
9 Basel 
Project description  The purpose of the Rhine-Rhone project is to complete the last missing link in a European 
route of strategic importance, namely the inland waterway route from the North Sea to the 
Mediterranean, which is nearly 1 600 km in length and links Rotterdam with Marseilles. 
It should also connect the Mediterranean and the Black Sea (via the Rhine, Main and 
Danube). 
There is already a Rhine-Rhone canal, built some 150 years ago, although the gauge of 
the canal — a maximum of 300 tons — is no longer adequate. According to forecasts of 
goods traffic as a whole, the total volume is likely to increase considerably and inland 
waterways will be called upon to play an increasingly important role in meeting this new 
demand. The inland waterways form an essential component of a transport system aiming 
at greater efficiency and more respect for the natural environment. In conjunction with the 
other modes, the inland waterways help towards the development of an integrated transport 
network while at the same time maintaining their own comparative advantages. 
For these reasons, it is essential to improve the Rhine-Rhone link, in order to increase the 
gauge over the whole of the stretch from Rotterdam to Marseilles. 
The missing section — the Rhine-Rhone link project — is between the large Alsace canal 
near Mulhouse and the river Saône (the Rhône-Saône stretch) near Laperrière. The total 
length of the stretch for development is 229 km and this includes 23 reaches separated by 
a 336.5 metre summit level and 15 dams. 
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The specifications decided upon for this project make it a Class Vb inland waterway 
according to European standards. The project forms part of the trans-European inland 
waterway network approved in October 1993 and was designated as a priority project. 
Apart from the benefits to international traffic, this development project is of structural 
importance at national level. The Rhine-Rhone link, in all, passes through six regions and 
two of the largest cities in France, namely Lyons and Marseilles. 
The project includes a number of sites for small businesses, industry and port activities. 
Eventually, these areas should be able to provide between 13 000 and 27 000 jobs, of 
which between 2 600 and 5 400 could be considered to be directly linked to the waterway. 
The total cost of improving the Rhine-Rhone canal is ECU 2 500 million, including the 
cost of land. The main part of the project is to be completed between 1996 and 2005. 
A study carried out with the financial support of the Community estimates the financial 
profitability of the project at between 7.2 and 9.4% (internal rate of return); the 
socioeconomic profitability is likely to be between 8.9 and 10.9%. 
State of maturity During the debate on the land improvement and development bill in the autumn of 1994. 
the French Government decided to set up a company as a subsidiary of the Compagnie 
nationale du Rhône (CNR), Electricité de France (EDF) and Voies navigables de France 
with the task of improving the Rhine-Rhone canal. Under this scheme, EDF, able to 
exploit the hydroelectric potential, will finance the operation together with the regional 
authorities. 
Administrative procedures are already well in hand. The 'déclaration d'utilité publique' 
was published by decree of the Council of State of 29 June 1978, and its effects where 
extended by a decree of 28 April 1988. At the same time, an environmental impact 
assessment was carried out. It will take between 8 and 11 months to complete the 
administrative procedures, which means that the main work can begin as planned. 
Work has already begun on the two end sections (Niffer-Mulhouse and north of 
Chalon-sur-Saône). 
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Seine-Scheldt link 
Project 
Other waterways 
w^ Dunkerque 
Oise^^ 
Paris^^ 
Gent ^^ 
Schelde/ / 
Escaut / 
^^^Schelde/ 
Ë Escaut 
WL Compiègne 
^^"»v,,^ Seine 
Mons 
^^ Antwerpen 
[ Bruxelles/ 
f Brussel 
Maastricht ^W 
Meuse/ 
Maas 
Project description  The Seine-Scheldt project is designed to link the whole of the Parisian region and the 
Seine basin, which have the heaviest inland waterway traffic in France, with the whole of 
the Benelux inland waterway network, which will thus considerably extend the European 
wide-gauge canal network. 
The Seine-Scheldt project was designated as a priority project in the European inland 
waterway improvement plan adopted in October 1993. 
Not only will the project benefit transit traffic and help to free other land transport 
bottlenecks, but it will also benefit the regions through which it passes, where there are 
plans for multimodal transhipment terminals. The project will include the development of 
industrial and port sites, which are expected to create between 12 000 and 20 000 jobs in 
the relatively long term. 
Improvements are to be made to 134 km of existing waterways, which include 16 locks or 
10 locks plus two waterslopes depending on the options chosen. 
The total cost is estimated at ECU 1 350 million. 
The construction period is to run from 1999 until 2006. 
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A study carried out with the financial support of the Community calculated financial 
profitability at between 7.1 and 8.4% (internal rate of return) while socioeconomic 
profitability varies between 8 and 9.6%. 
State of maturity The first stage in the administrative procedure leading up to a 'déclaration d'utilité 
publique' has been launched and is expected to be completed in the autumn of 1994. It is 
estimated that five years will be required to complete all the procedures. 
Financing of the project has not yet been decided upon. A large proportion of the financing 
could be based on hydroelectric returns (as with the Rhine-Rhône canal). Another possible 
source of funding is a land transport investment fund, as provided for in the land 
improvement and development bill currently being discussed by Parliament. 
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Elbe-Oder link 
Project 
Other waterways  ( J 
\_ Hamburg 1 
Mittellandkanal 
Hannover 
Lübeck 
■^ Elbe 
Elbe | 
Γ Magdeburg 
^\ Elbe 
f^ Berlin 
Potsdam 
Szczecin ^V 
/Oder 
V^Oder 
Oder 
Project description  The Elbe-Oder inland waterway link is of great importance to east-west traffic between 
North Sea ports, the industrial areas of Magdeburg and Berlin, the Polish Baltic Sea ports 
and the Polish inland waterway network. It forms part of the trans-European network that 
was adopted by the Transport Council in October 1993 and is one of the priority projects 
identified in this context. 
The existing infrastructure, having been completed in 1938, will not be able to meet future 
demand: traffic forecasts indicate that, in 2010, 25 million tons will be carried on the 
section Magdeburg-Berlin and 10 million tons on the section from Berlin to the Polish 
border. The entire link Magdeburg-Szczecin, comprising three subsections, needs to be 
upgraded in order to provide sufficient capacity with a view to future traffic flows. The 
German infrastructure master plan 1992-2010 includes all of these sections (ECU 2 400 
million total investment). 
The project dealt with by the Christophersen Group, however, considers only the section 
Berlin-Polish border-the Oder-Havel-Wasserstraße. North of Berlin, this canal goes 
towards the River Oder, and then runs parallel to it; at the Polish border it joins the Oder 
as the latter is deep enough for navigation. The implementation of the project should lead 
to considerably improved conditions on the link Berlin-Szczecin. 
The Oder-Havel-Wasserstraße upgrading to inland waterway category Va requires an 
investment of about ECU 650 million. 
The socioeconomic profitability of the project (German part) has been evaluated; the 
benefit-cost ratio amounts to 2.8. 
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State of maturity  Its inclusion in the German infrastructure master plan entails the insertion of the project 
into the medium-term budgetary planning. However, the authorities estimate that 
alternative ways of financing could accelerate the project's implementation by about five 
years. 
The detailed design and administrative procedures are in progress; the initial phases are 
expected to be finalized by the end of 1995. 
If financing is secured, construction could start in 1996. 
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Danube upgrading 
between Straubing and Vilshofen 
Project 
Other waterways 
Frankfurt 
Regensburg 
Project description 
State of maturity 
This project consists of the upgrading of approximately 70 km of the Danube. It serves the 
objective of eliminating a bottleneck on the Rhine-Main-Danube axis which links the 
North Sea with the Black Sea. At present, the Straubing-Vilshofen section is the 
shallowest on the entire link; the upgrading will thus enable constant inland navigation on 
this axis and noticeably contribute to improved conditions for international traffic. 
According to traffic forecasts, 8 million tons of goods will be carried on this link in the 
year 2010. 
The cost of the project amounts to ECU 700 million. 
It is envisaged that the upgrading work will be carried out from 1999 onwards. 
The socioeconomic benefit-cost ratio has been evaluated at higher than 2. 
The project is included in the German infrastructure master plan. 
Administrative procedures are in progress (Raumordnungsverfahren: impact on regional 
development). In this context, it is currently being examined whether or not alternatives to 
the existing technical solution for the removal of the bottleneck can be found; a respective 
feasibility study is under way. As soon as this question is solved, the completion of the 
'Raumordnungsverfahren' and the beginning of subsequent procedures (requiring three to 
four years) are possible. Studies presently under way involve an assessment of the impact 
on the environment. The German authorities estimate that possible negative impacts can 
be compensated by corresponding technical measures. 
The project will be financed from the Federal State budget (two thirds) and the budget of 
the Land of Bavaria (one third). 
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High-speed train Randstad-Dutch/ 
German border (-Rhine I Ruhr) 
Project 
High-speed lines 
Project description  The objective of this project is to improve the existing railway line between Amsterdam 
and the Dutch/German border so that speeds of up to 200 km/h can be achieved. The 
implementation of the project will thus contribute to completing such important European 
high-speed rail links as Amsterdam-Oberhausen (situated in the German industrial and 
consumer centre Rhine/Ruhr)-Frankfurt-on-Main-southern Germany-Basle/Switzer-
land, and Amsterdam-Düsseldorf/Cologne-Frankfurt-on-Main-Stuttgart-Munich-
Vienna. 
The construction of the Betuwe line (conventional rail) Rotterdam-Dutch/German 
border(-Cologne) will free the Amsterdam-Dutch/German border line from freight traffic; 
this should ensure the provision of high-quality passenger services on this line. Between 
Amsterdam and the German Rhine/Ruhr area, for example, travelling times can be reduced 
by about 30 minutes. 
The Amsterdam-Dutch/German border line, which has to be upgraded, is 111 km long. 
On the German side, upgrading work will be carried out on the 73-km-long section from 
the State border to Oberhausen in order to allow speeds of 200 km/h. 
The total cost of the project Amsterdam-German border amounts to ECU 1 560 million. 
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tate of maturity 
It is intended to upgrade the line in two phases, namely: 
(i) Amsterdam-Utrecht: 1998-2005; 
(ii) Utrecht-Emmerich (cross-border section): 2005-2010. 
The latter subsection still needs to be studied in detail. 
The financial and socioeconomic profitability of the project have been evaluated; the 
following results have been achieved so far: 1 % (IRR) and 4.4%, respectively. Given the 
density of population in the catchment area, these figures should, however, be re-examined. 
On 31 August 1992, the Ministers for Transport of Germany and the Netherlands signed 
an agreement on the upgrading of the link Amsterdam-Dutch/German border-Oberhausen 
for speeds of up to 200 km/h. 
The agreement lays down the abovementioned construction period for the Dutch project; 
as regards the continuation on the German side, it stipulates that the completion should be 
linked to the entry into operation of the Betuwe line (around 2001). 
Technical feasibility studies have been conducted; however, for the section 
Utrecht-Emmerich, more detailed studies are needed. Over the entire link, it will be 
necessary to eliminate level-crossings; the future line will, to a large extent, consist of four 
tracks. 
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Road corridor Valencia-Saragossa-Somport 
Project 
Other roads of the 
trans-European road 
network outline plan 
Project description  The project will improve substantially the interconnection of the Spanish and the French 
motorway networks; it concerns the construction of a road link from the Spanish 
Mediterranean arc (Valencia) via Saragossa and the Somport Tunnel to Pau in France. The 
link, 472 km in total, comprises the following four sections: 
Sagunto (Valencia-)Teruel, 
Teruel-Saragossa, 
Huesca-Somport, 
Somport Tunnel (French border). 
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Goods transport across the Pyrenees will be facilitated and substantial reductions in 
travelling time will be achieved by implementing the project. Consequently, a boost will 
be given to the economic activity and competitiveness of the Spanish Mediterranean arc, 
the Ebro Valley, the Pyrenees and the French Aquitaine region, situated in a triangle 
formed by Pau, Toulouse and Bordeaux. 
An express route (autovía) is planned from Sagunto to Huesca. The section 
Huesca-Somport will be implemented as an ordinary two-lane road (one lane in each 
direction). The work consists mainly of upgrading the existing ordinary road between 
Somport and Sagunto. 
The environmental impact assessment for the section Saragossa-Huesca has been 
approved. The particularly sensitive nature of the Somport area has triggered the interest, 
as well as the protests, of many environmentalists. 
Indicative costs and construction periods 
Section 
Sagunto-Teruel 
Teruel-Saragossa 
Saragossa-Huesca 
Huesca-Somport 
Somport Tunnel 
Total 
Length 
(km) 
120 
181 
70 
101 
472 
Cost 
(million ECU) 
450 
510 
143 
63 
63 
1 229 
Start of 
construction 
1995-96' 
1997 
1995-96 
no data 
started 
Entry into 
operation 
1998
2 
no data 
1997 
no data 
1997 
' Sagunto-Segorbe (1997: Segorbe-Teruel). 
: Sagunto-Segorbe (Segorbe-Teruel: to be determined). 
As regards financial and socioeconomic profitability, further studies are needed on the 
corridor. 
State of maturity  In the Community context the Valencia-Pau link has been included in the trans-European 
road network approved in December 1993. The road priorities programme for 1993-95, 
drawn up by the Spanish Government, includes the Saragossa-Huesca section and the last 
40 km of the link between Segorbe and Sagunto. The Saragossa-Huesca link will be put 
out to open tendering in 1995. 
The Spanish Government plans to invite the private sector to participate in the financing 
of the road. The Cohesion Fund has provided funding for studies on the section 
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Saragossa-Huesca in 1993; additionally, an application concerning the Somport Tunnel is 
under consideration under the 1994 budget line. 
For the majority of the sections along the corridor, the role of Community funding has yet 
to be determined. The same applies for possible EIB or EIF lending. 
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High-speed train (Brenner-)Milan-
Rome-Naples 
Project 
Other lines of the 
trans-European 
high-speed train 
network outline plan 
Project description 
State of maturity 
The Milan-Rome-Naples railway line, which links northern and southern Italy, is of 
great importance to international traffic. It ensures the continuation of such axes as 
Frankfurt-Basle-Milan and Berlin-Munich-Verona (Brenner axis) towards the south of 
Italy. 
The entire line is to be newly constructed; the section Florence-Rome was already 
completed in 1993. The remaining sections Milan-Florence and Rome-Naples remain to 
be built. 
The length of the new railway line amounts to approximately 630 km. Once the project is 
completed, high speeds of about 250 km/h will be possible. 
The cost of the project amounts to ECU 8 300 million. 
The project has been included in the five-year plan; it is planned to be built, financed and 
operated by TAV, the entity in charge of the promotion and development of the Italian 
high-speed railway network. The State subsidizes the financing of the project. 
Technical feasibility studies are in progress. As the line largely traverses mountainous 
regions (Apennines), a significant number of tunnels needs to be constructed (especially 
between Florence and Bologna). 
Construction work is already in progress on the Rome-Naples section. 
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Transrapid magnetic lévitation train 
Project  -IT 
Hamburg 
4v 
Hannover 
• 
• 
Braunschweig 
Kassel 
• 
Erfurt 
• 
φ Magdeburg 
Halle 
• 
• 
Leipzig 
Berlin 
Dresden 
• 
Project description  This project concerns the implementation of a completely new transport technology: the 
magnetic lévitation train. 
Once in operation, magnetic lévitation trains may constitute a real alternative to inter-EU 
short-haul flights: the speeds which can be achieved with this innovative means of 
transport amount to 400 to 450 km/h. It is designed only for passenger transport. 
A field test of this new system, carried out in Germany, has shown positive results. 
Germany now plans to build the first line for regular services: the 284-km-long 
Hamburg-Berlin link. 
This new transport system should enable passengers to cover the distance of almost 
300 km in 53 minutes. Every 10 minutes, a 'Maglev' train will operate between the seaport 
in the north of Germany and the capital Berlin. The line will have a capacity of 14.5 million 
passengers per year. 
German authorities selected the Hamburg-Berlin link to be the first in Europe to put this 
new technology into practice for two main reasons: 
(i) construction and operation of the line will give a decisive impetus to the economic 
upswing in a rural area which has not only suffered from the cyclical economic 
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State of maturity 
downturn but, in addition, from the structural changes linked to German unification, 
i.e. the Land of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania: the main part of the line traverses 
this region; 
(ii) forecast traffic — in combination with a sound financing scheme — points to 
promising profitability prospects; the financial profitability (internal rate of return) 
was assessed at 12.4% (assuming a 40-year operation period). 
It is estimated that the project will have a significant impact on employment: during the 
construction period, 68 000 man-years of employment could be generated; know-how 
transfer and the creation of jobs in such industries as construction and mechanical 
engineering contribute essentially to stimulating structural changes in the area concerned. 
In addition, 2 800 permanent jobs — directly and indirectly related to the project — could 
be created. 
The total cost of the project amounts to ECU 4 700 million, of which ECU 2 900 million 
has to be invested in infrastructure and the remainder in the rolling-stock and the 
traffic-management system. 
Construction is planned to start in 1995 and to take eight years. 
On the basis of a financing scheme, proposed by industry representatives, as well as of the 
results of technical studies and tests, the German Ministers for Research and Technology 
and for Transport agreed, in December 1993, to continue preparing the project's 
implementation. 
The private sector intends to play a significant role in the construction, financing and 
operation of the line. 
It is planned to form two joint-stock companies: 
(i) Fahrweg AG, responsible for the infrastructure (State-owned company); 
(ii) Betriebs AG, responsible for the operation of the line. 
The State will contribute to the infrastructure, financing the amount which would be 
necessary for the construction of a Hamburg-Berlin high-speed railway line. The 
remainder will be borne by the operating company, in the form of a concession fee. The 
infrastructure company will levy user charges from the operating company. 
The provision of the equity capital of the operating company by German railways 
Deutsche Bahn AG and the airline Deutsche Lufthansa (total 20%), industry and banks 
(47%) as well as small investors (33%) is under consideration. 
The operator will borrow via a bank consortium, without benefiting from State guarantees. 
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High-speed train Luxembourg—Brussels 
Project 
Conventional lines 
High-speed lines 
London 
h_ 
Amsterdam 
'Rotterdam 
Brussel/ 
Bruxelles 
Lille' 
Amiens 
Bretagne 
Bordeaux 
Hamburg 
'Hannover 
^P Antwerpen 
i Aachen 
^k "V^ Liège ^^^ 
Namur^T ^V 
Luxembourg ^F 
Metz φ·^* 
Nancy 9 
^Koln 
Frankfurt 
Mannheim 
Strasbourg 
Project description  The high-speed train project Luxembourg-Brussels is of great importance to the 
improvement of the connections between all of the European institutions. 
It will link Luxembourg with important north European high-speed train lines and allow 
noticeable improvements for a number of destinations (for example Luxem-
bourg-Amsterdam; Luxembourg-Channel Tunnel-London). Via the branch line 
Metz-Luxembourg of the high-speed train Paris-eastern France-southern Germany 
(TGV-Est), fast direct links Brussels-Luxembourg-Strasbourg should become possible. 
The Luxembourg-Brussels link is 222 km long. 
Two options are considered: upgrading of the existing line and construction of a new line. 
The reduction in travelling time which can be achieved amounts to 19 minutes and 
43 minutes, respectively. 
The cost for the two options has been estimated at ECU 85 million and ECU 500 to 
850 million, respectively. 
In the event of upgrading, the financial profitability will amount to 6.8% and the 
socioeconomic profitability to 20.7%. For new construction, these data are expected to be 
2.9 and 11.9%, respectively. 
Construction work could start quite soon if the line is to be upgraded, as no comprehensive 
administrative procedures would be necessary. 
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State of maturity  A political decision with respect to the project implementation will have to be taken by 
the governments concerned and by the Belgian and Luxembourg railways. 
Luxembourg is prepared to participate in the financing of the Belgian part of the project. 
For the time being, public financing is envisaged. 
197 Annex A 
Transport project descriptions 
Road corridor Naples-Reggio di Calabria 
Project 
Other roads of the 
trans-European 
road network 
outline plan 
Project description  This project concerns the upgrading of a motorway which is of great importance for 
regional and economic development in the south-west of Italy. This 493-km-long route is 
divided into two sections, namely Naples-Salerno (50 km) and Salerno-Cosenza-Reggio 
di Calabria (443 km). 
The improved road link between the extreme south of Italy and Naples would allow better 
connections to be created with northern Italy and central regions of the Union. As the 
Naples-Reggio di Calabria motorway is linked with several maritime ports, project 
implementation would make a noticeable contribution to the development of the 
multimodal transport network. 
An ever-growing volume of passenger and freight traffic is causing increased constraints 
on capacity, with the existing road no longer being able to meet demand; for instance on 
the stretch of road between Naples and Salerno alone average traffic figures are quoted as 
around 170 000 vehicles per day. Upgrading of the existing dual-carriageway (widening) 
is therefore of great importance; indeed, this project is given high priority by the Italian 
authorities. 
Work on the 50-km-long section is divided as follows: between Naples and Scafati, a third 
lane is to be constructed in both directions; intersections on the remaining part of the route 
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to Salerno are to be upgraded. Costs for this whole section are expected to be in the region 
of ECU 350 million. 
As regards the remaining 443 km to Reggio di Calabria, two strategies have been 
proposed: the first of these involves the building of an emergency lane or hard shoulder 
on some 52% of the total length of this section at a cost of ECU 1 100 million; the second 
concerns the construction of a third lane along 52% of this section, with costs amounting 
to approximately ECU 2 700 million. In both cases, if upgrading work were extended to 
cover the whole distance, this would result in a substantial increase in cost, owing to 
difficulties presented by the many tunnels and viaducts at different levels. 
Total cost of the project would, therefore, be approximately ECU 
the first strategy and ECU 3 050 million for the second. 
450 million including 
Construction work is expected to be completed by the year 2000. 
State of maturity  Although no information has been made available by the Italian authorities as to which 
strategy is to be followed for the entire link, for certain subsections project preparation 
already appears to be well-advanced: for example, tendering procedures are under way for 
the executive design of 97 km of emergency lane to be added on the section between 
Salerno and Reggio di Calabria with expected costs in the region of ECU 260 million. 
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Part III — Projects connecting 
to third countries 
Berlin-Warsaw-Minsk-Moscow (rail and road) 
Motorway 
Railway 
Berlin 
Project description  The Berlin-Warsaw-Minsk-Moscow route, identified by the Crete conference as one of 
the priority corridors, is part of the extension of the trans-European networks (TENs) 
towards the Central and East European countries. It is a concrete and visible means of 
supporting the reform process in Poland and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) and contributes to the integration of the continent. The central position of Poland in 
Europe between the West European countries and the CIS generates the necessity of 
creating and operating an effective transport network. 
As one of the main corridors for passenger and freight transport, the Berlin-Moscow 
itinerary has considerable international importance. The volume of road traffic is expected 
to grow in parallel with already increasing trade flows. The Berlin-Moscow railway 
corridor has special strategic importance in the larger European context for long-haul 
transit traffic and connects the main industrial areas of Central and Eastern Europe with 
the EU. Its upgrading should enable the railway to compete with road and air transport, 
and will therefore contribute to obtaining a modal balance in order to fulfil the general 
objective of sustainable mobility. It is well suited for combined road and rail transport. 
The main results of the modernization will be a reduction in transport times, an 
improvement in quality and safety, an increase in capacity and an economic stimulation of 
East-West trade. 
The corridor is part of the TEM and TER networks. The corridor's length of approximately 
1 820 km is divided into four sections: 
100 km 
650 km 
600 km 
470 km 
within Germany 
within Poland 
within Belarus l 
within Russia 
5% EU territory 
36% PHARE countries 
59% TACIS countries 
200 Annex A 
Part III — Projects connecting to third countries 
Selected projects 
on the corridor 
On the German part of the corridor (included in the Bundesverkehrswegeplan), the road is 
already upgraded to motorway standard. The railway has a designed speed of 200 km/h. 
The whole Polish section needs considerable upgrading. The existing normal road (A2) is 
in a relatively poor condition. A project, upgrading the railway between the German 
border and Warsaw, is already under way. 
The Belarus and Russian sections account for the major part of the corridor. The current 
involvement of the EU is limited (up to now, TACIS does not permit investment in 
infrastructure). To facilitate obtaining long-term funds for infrastructure projects, legal 
and administrative conditions need to be improved. On the other hand, both rail and road 
corridors are in better condition than they are in Poland. As regards the railway, there is, 
for the time being, only a need to modernize. A reasonably good motorway links Belarus 
with Poland (Brest-Minsk-Orska route). 
A number of improvements are needed at the border-crossings. Some parts of the Russian 
and Belarus section of the corridor are under rehabilitation. 
Within the G24 framework, private investors have shown great interest in investing in 
specific projects on this corridor. 
A Memorandum of Understanding on the development of the Berlin-
Warsaw-Minsk-Moscow transport corridor between the Ministers for Transport of 
Poland, Russia, Belarus, Germany and the European Commission has been initialled. A 
task force of customs and transport experts will be established to find solutions to existing 
problems on the corridor. 
The most important projects on the corridor ready for implementation are situated in 
Poland and on its borders. 
Section 
Road 
German border-Warsaw 
Rail 
Warsaw-Terespol (E20) 
Bypass Warsaw (CE20) 
Brest-bottleneck border-crossing 
Poland/Belarus 
Cost 
(million ECU 
1 111 
433.5 
398 
90.0 
Construction 
period 
1995-2003 
up to 2000 
up to 2000 
1994-96 
Traffic data 
For the whole stretch 
German border-Belarus 
border until 2011: 100% 
increase forecast 
Passengers: 1992 4.1 
(millions) 2010 9.8 
freight: 1994 1.4 
(million t) 2010 20.4 
201 Transport project descriptions 
Annex A 
Road project: Construction The road on the corridor (E30) is subdivided into the following sections with a total length 
of concession motorway of 1 857 km: 
German border-Warsaw 
Germany 
Poland (A2) 
Belarus 
Russia 
Berlin-Frankfurt-on-Oder (105 km) 
Swiecko (German border)—Warsaw 
(455 km) 
Warsaw-Belarus border (247 km) 
Polish border-Brest-Minsk-Russian 
border (590 km) 
Russian border-Moscow (460 km) 
Motorway exists 
Construction of a motor-
way foreseen 
Maintenance and rehabili-
tation sufficient for the 
time being 
State of maturity  The section Swiecko-Warsaw (455 km) is the continuation of the already existing 
motorway from Berlin to the Polish border. On the Polish side, only 50 km from Wrzesina 
to Konin has been built (a stretch of about 10% of the section considered). The envisaged 
programme of construction is in two stages: 
Stage 1: 1995-97 — section Swiecko-Kolo (280 km); 
Stage 2: 1997-2003 — section Kolo-Warsaw (175 km). 
The subsequent stretch, from Warsaw to the Belarus border, is planned to be finalized by 
2007. 
The whole project is included in the 15-year master plan, adopted by the Polish Council 
of Ministers in 1992. 
A preliminary feasibility study for a concession motorway was finalized by Transroute in 
1993. A more detailed traffic study financed by PHARE is under way. 
The alignment study for the A2 Swiecko-Warsaw is agreed with local authorities. The 
starting-point at the German border is fixed in agreement with the German authorities. 
Between Swiecko and Poznan three alternatives (approximately 30 km) for crossing the 
Lagów National Park have been studied. The Poznan bypass is planned on the southern 
side. The stretch between Konin and Warsaw has been fixed. 
The environmental impact assessment has yet to be completed. 
The implementation of cross-border facilities on the German/Polish border (Swiecko) is 
supported by the German Government and the construction of a cargo terminal is 
supported by PHARE. The cargo terminal has a design capacity of 4 000 trucks per day 
and aims at a 30-minute waiting-time for trucks (present average waiting-times: from 
Poland to Germany 5 hours, from Germany to Poland 25 hours). The construction will be 
completed in May 1995. 
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Estimated investment  The construction costs of the section are estimated at ECU 1111 million. The State budget 
commitments will be limited to 15% of total costs, to be used mainly for land acquisition. 
A State guarantee of up to 50% of the total construction costs will be provided. 
It is the intention of the Polish Government to have the A2 motorway built by a private 
concessionaire with the financial participation of the IFIs and the European Union. 
Regulatory framework  A Toll Motorway Act has been submitted to the Parliament. An Agency for Motorway 
Construction and Operation has been created for the implementation of the motorway 
programme. 
Railway projects  The rail line of the corridor Berlin-Moscow (E20: total length 2 050 km) is subdivided 
into the following sections: 
Germany 
Poland 
Belarus 
Russia 
Berlin-Frankfurt-on-Oder (89 km) 
Kunowice-Poznan-Warsaw (478 km) 
Warsaw-Terespol (Belarus border) (211 km) 
Warsaw freight bypass (180 km) 
Brest-Minsk-Russian border (605 km) 
Russian border-Moscow (487 km). 
1. Modernization of the section Warsaw-Terespol 
State of maturity  The section Warsaw-Terespol, together with the Warsaw bypass, is the continuation of 
the already upgraded section Berlin-Frankfurt-on-Oder (Germany) and the section 
Kunowice-Warsaw (Poland), the upgrading of which is scheduled to be completed by 
1997. 
The technical and economic feasibility study for the modernization of the E20 railway 
section Warsaw-Terespol financed by PHARE is under public tender. The study will be 
completed within 13 months. 
The line is currently double-track and electrified. Between Lowicz and Luków, it has two 
parallel lines: the main line through Warsaw and the Warsaw bypass, which is exclusively 
used for freight transport. 
The entire line is included in the AGC and AGTC agreements, but does not yet meet their 
requirements. The maximum speed is 120 km/h on the main line and 100 km/h on the 
bypass. The initial aim is to reach 160 km/h on the main line and 120 km/h on the bypass. 
The necessary modernization is foreseen by the year 2000. In a second stage, plans include 
an upgrading of the line to a high-speed railway link. 
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Improvements on the transfer station Malaszewicze-Terespol are necessary. The average 
waiting-time in 1992 was two hours for passengers, and 30 to 100 hours for freight. A 
feasibility study and technical documentation is in preparation. 
Estimated investment  The IFIs and other potential investors await the completion of the technical and 
economic feasibility study financed by PHARE. The estimated costs for the section 
Warsaw-Terespol are for the main line ECU 433.5 million and for the bypass ECU 398 
million; no specific financing plan has yet been developed. However, the PKP and the 
Polish Government hope to limit their contribution to around 43% of total costs and to 
win external financing for the remainder, as in the case of the section Kunowice-Warsaw. 
The modernization of the connecting section between Kunowice and Warsaw is under 
way with contributions by the EIB (ECU 200 million), the EBRD (ECU 50 million), 
PHARE (ECU 30 million) and Poland (ECU 207 million). PHARE also contributes ECU 
1.5 million to the modernization of the border station Malaszewicze-Terespol. 
Regulatory framework  A new regulatory framework is envisaged for railways in Poland: the Transportation Code 
which provides price and tariff freedom (under State anti-abuse regulation) with respect to 
railway and road carriers; the Railway Industry Law which sets different regulations for 
railway carriers and railway infrastructure operators, in compliance with the relevant 1991 
EC directives; and the PKP Law which defines the new statutes for the PKP as a 
commercial public enterprise. 
2. Modernization of the Brest railway junction 
State of maturity  The multimodal Brest railway junction, located at the Polish/Belarus border, is the most 
important junction of freight traffic on the interface between two different gauges (standard 
1 435 mm and broad 1 520 mm). Significant amounts of traffic to and from Western 
Europe, which normally should take the shortest route Berlin-Warsaw-Belarus, currently 
utilize much longer land and sea routes because of the existing waiting-times at the border. 
This is a major obstacle to the growth and efficiency of the flow of passengers and goods 
along the corridor. Investment is needed in order to achieve better efficiency in the 
operation of the Brest station (reduction of stop-over times, better transhipment service). 
On the basis of a technical and economic feasibility study financed by TACIS, the EBRD 
has developed an investment concept for the Brest railway bottleneck. 
The project concerns technical improvements to reduce waiting-times for rail passengers 
and rail freight (at the moment, frequently three days for freight), in particular through the 
introduction of modern information systems, modern container systems, efficient transfer 
techniques for the change of railway gauge, adequate passenger bogie exchange facilities 
and automatic axle-change sites on both sides of the border. Investments in fixed 
installations and rolling-stock shall be undertaken by the railways concerned, with a 
participation by the private sector and other external contributors. 
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Poland (60%) and Germany (30%) are the most important countries of origin forwarding 
freight through the Brest junction. In passenger traffic, the main user is Poland followed 
by Germany and France. 
Estimated investment  The estimated investment necessary for the full-scale project as devised by the EBRD is 
ECU 90 million. 
Regulatory framework  As far as the investment in fixed installations is concerned, no major obstacles have been 
detected. The investment in and joint operation of rolling stock might require flexibility in 
the application of the regulatory framework for the railways. Amendments might be 
required if a flexible application is not possible. 
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Dresden—Prague (road and rail) 
• Rail project 
Project 
Other corridors identified 
by the I 994 pan-European 
Transport Conference 
Other lines of the 
trans-European 
railway network 
outline plan 
Project description  The Dresden-Prague railway section (180 km) is situated in priority corridor No IV 
identified in Crete, continuing via Budapest and Thessaloniki (maximum length = 
1 640 km). It is potentially a critical bottleneck on the line providing the interconnection 
of the North Sea ports with central and south-eastern Europe, touching Austria and going 
on to Greece and Turkey. This axis is joined by several lateral branches which substantially 
contribute to the importance of the international traffic flows. In addition to that, corridor 
No IV is interconnected with project No 7 (motorway Patras-Bulgarian border) retained 
by the European Council in Corfu. 
Totally new traffic flows appeared on the Dresden-Prague section after the political 
changes in Europe, leading to an extremely high density of international freight and 
passenger traffic. The upgrading of the railway stretch responds also to the need to 
discharge transit roads between Saxony and Bohemia. In this context, the upgrading also 
helps to establish the conditions for the development of an effective combined transport 
system. In addition to the general objectives of increases in capacity, reduction in transport 
times and improvement of quality and safety, the rehabilitation and upgrading of the 
Dresden-Prague section would enable the railway to compete better with road transport 
and mitigate the high environmental burden in the region. 
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Indicative costs, construction period and traffic forecast 
Section 
Germany 
Dresden-Decin 
Czech Republic 
Decin-Prague 
Total 
Length 
(km) 
51 
129 
180 
Cost 
(million ECU) 
7.5 
270 
277.5 
Construction 
period 
up to 2000 
up to 2000 
Traffic growth 
forecast 
1992-2010 
+ 33.3% 
persons/km 
State of maturity  The Bundesverkehrswegeplan 1992 already provides for the upgrading of the 
Dresden-Prague stretch in accordance with the Czech railways. In the Czech railway 
development plans, the corridor is rated as being the first priority. 
The Dresden-Prague stretch and its continuation to Budapest (line E55/E40/E51) is 
classified in the AGC and AGTC international network, but does not yet meet these 
requirements. 
Technical and environmental feasibility studies for different solutions were elaborated. 
Following a cost-benefit analysis, a solution was chosen which combines selected 
rehabilitation measures on the track with the use of tilting trains. The latter will 
significantly increase the speed of passenger transport (reduction of travelling time by 
31 % between Dresden and Prague). 
On a part of the Dresden-Prague link (Dresden-Lovosice), a rolling motorway service 
was opened recently; the governments of the Czech Republic and of the State of Saxony 
contributed decisively to preparing this project. 
The modernization of the Dresden-Prague section has already been started with the 
reconstruction of 17 km for speeds of 160 km/h between Uvaly and Porcany. 
To speed up the process of further modernization, the Czech Government provides a 
guarantee for investments up to ECU 450 million on the line Decin-Breclav. A major part 
of it will be used for the stretch Decin-Prague. 
The Czech legislation for rail transport has already incorporated the relevant EU 
experience. A governmental agreement between the Ministers for Transport of Germany, 
the Czech Republic and Austria is in the final stages of preparation. 
An agreement has been concluded between the German, Czech and Austrian railways 
regarding the increase in commercial speed and reduction of travelling time between 
Berlin, Prague and Vienna. A further agreement concerning the development, use and 
financing of the tilting train between the abovementioned railway administrations is in 
preparation. 
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Estimated investment  The estimated cost for the German section Dresden—Decin (51 km) amounts to ECU 
7.5 million (financing is assured through the State budget) and ECU 270 million on the 
Czech side between Decin and Prague (129 km). 
For the whole stretch of 504 km in the Czech Republic, leading from Decin via Prague to 
Breclav (Slovak border), an amount of ECU 470 million is estimated. The Czech 
Government expects a decision from the EIB by December 1994 on a loan of ECU 
200 million. Discussions are under way for a loan of USD 50 million (approximately ECU 
45 million) from the EBRD. Furthermore, a substantial contribution by the German 
Bundesbahn AG is under consideration. A concept which will allow repayment of this 
contribution through a scheme of user-charges is being developed. 
It should be noted that the Czech Government intends to provide a guarantee which to a 
large extent would cover investments on this section. Under these circumstances, private 
banks have shown much interest in participating in the financing. 
The IRR (internal rate of revenue) of the project on the Czech side is estimated at 28.9%. 
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Road project 
Project 
Other corridors identified 
by the 1994 pan-European 
Transport Conference 
Other roads of the 
trans-European 
road network 
outline plan 
Project description  This motorway forms part of the road corridor (Berlin-)Dresden-Prague-Bratislava-
Budapest-Sofia-Thessaloniki which was identified by the second pan-European Transport 
Conference in Crete in March 1994. It constitutes thus an important link connecting the 
Union with the south-east of Europe and allowing for the interconnection of Greece with 
the other Member States (especially Germany). 
The entire Dresden-Prague motorway has to be newly constructed. It will be 136 km long 
(46 km on German and 90 km on Czech territory). 
After completion of the new motorway, it should be possible to bundle traffic, thus 
reducing traffic on national roads passing through ecologically sensitive mountainous 
areas as well as a large number of cities and villages. By so doing, it will make a 
significant contribution to more environmentally friendly transport. 
Future traffic on the German section has been estimated at 25 000 to 30 000 vehicles per 
day; in the area near Dresden, daily traffic is expected to reach about 80 000 vehicles. 
An important part of the traffic will be directly linked with the development of the Upper 
Elbe Valley binational industrial region, in which great potential for manufacturing 
enterprises and service industries lies. 
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While on the Czech part a few short sections have already been completed (14 km) or are 
under construction, the German authorities are planning to start work in 1996. The 
completion of the motorway is envisaged for the year 2000 (Czech part) and 2002 (German 
part) respectively. 
The total investment has been estimated at ECU 1 070 million, ECU 740 million of which 
for the German part and ECU 330 million for the Czech part. The German part appears to 
be relatively expensive; this may be partly due to the topographical situation; on the other 
hand, however, the Czech part may be subject to noticeable cost increases (adjustment of 
exchange rate). 
State of maturity  Both the Czech and the German parts of the project are included in the national master 
plans. 
Preparatory work for the Czech part is already well advanced (on the basis of a government 
decision made several years ago). While two of the total seven subsections are already 
complete, for the remaining subsections administrative procedures are still to be finalized. 
In one case, for example, ecological problems will have to be solved. Especially with 
regard to the border area, the decision on alignment is pending. 
As regards the German section, the 'Raumordnungsverfahren' (assessment of regional 
impact; responsible authority : Land of Saxony) has been completed; this means that the 
route, to a scale of 1:25 000, has been determined and an environmental impact study has 
been carried out. On this basis, the 'Linienbestimmungsverfahren' (determination of the 
route within a 400-m wide corridor) is now under way; the relevant decision by the 
Federal Government is expected by the end of 1994. 
An agreement between the German and Czech Governments on the alignment in the 
border section is still outstanding. 
The Czech part of the motorway will be traditionally financed. However, revenue 
generated from a permit to be introduced on the entire main road network should facilitate 
the public financing. 
As regards the German part, the introduction of a permit for heavy goods vehicles 
(Euro-Vignette) in 1995 will also generate additional revenue which, however, will nol 
feed a separate fund. The introduction of direct user charges on motorways is at present 
being analysed; no decision has been made by the government as yet. At a later stage, the 
levying of tolls may thus become relevant for the project and the involvement of the 
private sector may be considered. 
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Nuremberg-Prague (road) 
Project 
Other lines of the 
trans-European 
railway network 
outline plan 
Other corridors identified 
by the 1994 pan-European 
Transport Conference 
Project description  The Nuremberg-Prague motorway forms part of the priority corridor IV identified by the 
Crete pan-European Transport Conference in March 1994; this corridor continues via 
Bratislava, Budapest and Sofia towards Thessaloniki/Istanbul. 
The construction of this new four-lane motorway is of national priority for both Germany 
and the Czech Republic. Its total length amounts to 250 km, of which 93 km are in 
Germany. A 36-km-long stretch (Nuremberg-Amberg) on German territory and a 
42-km-long stretch on Czech territory have already been constructed and are now open. 
The completion of the Nuremberg-Prague motorway will be of particular benefit to 
international traffic. Road capacity on this link will be considerably increased in response 
to ever-increasing traffic flows, which have been greatly influenced by the political events 
of the year 1990. Whereas the traffic volume on the border-crossing for 1998 is estimated 
at 17 000 vehicles per day (of which 2 300 heavy goods vehicles), this amount is expected 
to rise to about 35 000 vehicles per day by 2010 (forecast for the Czech section). Lengthy 
waiting times at the present Waidhaus/Rotwadar border-crossing and, with that, journey 
times on the entire link should be considerably reduced. The opening of the new motorway 
should also produce important improvements in road safety. 
Once completed, the new motorway should make a valuable contribution to reducing 
negative environmental effects of road traffic, as it relieves national and regional roads 
passing through local centres and thus reducing noise pollution and emissions. 
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Estimated costs for the construction of the missing sections amount to ECU 925 million 
(ECU 374 million on the German side and ECU 550 million on the Czech side). 
The opening of the completed motorway is foreseen for the year 2000. 
Maturity  The German part of the project is included in the 'Bundesverkehrswegesplan' 1992. 
Administrative procedures are in progress on the 57-km-long section which has still to be 
constructed; the 'Planfeststellungsverfahren' (resulting in the building permission) is 
finalized for some subsections; for the remaining ones, it is in preparation. The major pan 
of the alignment has been fixed. 
Of the 115 km still to be constructed on the Czech side of the border, work on 25.2 km is 
already under way. 
In 1990, the Czech and German Governments signed an agreement regarding the 
establishment of a new common border-crossing point by 1997 at the latest. 
For the time being, both Germany and the Czech Republic envisage traditional budgetary 
financing of their respective parts. After the Czech Government had launched a tendering 
procedure in 1993 aimed at attracting a private concession, it finally decided to go back to 
public financing (main reason: cost increase due to high capital cost). To facilitate the 
financing of the national motorway network, the government now plans to introduce a 
permit system on the entire main road network. 
As from 1995 heavy goods vehicles using the motorways in Germany will be required to 
buy a permit (vignette); revenues obtained in this way will, however, not be channelled 
into a separate fund. The introduction of direct user charges on motorways is at present 
being analysed; no decision has as yet been made by the government. The levying of tolls 
might, therefore, become relevant for the project at a later stage and the integration of the 
private sector might also be considered. 
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Fixed link across the Danube (road and rail) 
between Bulgaria and Romania 
f-> 
Possible location for 
the fixed link 
Corridors identified by the 
1994 pan-European 
Transport Conference 
Danube 
Beograd 
\ Budapest 
f W Drobeta 
/ /Turnu Severin 
Vidin 
•"Calafat 
Rostu 
LòVn 
•1 Craiova 
I Bechet 
jOrjahovo 
1 Sofia 
Project description  The project is located on a corridor which provides an essential link between Greece and 
the rest of the European Union. It covers a critical bottleneck on priority corridor No IV 
identified in Crete, which is interconnected with project No 7 (motorway Patras-Bulgarian 
border), retained by the European Council in Corfu. 
The construction of a new fixed link across the Danube between Romania and Bulgaria 
could also improve traffic flows appreciably between the economic centres of south-eastern 
Europe, Turkey and the Middle East and the EU while at the same time serving regional 
needs. 
The fixed link is part of a wider project which includes the links into the existing main 
road and rail networks on either side of the border. 
State of maturity  A study financed by the PHARE regional programme, which is planned to be finalized by 
15 January 1995, aims at defining the most appropriate place (three sites are still under 
consideration) and type (bridge or tunnel, for road and/or rail) of construction. The study 
will also determine whether the construction of a fixed link is economically viable in 
comparison with improved ferry services. 
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Estimated investment  Total estimated costs for a bridge vary — depending on the location — between USD 340 
and 221 million. Total costs for the bridge, including road and rail links into existing 
networks on both sides, vary between USD 1 333 and 1 244 million. 
The two governments would prefer a BOT (build-operate-transfer) solution for the 
construction of the new bridge, This type of project is particularly suited to mixed 
financing since the direct revenues generated, in the form of tolls by this new infrastructure, 
might be significant. 
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Multimodal corridor 
(Helsinki-)Finnish/Russian border-
St Petersburg-Moscow (rail and road) 
Project 
Corridors identified by the 
1994 pan-European 
Transport Conference 
Saint-Petersburg 
Project description 
State of maturity 
The Finnish/Russian itinerary Helsinki-St Petersburg-Moscow, located on priority 
corridor No IX identified by the Crete Conference, connects Finland and the Nordic 
countries with the St Petersburg and Moscow region, the main growth area of the Russian 
economy. The project is of strategic importance for access to the Russian market via 
Finnish ports, in terms of both imports and exports of goods. It is also of considerable 
interest for passenger transport. Whereas after the economic changes in Eastern Europe 
traffic flows generally decreased, on corridor IX traffic flows increased rapidly. With 
Finland joining the Union in 1995, there is a major interest in the project. 
The Russian part of the corridor includes around 946 km of roads and 834 km of railway 
lines. It has been divided into a number of sections where specific projects of new 
construction, rehabilitation and upgrading of existing road and rail infrastructures are 
already under way or foreseen in the near future. The benefits of these projects will be an 
increase of capacity, a reduction in travelling times and an improvement in reliability and 
safety of transport. Combined transport with the inclusion of sea routes will be facilitated. 
Costs have been estimated only with respect to some specific projects. 
The development of the corridor has been made a priority of both the Russian and Finnish 
Governments. The Finnish Government and the Russian regions concerned by the corridor 
signed an agreement on cooperation in 1992. 
On Finnish territory, the continuation of this corridor via Helsinki to Turku is part of the 
Nordic triangle (one of the Christophersen Group priority projects). 
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Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest-Lvov-Kiev 
(rail and road) 
Project 
Corridors identified by the 
1994 pan-European 
Transport Conference 
Danube 
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Project description  The Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest-Lvov(-Kiev) route, located on the main branch of 
priority Corridor No V, identified by the Crete Conference, is part of the extension of the 
trans-European network. It connects Italy with Slovenia, Hungary and the Ukraine. 
Corridor V is linked to the Crete priority Corridors IX (Plovdiv-Kiev-Helsinki) and III 
(Berlin-Kiev). 
The improvement of the infrastructure and removal of bottlenecks will facilitate 
commercial relations within the regions as well as trade with the European Union. Trieste, 
as the starting point of Corridor V, is the most important port in the North Adriatic; the 
further development of short sea shipping routes and combined transport would substan­
tially increase trading potential in the corridor. Potential distance savings for international 
transport, increase of capacity, reduction in travelling and waiting times, improvements in 
reliability and safety are further benefits to be gained from the specific projects of 
upgrading or new construction of existing road and rail infrastructures. 
The development of the corridor is a priority for all participating countries. 
A transport agreement was concluded between Slovenia and the European Union and a 
memorandum of understanding on the establishment of the Slovenian and Hungarian 
direct railway link was signed by Slovenian and Hungarian ministers of transport. 
The road corridor is part of the trans-European motorways (TEM) up to the Hungarian 
border. Its total length is about 1 900 km. 
Part of the Slovenian corridor is already upgraded to motorway standards. A further 
upgrading of the network to a four-lane motorway with a designed speed of 100/120 km 
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and the construction of a direct link between Slovenia and Hungary, which is the main 
component of the development of the road corridor, is foreseen. 
As far as Hungary is concerned, the planned motorways M3 (25% already in operation) 
and M7 (40% already existent) are on the corridor and are to be considered as Hungarian 
infrastructure priorities. The Budapest ring motorway, connecting the M3 and M7, is 
under construction. 
The location of the border-crossing point to Ukraine has been determined. On the 
Ukrainian side, a severe upgrading of the existing road system is necessary. 
State of maturity  Financial studies and a preliminary routing of the corridor on Slovenian and Hungarian 
territories up to the Ukrainian border are under way. Feasibility studies regarding the 
layout were financed by the EBRD and are included in the Slovenian and Hungarian road 
plans. 
For the M3 and M7 projects in Hungary, a competitive bidding concession is under way. 
A general study for the Hungarian border-Kiev link (770 km) has been finalized. Work 
on the corridor should be completed by the year 2008. 
Investment costs  The estimated cost for the whole motorway project amounts to ECU 3 491 million. 
The estimated total cost on Slovenian territory is ECU 99.2 million. Loans from the EBRD 
and the EIB for an amount of ECU 48.5 million for the improvement of the main east-
west road network in Slovenia have been signed. 
As regards the total estimated costs on the Hungarian territory, the M3 motorway 
programme amounts to ECU 1 051 million and the M7 programme to ECU 840 million. 
Regarding the Ukrainian part, from the Hungarian border up to Kiev, the expected costs 
are about ECU 1 500 million. 
The rail corridor is part of the TER network. Its total length is about 1 800 km. 
The major part between Trieste and the Ukrainian border is included in the AGC and 
ACCT network but does not meet their requirements. The creation of suitable conditions 
for the development of combined transport will be a priority. 
The construction of a link missing between Slovenia and Hungary constitutes the major 
component of the development of the rail corridor. The approximate length of this missing 
link is 42 km. 
Existing rail infrastructures on the Slovenian territory are rehabilitated and partially 
upgraded with support of the Community under the financial protocol to the Transport 
Agreement between the Community and Slovenia and with a loan from the EBRD. These 
works should allow speeds of 160 km/h. 
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State of maturity 
Estimated investment 
A general upgrading programme on the Hungarian territory includes the railway lines 
located on the corridor. The upgrading and reconstruction works planned should allow 
speeds of 140-160 km/h. 
The Ukrainian section needs modernization and reconstruction in order to allow speeds of 
120 km/h and the introduction of inter-modal facilities. 
On Italian territory, a high-speed train is planned in three phases leading from Turin to 
Trieste. This project will constitute an appropriate continuation on Corridor V. 
Work on Slovenian territory is under way. As regards the Hungarian upgrading works, a 
preliminary feasibility study has been completed but the starting date cannot be estimated 
at this stage. 
As regards the missing link, the transport ministers of Slovenia and Hungary signed a 
memorandum of understanding in December 1993. Building this section is one of the 
priorities in the infrastructure planning of both countries. 
A financial feasibility study is to be carried out on the Ukrainian section. TACIS could 
possibly be involved in its financing. 
Work on the corridor should be completed by 2007. 
The estimated total costs for the railway projects are estimated at ECU 4 500 million. 
Concerning the missing link between Slovenia and Hungary, the estimated construction 
costs amount to ECU 74 million on Slovenian territory and ECU 89 million on Hungarian 
territory. 
The EIB supports the modernization of Slovenian Railways with a loan of ECU 60 million 
and the EBRD with a loan of ECU 50.5 million. 
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Baltic Sea telematic platform 
Project description  A Finnish proposal on a Finnish/German/Russian pilot project entitled 'Telematics in 
foreign trade delivery management in the Baltic Sea area' has been made to the Group. 
This pilot project aims at improving logistic systems on the Baltic seaboard and adjacent 
areas. The introduction of these systems will improve the competitiveness of companies 
operating in the area and allow for a more effective use of multimodal transport chains 
between riparian Baltic States and between these States and the European Union, in 
particular after the accession of Finland to the Union. 
The TEDIM programme was prepared by Finnish, German and western Russian private 
companies and supported by their respective governments. It contains 13 subprojects that 
can be summarized in three main components that will ensure a balanced development of 
the transport land/sea corridor: 
(i) development of network-based logistic information systems; 
(ii) telematics cooperation between customs authorities and railway companies; 
(iii) modernization and upgrading of cargo handling and data-communication facilities. 
The networked systems that will be developed in the framework of this programme will 
increase the cohesion of participating countries by introducing common business practices 
and technical and other standards. It should be noted that, whenever possible, the technical 
solutions chosen will be based on existing or developing Union standards so as to ensure 
the interoperability of the logistic systems with other systems developed in European 
waters. 
The project will be kept open to all riparian Baltic States. 
State of maturity  The TEDIM programme is based on an ongoing Finnish/Russian project. The various 
work packages of the programme are expected to be completed between 1995 and 1998. 
Investment costs  A preliminary evaluation of the estimated cost for the entire programme is ECU 80 
million. The investment costs will, to a large extent, be borne by the participating private 
firms. Specific breakdowns are not available. 
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Priority projects 
Other projects 
Existing networks 
Energy project descriptions 
List A: Priority energy network projects 
a4: Electrical interconnection between 
Italy and Greece 
Project description  The purpose of this project is the connection of the Greek network (at present isolated) to 
that of Italy and to the interconnected European network (the UCPTE network), improving 
the system reliability and security of supply. This will also contribute to the implementation 
of the internal market, allowing electricity exchanges, giving access to new supply sources 
and creating the physical conditions for increased competition in the electricity markets. 
The project consists of the following elements: 
(i) submarine cable: 160 km long, from Porto Badisco (Italy-Puglia) to Aetos 
(Greece-Ipiros), 500 MW/400 kV, one of the deepest cables in the world ( 1 000 m 
deep near Corfu); 
(ii) overhead lines: to Galatina in Italy (45 km) and to Arachthos in Greece (190 km); 
(iii) conversion stations: DC/AC at Galatina and Arachthos. 
The total cost is approximately ECU 300 million (75% for Italy and 25% for Greece). 
The financial viability is limited because of the high construction costs. However, there is 
potential long-term economic viability if other elements, in many cases very difficult to 
quantify, are taken into consideration, such as: 
(i) possible electricity exchanges through Greece between Italy and the other Balkan 
countries and Turkey; 
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State of maturity 
(ii) direct and indirect economic benefits in Greece and southern Italy; 
(iii) political aspects of the project; 
(iv) security of supply in southern Italy. 
Environmental impact assessments (EIAs) have been carried out in Italy and partly in 
Greece (for a conversion station and a part of the route). In Italy, the routing had to be 
modified; approval from the Ministry of the Environment is pending. In Greece, no major 
problems are anticipated; small changes in the DC layout (110 km from the coast) have 
been required and the EIA for this part was submitted in November 1994. 
Given the configuration of the seabed, there is a need for a trial laying of the cable. A 
prototype of the cable is being manufactured. The construction permits will be issued in 
both countries as soon as the environmental impact assessments are approved. The final 
ordering of the cable is subject to the successful completion of the authorization 
procedures. 
Commissioning is foreseen by the end of 1997. 
The financing of the project is not yet finalized. Aid of ECU 35 million has been granted 
by the Community initiative REGEN I (ERDF 1989-93). Further aid from Interreg — 
REGEN II (ERDF 1994-99) is foreseen. The EIB has been contacted for a loan by the two 
operators. 
Some progress has been made during the Christophersen Group exercise. The contract for 
the manufacture of the cable has been signed, manufacture of a prototype cable (several 
kilometres in length) to carry out laying tests in situ has advanced and an agreement on 
the use of the interconnection has been reached between the two companies concerned 
(ENEL and PPC). 
The remaining problems are: 
(i) the low financial profitability and thus the need to take into consideration long-term 
elements; 
(ii) the authorization procedures which have to be completed in Italy and Greece; 
(iii) the financing of the project, which has to be finalized. 
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bo: Electrical interconnections between 
France and Italy 
Priority projects 
Other projects 
Existing networks 
Grande-He 
Project description 
State of maturity 
The purpose of the project is to increase the capacity of the interconnection between 
France and Italy while improving security of supply. The interconnection capacity will be 
doubled. This will contribute to the implementation of the internal market, allowing 
increased electricity exchanges and transit, and improving the physical conditions for 
increased competition in the electricity markets. 
The project involves the construction of 151-km-long (95 km in France and 56 km in 
Italy) overhead lines (400 kV/2 χ 2 000 MVA). 
The total cost is approximately ECU 170 million (ECU 110 million for France and ECU 
60 million for Italy). 
The profitability is excellent because of the optimization of production capacities and the 
supply of electricity for a potential new industrial zone near Turin. 
Environmental impact assessments (EIAs) have been carried out in both countries. In 
France, the EIA has been completed and accepted. In Italy, the routing will have to be 
revised by the company concerned (ENEL). 
In France, the Déclaration d'utilité publique (Declaration of Public Utility) was confirmed 
in 1992. Construction has not yet commenced, pending authorization from the Préfet de 
région. In Italy, a new route will be proposed by ENEL. 
Commissioning is foreseen for 1998. 
The project will be entirely financed by the companies concerned (EDF and ENEL). 
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bl: Electrical interconnection between 
France and Spain 
Priority projects 
Other projects 
Existing networks 
Aragon 
Project description 
State of maturity 
The purpose of the project is to increase the electricity exchange capacity between the 
electrical systems of the Iberian peninsula and those of France and the rest of Europe. This 
will contribute to security of supply as well as the internal market and cohesion objectives. 
The project consists of 242-km-long (55 km in France and 187 km in Spain) overhead 
lines (400 kV/2 x 1 600 MVA). 
The total cost is approximately ECU 115 million (ECU 60 million in France and ECU 55 
million in Spain). 
The economic viability of the project is good and there are no problems concerning 
financing. 
In France, the Déclaration d'utilité publique and the construction permits were confirmed 
in 1994. Construction has not yet started. 
In Spain, most of the work is already completed. Remaining work will progress in parallel 
with the work in France. 
A construction period of three years will be required. 
The project will be entirely financed by the companies concerned (EDF and REE). 
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b 10: Spain-Portugal: Electricity interconnections 
(including an internal connecting line 
within Portugal) 
Project description  The project will significantly increase the capacity of interconnection between Spain and 
Portugal; it will contribute to the implementation of the internal market allowing increased 
electricity exchanges between Spain and Portugal and, in the longer term, transit of French 
electricity to Portugal; it will improve the physical conditions for increased competition in 
the electricity markets. The project will also improve security of supply: the enhanced 
interchange capacity will make it possible to benefit from the complementarities, in terms 
of security of supply, of the Spanish and Portuguese electrical systems. 
The electricity interconnections between Spain and Portugal comprise the following three 
complementary projects: 
(i) northern interconnection: Mesón (E)-Cartelle (E)-Lindoso (P)-Recarei (P) 
This project is composed of the following three sections: 
• Mesón (E)-Cartelle (E)-Lindoso (P): the interconnection line between the two 
countries; 
• Lindoso (P)-Riba d'Ave (P)-Recarei (P): the construction of a second line to 
reinforce the capacity over this section; 
• Cartelle (E)-Trives (E): the construction of this new line will complete the 
transmission infrastructure in Galicia and improve the security and reliability of 
the northern interconnection; 
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(ii) north-eastern interconnection: Recarei (P)-Douro International (P)-Aldeadávila (E). 
This project concerns the reinforcement of a line in Portugal and the construction of 
a few kilometres of new lines in Spain; 
(iii) central connection: Rio Maior (P)-Pego (P). This project concerns the reinforcement 
of this line within Portugal. 
These three projects should be seen as the achievement of an overall highly coherent 
interconnection strategy between the two countries. The guaranteed capacity of intercon-
nection between Spain and Portugal will grow from 300 MW to 1 800 MW (35% of the 
peak load in Portugal). 
The total cost of these three projects amounts to approximately ECU 110 million. 
The economic viability is good. The project will reduce production costs and losses and 
will allow the best use of the available production capacities (hydroelectric versus thermal) 
of the Spanish and Portuguese power systems. 
Environmental impact assessments (EIAs) were carried out for the northern intercon-
nection. In Portugal, principles of a solution have been found for the layout in a national 
park. In Spain, an EIA is not necessary for the remaining 10 km of the interconnection 
near the Portuguese border. 
For the north-eastern interconnection and the central connection, no major problems are 
anticipated. 
State of maturity  The northern link is under construction: 
(i) for the Mesón (E)-Cartelle (E)-Lindoso (P) line, 10 km remain to be constructed in 
Spain, near the Portuguese border, due to the modification of the original route. 
Completion of this work is expected by June 1995; 
(ii) completion of the second line, namely Lindoso (P)-Riba d'Ave (Ρ), is expected by 
May 1996, the section Riba d'Ave-Recarei being already completed; 
(iii) completion of the new line Cartelle (E)-Trives (E) is expected by the end of 1996. 
The completion of the central connection is expected by 1997 and the north-eastern 
interconnection by 1999. 
The projects will be financed by the companies from own resources and through loans. 
The EIB has approved an ECU 57 million loan to the Spanish operator for the northern 
interconnection. 
The remaining problems are: 
(i) for the northern interconnection, the obtaining of construction permits for the 
remaining (approximately 10 km) section of the line in Spain (waiting for a 
Declaration of Public Utility to be signed) and Portugal (waiting for the approval of 
modifications to the layout); 
(ii) for the north-eastern interconnection and the central connection, progress on the 
authorization procedures. 
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c2: Electrical interconnection between 
the eastern and western parts of Denmark 
-7Δ. 
Project description  The purpose of this project is the connection of the eastern and western networks in 
Denmark, at present separate. The continental part (western part) is synchronously 
connected to UCPTE, while the island part (eastern part) is synchronously connected to 
Nordel. The project will thus enable exchanges of electricity between east and west 
Denmark and between UCPTE and Nordel operators in general. The project consists of a 
DC link composed of 30 km of 400 kV submarine cable and 40 km of underground cable 
and conversion stations. The cable will enable electricity exchanges of up to 500 to 600 
MW within Denmark. 
The estimated total direct cost for the project is between ECU 135 and 200 million, to be 
shared between the two utilities operating respectively in east and west Denmark. 
The short-term financial profitability is uncertain but is under study and the use of the 
interconnection is being negotiated. There is potential long-term economic viability in 
view of the strategic aspects, and if wider exchanges are taken into consideration. It would 
marginally facilitate overall transfers of hydroelectricity from Scandinavian countries to 
northern Germany. As with all the other existing or foreseen links between the Nordel and 
the UCPTE networks, the project will contribute towards realizing the role of 'pumping 
storage capacity' that could be played in the future by these Nordic countries for the rest 
of northern Europe. 
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State of maturity  Technical specifications of the project will be published shortly. 
Commissioning is expected by early 1998. 
The remaining problems are: 
(i) the cost of investment may be recovered by the companies responsible for the project 
through tariff increases, under the Danish Electricity Act. However, the financial 
profitability of the project is uncertain; 
(ii) negotiations on use and financing of the interconnection have to be completed. 
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eó: Introduction of natural gas in Greece 
Priority projects 
Other projects 
Existing networks 
Project description  The purpose of the project is to give Greece access to a new source of energy. 
The project is of strategic importance for Greece; it will foster regional development, 
enhance the diversification of primary energy supply away from oil, make a major 
contribution to the improvement of the environment via the reduction of pollution, 
particularly in urban areas, and introduce new degrees of freedom in electricity generation. 
The project will make an important contribution to cohesion and security of energy supply 
objectives and will improve the competitiveness of economic activities established in 
Greece. 
The supply of natural gas will come to Greece from Russia by pipeline and by LNG from 
Algeria. The project involves the construction of a gas pipeline (510 km) from the border 
with Bulgaria to the Athens area, several branches to the main consumer centres, and an 
LNG terminal at Revithoussa (an island facing the coast west of Athens). 
The total cost (apart from the distribution networks) is estimated between ECU 1 300 and 
1 500 million. 
Although the financial profitability is low, the project has an acceptable economic viability 
because of the benefits derived from supply diversification, reduction of pollution and 
other strategic advantages. 
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Environmental studies have already been undertaken, demonstrating the substantial 
benefits to be expected with virtually no adverse impacts. The completed project will bring 
about a decisive improvement in environmental conditions in the Athens, Thessaloniki and 
other urban areas. 
State of maturity  Internal discussions, followed by the setting-up of a project group, started in 1982. A 
special body for the realization of the project was established in 1987 (DEPA). The 
construction of the main pipeline commenced in 1991, and 495 km of the total length of 
511 km have been welded so far. 
The complete project (main pipeline, high-pressure branches, LNG terminal) is scheduled 
for completion in 1998. 
Total expenditure in the years 1990 to 1994 amounted to ECU 400 million, financed by 
ECU 149 million of Community aid, a USD 10 million loan from the EIB and a USD 100 
million loan from the ECSC Guarantee Fund. 
For the 1994-99 period, total expenditure might reach ECU 2 000 to 2 200 million 
(including public distribution networks). The sources of funds foreseen for the period 
1994-99 will be: 
(i) the ERDF aid already decided under the new CSF for Greece and that foreseen under 
the Interreg-REGEN II Community initiative; 
(ii) ECSC loan (the remainder); 
(iii) bank loan(s) (the EIB has been contacted); 
(iv) government (as a shareholder); 
(v) private partners (as shareholders in the distribution companies). 
Considerable progress has been made during the Christophersen Group exercise, namely: 
(i) completion of the construction of the main gas pipeline; 
(ii) setting-up of a more efficient project management structure; 
(iii) signing of the contract for the sale of gas to the electricity undertaking, which will be 
the biggest customer; 
(iv) ERDF aid provided for in the new Community support framework for Greece and in 
the Interreg II initiative; 
(v) negotiation of an agreement in principle with Russia to postpone the first gas supplies 
to 1997; 
(vi) drafting of the bill concerning the urban distribution system. 
The remaining problems concerning basically financial profitability, financing and 
construction delays are as follows: 
(i) to make the agreement with Russia official; 
(ii) to have the distribution bill adopted by the Greek Parliament; 
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(iii) to speed up the completion of the high-pressure branches and prepare for the 
penetration of gas into the industrial market; 
(iv) to speed up the completion of the urban distribution networks, this being the sector in 
which the introduction of gas will have its greatest economic value; 
(v) to speed up construction of the LNG terminal (Algerian contract); 
(vi) to tie up the financing. 
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e5: Introduction of natural gas in Portugal 
Priority projects 
Other projects 
Existing networks 
Project description  The purpose of the project is to give Portugal access to a new source of energy. Portugal 
has traditionally been heavily dependent on imported oil and coal for its energy needs, the 
current level of that dependency being around 90%. Given the desirability of diversifying 
energy supply, thus enhancing supply security, and under increasing environmental 
pressures, the government has sought to introduce gas to the energy economy of 
the country. The government has formed a Portuguese consortium named Transgás. 
Shareholders of Transgás are: Gás de Portugal (34%), Electricidade de Portugal (EDP) 
(29%), Caixa Gérai de Depósitos (29%), the Portuguese State (5%) and Portgás, 
Lusitaniagás and Setgás with 1% each, the first three being State-owned companies. 
Another consortium, Turbogás, has been set up to build and operate a new combined-cycle 
gas turbine which will consume the bulk of the gas. The project as a whole is the biggest 
civil project ever undertaken in Portugal. The proportion of the country to benefit from the 
gas supply will be considerable: 80% of the population and 85% of industry are ultimately 
expected to have access. During the building phase, 4 000 new jobs will be created, while 
in the longer term it is expected that lower energy costs will improve industrial 
competitiveness, thus boosting market share and jobs. 
The project involves the construction of the Sétubal-Braga pipeline to supply natural gas 
to Portugal. Natural gas will be taken from the Maghreb-Europe line and transported by 
means of an interconnecting pipeline (see Project f6) running through Spain and which 
will connect with the Sétubal-Braga pipeline. 
The total cost of the project ( 1993-97) amounts to ECU 440 million. 
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The economic viability is acceptable; this has been confirmed by the EIB evaluation of 
the project. Financial profitability is acceptable if there is public aid (results of the 
preliminary feasibility study: 11 % ROR with 40% of public aid). 
The project is expected to make a major contribution to the reduction of pollution, with a 
reduction of 20 to 30% in C02 emissions expected for the year 2000, notably in Lisbon 
and other urban areas. Specifically, COi emissions will be reduced by 2.5 mt/year, and 
S02 by 50 kt/year. The project has been the subject of public consultations, following 
which the corresponding competent authorities have given their approval. 
State of maturity  About 80% of the construction contracts have been committed to date. Construction work 
started in July 1994. 
The financing arrangements have been designed as follows: 
(i) the concession agreement established that, at the end of each year, 25% of the assets 
of Transgás should be financed from shareholders' funds; 
(ii) as far as the main pipeline (Sétubal-Braga) is concerned, the European Regional 
Fund committed ECU 82 million in 1993 under the Community initiative REGEN I. 
It is foreseen that the project will also receive a further Regional Fund subsidy 
under the Community support framework for Portugal for the period 1994-99, or 
alternatively obtain Interreg II funds, to cover 40% of the investments; 
(iii) Transgás has obtained an ECU 354 million loan from the EIB for the project, as well 
as for the Portuguese section of the interconnecting pipeline (Leiria-Spanish border). 
Transgás has also requested an additional PTS 20 000 million loan from the ECSC. 
The project has considerably advanced during the Christophersen Group exercise, namely: 
(i) economic viability has proved to be acceptable; 
(ii) financing of the project has been finalized; 
(iii) signing of the contracts for the construction of the project has made good progress; 
(iv) construction of the main gas pipeline (Sétubal-Braga) has started. 
The remaining problems are: 
(i) to conclude the contracts with the electricity sector (main gas user); 
(ii) to prepare the penetration of gas into other sectors. 
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fa: Spain-Portugal natural gas interconnections 
(including introduction of natural gas into 
Galicia and Extremadura) 
Priority projects 
Other projects 
Existing networks 
Project description  The purpose of the project is the interconnection of the natural gas networks of Portugal 
and Spain and the extension of the natural gas networks to new regions. The southern 
interconnection will bring gas to Portugal and at the same time will provide gas to the 
Extremadura region of Spain. The northern interconnection will connect with the existing 
Spanish network (already connected to the French system) providing security to the 
Iberian system and, at the same time, will bring gas to the north-western part of Spain. 
The realization of this project is connected to the introduction of natural gas in Portugal. 
As in the case of Portugal, the arrival of natural gas in Galicia and Extremadura will 
benefit the economic activity established in these regions. 
The project will interconnect the natural gas networks of Portugal and Spain by means of 
two high-pressure pipelines, located as follows: 
(i) southern interconnection: from Cordoba (Andalusia) to Leiria (central Portugal) 
The Cordoba-Leiria line will form a branch of the Maghreb-Europe pipeline, enabling 
Algerian gas arriving at Cordoba from Tarifa to be transported on to Leiria in Portugal 
and to be delivered to the Sétubal-Braga line. 
The Cordoba-Leiria line will be devoted almost exclusively to transit purposes. Only 
5 to 10% of the gas will be used for sale to Spanish customers in the Extremadura 
region; 
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(ii) northern interconnection: from Braga (northern Portugal) to Tuy (Galicia) and to 
Oviedo 
The Tuy-Braga gas pipeline will connect with the Sétubal-Braga line at Braga, thus 
linking the Portuguese and Spanish networks via the Galician extension. 
This Galician extension includes: 
• an LNG terminal at El Ferrol, able to receive vessels with a capacity of up to 
130 000 m
3, two LNG tanks with a capacity of 100 000 m
3, and a regasification 
capacity of 500 000 m-Vh; 
• 450 km of 20/26 inches 72-bar pressure pipelines with capacities ranging from 
225 000 m-Vh to 500 000 m-Vh. 
The total cost of the project is about ECU 800 million (ECU 337 million for the southern 
interconnection and ECU 461 million for the northern). 
The economic viability of both interconnections is acceptable. The financial profitability 
for the southern interconnection is acceptable given the public aid from the ERDF. This 
has been confirmed by the EIB evaluation. For the northern interconnection, the subproject 
Oviedo-Tuy appears to have a limited financial profitability. 
State of maturity  Expenditure up to the end of 1993 amounted to ECU 7 million for the southern 
interconnection and to ECU 37 million for the northern interconnection. 
The project is scheduled for completion in 1996, for the southern interconnection, and in 
1997, for the northern interconnection. 
The project is in Objective 1 regions as defined for the purpose of assessing eligibility for 
European Regional Fund support. Portugal and Spain have included this project in their 
regional development plans (1994-99) submitted to the Commission with the intention of 
obtaining such support (through the Community support framework or Interreg II scheme). 
The Portuguese and Spanish CSFs (1994-99) have been approved by the Commission. 
Regional Fund support to the southern and northern interconnecting pipelines is foreseen 
under the Interreg II initiative. 
For the southern interconnection, the EIB has agreed a loan for the construction of the 
Portuguese section. For the Spanish section an agreement on the shares of Transgás and 
Enagás in the operating company has recently been reached (49 and 51% respectively). 
During the Christophersen Group exercise, a firm decision to make the gas interconnection 
through the south was taken. In particular, for the section within Portugal, financing of the 
project has been finalized (as in the case of Project e5) and about 40% of the contracts for 
the construction have been signed. 
The main remaining problems are: 
(i) for the northern interconnection, the low financial profitability: 
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(ii) for the southern interconnection, on the Spanish side, the delay in tying up the 
financing due to negotiations concerning the operator; 
(iii) the finalizing of ERDF aid decisions; 
(iv) the need to optimize the development of the gas infrastructure throughout the 
geographic entity constituted by Portugal and the contiguous regions of Spain, while 
taking account of the storage capacity requirements and of concern regarding 
diversification of the gas supply. 
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Priority projects 
Other projects 
Existing networks 
h4: Natural gas pipeline Algeria-Morocco-
European Union 
• section from Tangier to Tarifa and 
• section from Tarifa to Cordoba 
Project description  This project gives access by pipeline to the Algerian gas reserves, facilitates the planned 
doubling of present gas consumption in Spain, and enables the transit of gas for the 
Portuguese market. In a later phase, this project could be extended (from Cordoba to 
Fos/Toulouse) to provide an alternative route for Algerian gas to the rest of Europe. This 
project will increase diversification of overall energy supply, and thus supply security. It 
will also help to foster cooperation and stability in the Maghreb countries, which is in the 
interest of the European Union. 
The arrival of the Maghreb line in Europe is of long-term significance for European gas 
supply, providing as it does a major new input to the European gas system. It has been 
designed with a capacity that is intended to be sufficient to supply other European 
countries in addition to Portugal and Spain. 
The project covers the Gibraltar crossing (from Tangier in Morocco to Tarifa in Spain) 
and the Iberian section (from Tarifa to Cordoba, also in Spain) of the Maghreb-Europe 
high-pressure gas pipeline. 
The line is sized to provide for a net export capacity of 18 500 million m-Vyear. The used 
capacity in this first phase will be 8 500 million m-Vyear for the supply of all the 
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Portuguese market and part of the Spanish market. The remaining 10 000 million mVyear 
will be available for future new markets. 
The cost of the line from Tangier to Cordoba is estimated at ECU 446 million 
(Tangier-Tarifa, ECU 198 million, and Tarifa-Cordoba, ECU 248 million). 
The appraisal of the overall project (including the pipelines to be constructed in Algeria 
and Morocco) resulted in acceptable economic ROR. The assessment done by the EIB 
confirmed the economic viability of the overall project. 
From the environmental point of view, there are substantial benefits with virtually no 
adverse impacts. The project is expected to bring about a reduction in emissions of 7.9 
mt/year in C02 and 170 kt/year in S02 throughout Spain. 
State of maturity  The construction of the Spanish land section has recently been awarded to two construction 
groups. The construction of the underwater section across the Straits of Gibraltar has 
recently started. 
Construction of a 530 km section from southern Algeria to the border with Morocco began 
on 30 June 1994. 
The contract for the construction of the 545 km section across Morocco has been awarded. 
The EIB has authorized a loan of USD 530 million to EMPL (100% Enagás affiliate) to 
finance the 40% of Enagás' participation in the cost of the Moroccan and Tangier-Tarifa 
sections of the pipeline. The Banco Central of Spain has also agreed to a USD 92 million 
loan for this section. 
The Tarifa-Cordoba line has been included by the Spanish Government as an Objective 1 
region project in its 1994-99 regional development programme, which has been submitted 
to the European Regional Fund as part of its application for assistance. The amount of 
Regional Fund aid to be given to this project is not yet known. 
For the Tarifa-Cordoba line, an agreement on the shares of Transgás and Enagás in the 
operating company (30 and 70% respectively) has recently been reached. 
During the Christophersen Group exercise, the financing of the project has been finalized 
for the sections in Algeria and Morocco, including the Gibraltar crossing (operators' own 
funds and EIB loans), and the construction of the gas pipeline in Algeria commenced. 
The remaining problem for the section in Spain (Gibraltar-Cordoba) is the delay in 
finalizing the financing due to the negotiations concerning the operator. 
237 Annex Β 
Energy project descriptions 
hi: Natural gas pipeline 
Russia-Belarus-Poland-European Union 
Priority projects 
Other projects 
Existing networks 
Project description  The purpose of the project is to enhance the supply and security-of-supply situation of the 
European Union by establishing an alternative route (via Poland) to the already existing 
route (via Ukraine, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) for Russian gas. The project is of 
importance for the traditional customers of Russian gas in the Community (Germany, Italy 
and France). 
The project involves the construction of a new interconnection pipeline linking the gas 
networks of eastern Germany, Poland and Belarus. In Belarus, this new interconnecting 
pipeline will be connected to the existing pipeline system coming from Siberia. The 
project would consist of about 200 km of pipeline in Belarus, about 700 km of pipeline in 
Poland and a system of lines in eastern Germany for the transmission of the gas within the 
European Union (several thousand million m-Vyear). 
The project could be implemented in two stages: 
(i) in a first stage, the interconnecting pipeline will link eastern Germany and western 
Poland and could transmit, in an initial period, around 700 million m-Vyear. This 
section would be commissioned by end 1995/beginning 1996; 
ι 
(ii) in a second stage, the interconnecting pipeline will link western Poland to Belarus, 
raising the capacity of the line to around 5 000 million m-Vyear. This section would be 
commissioned in 1997-98. 
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It is worth noting that, in a final phase, Russia plans to produce natural gas on the Yamal 
peninsula in north-west Siberia: 150 to 200 000 million m-Vyear of which 50 000 million 
m
3 could be supplied at the German border (Frankfurt-on-Oder). For the transport, a new 
multipipeline system of 2 900 km in Russia, 600 km in Belarus and 700 km in Poland will 
be needed. The final phase is scheduled to be completed around the year 2010. This final 
phase is to be considered as a separate project from the present one. 
The cost of investments needed in Germany is estimated at ECU 830 million. 
The project shows a potential economic viability that needs to be demonstrated. 
From the environmental point of view, huge benefits can be expected during the operation 
phase. 
State of maturity  The two stages of the project could be realized within the next three to four years. The 
contractual basis between Russia, Belarus and Poland for the construction has been 
laid down and the discussions with regard to the marketing of the gas arriving at 
Frankfurt-on-Oder are ongoing. 
A clear definition of the project and of the ownership-financing implications is still to be 
disclosed. 
The receiving system in eastern Germany may be eligible for aid from EU Structural 
Funds (ERDF). The sections in Poland and Belarus may be eligible for aid respectively 
from the PHARE and TACIS programmes. Both the EBRD and the EIB have manifested 
their interest in considering short- to medium-term investment in energy transmission lines 
in Central and Eastern Europe. 
During the Christophersen Group exercise, the definition of the project has progressed. 
There is, however, insufficient published information about the first stage, although it 
seems to be nearing completion. 
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List Β: Other energy network projects 
d6: Electrical interconnection between Austria and Italy 
The purpose of the project is to increase the electricity exchange capacity between the 
electrical systems of Austria and Italy and to enable full use to be made of the extensive 
hydroelectricity resources of these two countries. In addition, it will allow the transit, 
through Austria to Italy, of electricity produced in Bavaria, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia and vice versa. 
The present exchange capacity between Austria and Italy is very low (approximately 200 
MW), when compared with the size of both systems, and is fully used. 
The project consists of 185-km-long (152 km in Italy and 33 km in Austria) overhead 
lines (400 kV/l 500 MVA) linking Linz in Austria to Sandrigo in Italy (approximately 60 
km north-west of Venice), and would be in operation in 1998. 
d3/dll: Electrical interconnections between Norway and the Continent 
This project has great significance for the economy and security of supply in the north-west 
of the European continent. The purpose of the project is to increase the electricity exchange 
capacity between the electrical systems of Norway (member of the Nordel network) and 
Germany and the Netherlands (and the rest of the UCPTE network). The project will 
enable increased use to be made of the large hydroelectricity-generation resource and 
capacity existing in Norway in order to supply the German and Dutch markets. During the 
night the Netherlands would supply electricity to Norway. 
In the present configuration of the networks, electricity can be exchanged between Norway 
and Germany, transiting through the Danish and/or the Swedish grids. 
The project consists of two submarine HVDC cables to be laid down from the 
south-western coast of Norway (Lista) respectively to Germany (to be interconnected to 
the Preussen Elektra grid) and to the Netherlands (to be interconnected to the SEP grid). 
The transmission capacity of each of these new cables will be in the range of 600 to 800 
MW. The project also includes the reinforcement of the internal electricity transmission 
grid in Norway, by new overhead lines and the reinforcement of existing lines, needed to 
serve these new submarine cables. 
n2: Baltic ring electrical interconnections 
The purpose of the project is to establish electrical interconnections between the networks 
of Germany, Poland, the Baltic countries and Finland and, where needed, to reinforce 
them. Given the fact that the electrical networks of Finland, Sweden, Denmark and 
Germany are already interconnected, the implementation of the project will constitute an 
electrical ring around the Baltic. 
The project includes: 
(i) an AC/DC/AC (back-to-back) conversion station near the Polish/Lithuanian border 
and a connecting line to the Polish grid; 
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(ii) the strengthening of high-voltage lines in Poland and the Baltic countries; 
(iii) the strengthening of the interconnection between Finland and Estonia, either through 
the St Petersburg area or through a new submarine cable; 
(iv) the laying of new submarine cables across the Baltic (possibly between Sweden and 
Finland and/or Sweden and Poland). 
It is worth noting that the 'East-West high voltage DC interconnection' project 
(Borken-Berlin-Warsaw-Minsk-Smolensk) is to be considered as a separate project from 
the Baltic ring project, because of its technical characteristics (long-distance transmission 
and large capacity, in the order of 4 000 to 5 000 MW) which introduce a new concept 
into the transmission of electricity. 
241 IX — Conclusions of the Essen European Council 
(on the subject of trans-European networks) 
Trans-European networks in the transport, 
energy and environment spheres 
The European Council welcomes submission of the report 
from the Group of Personal Representatives. It confirms 
that the 11 projects decided in Corfu and the three new 
projects concerning the Nordic Member States and Ireland 
have already been started or can be started shortly. The 
list of priority transport and energy projects is set out in 
Annex I. For the rest, the European Council endorses the 
most important recommendations of the report of the 
Christophersen Group (see Annex II). 
It welcomes the progress that has been made in selecting 
major transborder projects, particularly with the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe (CCEE) and the Mediter-
ranean basin. The European Council stresses the import-
ance of traffic management systems, particularly in the 
case of air traffic. 
The European Council welcomes the creation of a special 
window at the European Investment Bank for the finan-
cing of trans-European networks, as indicated in Annex III 
to these conclusions. The Member States, the Commission 
and the European Investment Bank will continue to 
monitor progress made in financing priority projects. It 
shares the Group's view that the financing requirements 
for each project must be examined individually. 
The European Council is pleased that a start is to be made 
on priority transport infrastructure projects, particularly 
rail projects, as from 1995. 
The European Council calls upon the Ecofin Council to 
adopt the necessary decisions, acting on proposals from 
the Commission, to top up the funds cunently available 
for the trans-European networks. 
The European Council emphasizes the Group's finding 
that obstacles are mainly of a legal and administrative 
nature, and urges the Commission and the Member States 
to take appropriate measures to overcome these obstacles. 
The European Council calls upon the European Parliament 
and the Council to take the necessary decisions on the 
guidelines for transport and energy in the near future, in 
order to create a lasting framework for the Union's activity 
in this area. 
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List of priority transport and energy 
projects 
A. Transport projects 
Work begun or to begin by the end of 1996 
1. High-speed train/combined transport North-South I/A/D 
Nuremberg-Erfurt-Halle/Leipzig-Berlin 
Brenner axis: Verona-Munich 
2. High-speed train (Paris-)Brussels-Cologne-Amsterdam-London 
Belgium: French/Belgian border-Brussels-Liège-
Belgian/German border; 
Brussels-Belgian/Dutch border 
United Kingdom: London-Channel Tunnel access 
Netherlands: Belgian/Dutch border-Rotterdam-
Amsterdam 
Germany: (Aachen-) ' Cologne-Rhine/Main 
3. High-speed train South 
Madrid-Barcelona-Perpignan-Montpellier 
Madrid-Vitoria-Dax 
4. High-speed train East 
Paris-Metz-Strasbourg-Appenweier(-Karlsruhe) 
with junctions to Metz-Saarbrücken-Mannheim 
and Metz-Luxembourg 
5. Conventional rail/combined transport: Betuwe line 
Rotterdam-Dutch/German border(-Rhine/Ruhr) ' 
6. High-speed train/combined transport France-Italy 
Lyons-Turin 
Turin-Milan-Venice-Trieste 
7. Greek motorways: PATHE: 
Rion-Antirion, Patras-Athens-Thessaloniki-
Promahon (Greek/Bulgarian border) and 
Via Egnatia: 
Igoumenitsa-Thessaloniki-Alexandroupolis-
Ormenio (Greek/Bulgarian border-)Kipi 
(Greek/Turkish border) 
Β 
Β 
UK 
NL 
D 
E/F 
F/D 
F/D 
F/L 
NL/D 
F/I 
GR 
8. Motorway Lisbon-Valladolid P/E 
9. Conventional rail link Cork-Dublin-Belfast-Larne-Stranraer IRL/UK 
10. Malpensa airport (Milan) I 
1 Ongoing construction support already provided at Community level. 
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11. Fixed rail/road link between Denmark and Sweden DK/S 
(Øresund fixed link) including access routes for road, rail and air 
12. Nordic triangle (rail/road) FIN/S 
13. Ireland/United Kingdom/Benelux road link UKV(IRL) 
14. West coast main line UK 
B.  Energy projects 
(Projects on which work has already begun or may begin in the 
short term — up to 1997 — and which are to be completed in the 
medium term, up to 1999). 
Projects in the European Union 
1. Italy-Greece 
2. France-Italy 
3. France-Spain 
4. Spain-Portugal 
5. Denmark 
6. Greece 
7. Portugal 
8. Portugal-Spain 
Projects with neighbouring countries 
9. Algeria-Morocco-European Union 
10. Russia-Belarus-Poland-European 
Union 
electrical interconnection 
(submarine cable) 
electrical interconnection 
electrical interconnection 
electrical interconnections 
east-west electrical interconnection 
(submarine cable) 
natural gas network 
natural gas network 
gas interconnection 
gas delivery pipeline 
gas delivery pipeline 
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Main recommendations 
The Group of Personal Representatives of the Heads of State or Government invite the 
European Council to endorse the recommendations contained in the Group's report. These 
can be summarized as follows : 
The European Council is asked to : 
(a) endorse the priority nature of the projects in Annex 1, Part I, and Annex 2, list A, and 
invite: 
— the Council and the European Parliament, in setting up the guidelines identifying 
the projects of common interest, to include these priority projects; 
— the Member States and the Community to give all appropriate support to these 
projects and to implement them as soon as possible; 
(b) urge the European Parliament and the Council to adopt as soon as possible the 
guidelines and the accompanying financial Regulation; 
(c) take note of the potential relevance of a network approach in selected sectors of 
environmental protection, and invite the Commission, the Council and Member 
States to examine the possibility of establishing guidelines for environmental network 
infrastructure and the obstacles to environmental infrastructure, stressing the use of 
existing financial instruments in support of possible future guidelines and priority 
projects; 
(d) acknowledge that obstacles of an administrative, legal and regulatory nature are a 
major brake on the implementation of priority projects, and invite Member States and 
the Commission to take all appropriate initiatives needed to eliminate such obstacles; 
(e) confirm the objective of strengthening cooperation with neighbouring countries to 
connect the trans-European networks with networks outside the Union, in particular 
in Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean area; 
(f) confirm the objective of facilitating private/public partnerships, and invite Member 
States, the Commission, the EIB and the EIF to take appropriate measures to this 
effect; 
(g) confirm that measures will be taken — if proven necessary — in order that priority 
projects do not run into financial difficulty or other obstacles which would jeopardize 
their implementation; 
(h) acknowledge that the particular approach of the Christophersen Group, consisting in 
identifying and accelerating selected priority projects, gives added-value to the 
implementation of trans-European networks, and that this effort should be continued 
in the future, and consequently to endorse the follow-up procedure recommended by 
the Group, namely that : 
(i) The European Council should provide, on a continuing basis, the necessary 
impetus to the implementation of priority projects on the basis of an annual 
report to be submitted by the Commission to the European Council in accordance 
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with the White Paper action plan adopted by the European Council in December 
1993. 
(ii) If the achievement of individual priority projects is threatened, the Commission 
should report to the Council, which shall immediately consider appropriate 
responses together with, as appropriate, the Commission and the EIB. 
(iii) Member States and the Union should be asked to consider the creation of 
suitable vehicles ('project authorities'), open to public and private operators as 
appropriate, to ensure the promotion of priority projects; the Commission, the 
EIB and the EIF should support actively the coordination between parties 
potentially interested in priority projects, inter alia by project seminars arranged 
by the Commission; the Commission will examine how the abovementioned 
vehicles can be facilitated through Community legislation. 
(iv) The Commission and the EIB should, in consultation with Member States, 
monitor progress in the financing of individual priority projects, and if financial 
obstacles of a general nature and common to several priority projects occur, they 
will consider appropriate action. 
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EIB financing of trans-European networks 
The Council encourages the Bank to continue the work on which it is already well 
advanced in helping to finance the priority projects and, subject to its normal appraisal 
and lending criteria, to make an enhanced effort in the future. This effort should be 
undertaken in close association with the Member States and the promoters concerned, and 
should include the private sector in financing and risk-taking to the extent possible. 
To push this forward, the EIB is introducing a special window for the financing of 
infrastructure of Community interest, in particular the list of priority TEN projects. The 
purpose is to maintain or increase the momentum of EIB lending which was achieved 
under the Edinburgh facility. This will cover transport, telecommunications, and energy 
investment in the public sector, the private sector and partnerships between the two, as 
well as environmental lending for projects of a trans-European nature. The window will 
be available for lending not only within the Union but also in Central and Eastern Europe 
as well as in Scandinavia, the Mediterranean area and the transalpine crossings. 
The main features are, in appropriate circumstances : 
(a) where there is a sound financial case, the provision of longer maturities and longer 
capital grace periods so as better to match the debt repayment required to the 
cash-flow characteristics of the projects; 
(b) provision of refinancing facilities to the banks at the outset of a project so that they 
can be assured that their loans can be refinanced in accordance with their normal 
maturities; 
(c) involvement of the EIB in the earliest possible stages of the financial and contractual 
structuring of a project in cooperation with the Member States and the Commission 
so that the Bank's involvement and that of the EIF can facilitate the identification of 
suitable financial arrangements; 
(d) an extension of the Bank's normal eligibility rules to provide for the more systematic 
inclusion of transport, energy and telecommunications network infrastructure irres-
pective of whether it is located inside oroutside the assisted areas. 
The Bank will also keep its Board of Directors regularly informed on the progress which 
has been made and will report annually to its Board of Governors. 
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Report from the Council to the Essen 
European Council on a strategy 
to prepare for the accession 
of the associated CCEE (extract) 
Transport/TEN 
The integration of the associated countries into the trans-European networks is a key 
element in strengthening their economic and political ties to the Union. 
In light of this, the Group of Personal Representatives of the Heads of State or Government 
in the areas of transport and energy has addressed the question of the expansion of the 
TEN to neighbouring States, taking into account the relevant guidelines for the Union area 
and the priorities of the neighbouring States. Their recommendation to intensify 
coordination procedures is an important step toward establishing the trans-European 
networks beyond the Union. 
The group recommended further work on the following projects : 
— Berlin-Warsaw-Minsk-Moscow (rail and road) 
— Dresden-Prague (rail and road) 
— Nuremberg-Prague (road) 
— permanent connection over the Danube between Bulgaria and Romania (rail and road) 
— Helsinki-St Petersburg-Moscow (rail and road) 
— Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest-Lvov-Kiev (rail and road) 
— Russia-Belarus-Poland-EU (natural gas pipeline) 
— Baltic Sea telematic platform and Baltic ring electricity network. 
The Commission and the Member States will, in accordance with the conclusions of the 
Group, continue to examine intensively which corridors and projects shall be given 
priority and how they can be completed. For this the available financial instruments are to 
be used in the most efficient way possible. This applies to European Investment Bank 
loans, the PHARE programme and cross-border cooperation in connection with the 
Interreg II Community initiative. 
Particular attention should be given to the special TEN window announced by the EIB, 
which is also relevant for projects in the associated countries. Plans in the areas of 
transport, telecommunications and energy, as well as trans-European plans in the 
environmental area, would come under this facility. 
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